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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation examines how certain epidemic outbreaks become "global 
threats", that is, diseases that become the focus of international regulations and organized 
responses while others do not. To answer this question, this dissertation draws upon 
archival data collected at the World Health Organization (WHO) archives in Geneva, the 
Western Cape Archives in Cape Town, the British Library, British National Archives, the 
Wellcome Library Archives in London, and twelve qualitative interviews with senior 
global health actors in order to analyze five cases when disease threats were prioritized 
internationally as well as how these constructions patterned responses to outbreaks. I begin 
by exploring the formation of the first international disease controls in the 19th century, the 
International Sanitary Conventions, created to prevent the spread of three diseases- plague, 
cholera and yellow fever. I probe how these earliest conventions patterned responses to 
diseases covered under them and limited responses to those beyond their scope. Examining 
how these conventions transformed, I explore why the same disease priorities were 
maintained by the WHO in their International Sanitary Regulations of the 1950’s. Finally, 
I analyze the transformation of the International Health Regulations in 2005 and its effects 
on the assessment of disease threat. This dissertation shows that three factors structure the 
  
 
xi 
construction of disease threat: epidemic orientalism, economic concerns and field 
dynamics. Epidemic Orientalism, a discourse motivating the construction of disease threat 
that first emerged in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, positioned the colonized world as 
the space from which Europe and the Imperial powers needed to be protected. This 
orientalist gaze prioritizes the control of diseases emanating from colonial sites that 
threaten international trade and commerce and has been re-inscribed in all past and present 
regulations. These factors explain how and why plague, cholera and yellow fever came to 
be maintained as the primary diseases of international concern until the 21st century. As 
the WHO has recently been challenged in its authority to manage disease threats, these two 
factors are also mediated by the WHO’s manipulation of symbolic power within a new 
field of infectious disease management which conditions responses to outbreaks today. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  
 
Over the last twenty years the reemergence of infectious diseases as a major global 
health threat has become a great concern for health practitioners and a subject of academic 
inquiry for scholars. The emergence of epidemics of zika virus, ebola virus disease, yellow 
fever, influenza and a multiplicity of antibiotic resistant strains of more common diseases 
have prompted the question: When will the next great pandemic emerge and how will we 
fight it?  
In the last decade the World Health Organization (WHO) and its member nations 
have come under significant scrutiny over its management of epidemic emergencies like 
the West African ebola virus disease (EVD; ebola) outbreak of 2013-2016 and the more 
recent zika microcephaly and yellow fever outbreaks of the last several years (Chardell 
2016; Roberts 2015; World Health Organization 2015b) resulting in significant calls for 
reform and a transformation in how the international community assesses and responds to 
epidemic emergencies. The primary criticisms of the WHO have been that they acted too 
late in effectively appraising threat (in the case of ebola) (Chardell 2016; Kamradt-Scott 
2016; Médecins Sans Frontières International 2015; World Health Organization 2015a) or 
refused to take significant action when that threat was clearly evident (in the case of the 
West African Yellow Fever outbreak) (Lucey D and Gostin LO 2016).  
In condemning the weak response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, Médecins 
Sans Frontières exclaimed that the world, namely the WHO and its member nations, only 
took notice of the epidemic once the disease traveled overseas.  
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“The lack of international political will was no longer an option when the real-
isation [sic] dawned that Ebola could cross the ocean,” says Dr. Joanne Liu, MSF 
international president. “When Ebola became an international security threat, and 
no longer a humanitarian crisis affecting a handful of poor countries in West Africa, 
finally the world began to wake up.” (Médecins Sans Frontières International 
2015:11) 
Significant scholarship  has shown that international responses to epidemic outbreaks are 
increasingly conditioned by the security and health concerns of the most powerful member 
states within the WHO that align with the national security concerns or economic interests 
of those nations (Bingham and Hinchliffe 2008; Collier and Lakoff 2013; Fearnley 2008; 
Ingram 2010).  
However, these theories do not fully explain why certain epidemics trigger more 
aggressive responses than others. Since 20071, the World Health Organization has 
employed the term Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) to 
designate the highest level of disease threat. The designation of this term under the 
International Health Regulations of 2005 (IHR 2005) mandates the WHO and in some 
instances its member nations to commit to extraordinary measures to combat the health 
threat. Four outbreaks have received the designation PHEIC- the 2009 outbreak of H1N1 
Swine Flu; the resurgence of Polio in 2014; the West African Ebola outbreak of 2014-
2016; and the Zika Virus outbreak of 2016. Each of these diseases was determined to be a 
PHEIC by the Director General of the WHO after deliberation with an Emergency 
committee of experts. However, two diseases have come before the Director General and 
Emergency Committee that did not receive the designation PHEIC; Yellow Fever in 2016 
                                               
1 This was the year the IHR 2005 went into effect.  
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and MERS Coronavirus (MERS-CoV). While MERS-CoV has caused fewer deaths 
ultimately it has produced a higher mortality rate than zika virus and a higher rate of 
contagion than ebola. Yellow fever, a deadly disease carried by the same mosquito as zika 
virus has similarly killed far more people in the last several years than zika virus and has 
spread from central urban areas in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo to 
Beijing and other parts of China. Despite both diseases spreading across borders and having 
serious public health impacts thus meeting the criteria for an alert, the Emergency 
Committee denied the designation of PHEIC for these two diseases. 
The experience of responses to ebola, zika virus among others leaves policy 
makers, academics and infectious disease doctors with an enduring puzzle: Why and when 
do outbreaks of infectious disease trigger international responses and why do others receive 
little international attention?  
 The objective of this dissertation is to uncover the reasons why certain epidemics 
receive far greater international attention and focus from global health actors than other 
outbreaks. By embracing a comparative historical approach, I interrogate the historical 
geneses of present day understandings of epidemic outbreaks and the construction of 
disease risk. Existing explanations suggest the international focus on disease control and 
surveillance to be a novel phenomenon predicated on a post-cold war mindset. Far before 
the PHEIC designation structure existed, international regulations have prioritized the 
control of three particular diseases, plague, cholera and yellow fever. These, like present 
day epidemics may not have been the most aggressive or globally threatening, yet they 
were the primary focus of international control for over 100 years. What processes explain 
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why diseases like plague, cholera and ebola prompt overwhelming international responses 
to prevent their spread while others do not? What processes produce and define disease 
risk? For whom? How does the perception of disease risk affect responses at the sites of 
contagion? This dissertation engages these questions by examining the regulations through 
which infectious disease have been controlled internationally for the last century, asking 
how and why certain diseases become the focus of international regulations, monitoring 
and control where others have not?  
 I explore the factors that shape responses to epidemic outbreaks as a case of 
divergent social constructions of disease and disease threat. I explore five key cases when 
diseases were prioritized internationally as threats requiring international cooperation to 
prevent their spread. Each of these moments represent cases where the concept of global 
disease threat was defined or redefined through international consensus. My first case 
examines the development of the first international regulations for the prevention of 
epidemic spread in the 19th century- the International Sanitary Conventions. I explore the 
motivations driving the first signatories to these conventions to produce international 
standards to prevent the spread of three diseases- plague, cholera and yellow fever over 
other infectious threats. I then examine in my second case how these regulations produced 
divergent responses around the world to the presence of those three diseases relative to 
other deadly outbreaks of similar pathogens. My third case explores the transformation of 
the International Sanitary Conventions in the mid 20th century into the International 
Sanitary Regulations and ultimately the International Health Regulations under the 
authority of the WHO. I probe how the conventions changed under the authority of the 
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WHO and ask why the WHO maintained a focus primarily upon the three diseases 
previously assessed as threat. In my final two cases I examine how disease threats have 
been prioritized since the reform of the most recent International Health Regulations, the 
factors that produced the revision and how threats are conceived of under these new 
regulations. The final case, drawing from interview data collected from members of the 
WHO’s emergency committees examines how they assess the threat of epidemic outbreak 
and choose to determine a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.  
 I have selected these cases as they represent key moments when international 
disease control priorities were established on a global scale and when responses have been 
organized according to them. Since the late 19th century the International Sanitary 
Conventions, now the International Health Regulations, have existed as the only 
international regulations to prevent the spread of human-borne diseases. As such, they 
represent the organizing regulations to construct and assess disease risk on a global scale. 
Organizations such as the WHO are recognized for their leadership on medical issues, 
providing technical support, scientific knowledge, while also establishing norms and 
standards for the management of health around the world (Fidler and Gostin 2006; Gostin, 
Sridhar, and Hougendobler 2015; World Health Organization 2015b). Through an 
investigation of how these regulations come into being and assign threat, I am able to 
uncover the ideologies, concerns and motivations driving the establishment of global health 
orders.  
 
ARGUMENT  
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 Since the emergence of international cooperation to prevent the spread of disease, 
the threat of particular diseases has historically been interpolated as more threatening than 
others thereby prompting greater responses. These divergences cannot be explained fully 
by differing epidemiological profiles or biomedical explanations and are therefore 
produced by factors as of yet untheorized in both historical and sociological scholarship.  
 How and why certain diseases become global health concerns requiring 
international coordination to prevent can be explained by three primary factors: epidemic 
orientalism, economic concerns and field dynamics. The expansion of European empires 
across the world and the Atlantic in particular shifted the perception of disease threat within 
those empires from a concern for diseases already present within Europe to those that 
threatened to arrive from sites of colonial control. The arrival of diseases such as syphilis, 
yellow fever, cholera and plague to Europe galvanized fears of the permanent, perpetual 
disease threat of colonial spaces and the native peoples residing there, not only to European 
bodies but to colonial enterprise and trade. The emergent understanding of the disease risk 
emanating from colonial sites and colonized people fashioned an epidemic orientalism 
which relocated the position of Europe relative to its colonies as the perpetual possible 
victim of diseases emergent from its overseas dominions and the colonial subject as the 
permanent vector in which those diseases reside. This orientalist gaze positioned the 
colonized world as the space from which Europe and its Imperial powers, as well as its 
trade routes needed to be protected. As demands for a coordinated international sanitary 
system grew in Europe and the Middle East due to the threat diseases were posing to trade, 
the Imperial powers of the world organized International Sanitary Conferences which 
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consolidated a unified perspective of disease threat grounded in this epidemic orientalism 
primarily for the protection of European trading interests around the world. The 
formulation of the International Sanitary Conventions, the first international regulations to 
prevent the spread of diseases established a sanitary border between Europe and the rest of 
the world aimed at preventing the spread of plague, cholera and yellow fever from colonial 
dominions back to Europe at the expense of policing diseases emanating from Europe to 
the rest of the world. These International Sanitary Conventions organized the international 
disease controls of the world, focusing on plague, cholera and yellow fever from the late 
19th century until 1947 when the authority over the conventions passed to the World Health 
Organization. Operating under the same orientalist perspective, the WHO ultimately 
reproduced this perspective towards disease threat, prioritizing the control and limiting the 
spread of the same three diseases.  
 Since 1995 the space of international infectious disease management has shifted 
into a competitive field in which the WHO is actively challenged in its ability to assess 
disease threat. While epidemic orientalism and economic concerns still structure how 
threats are perceived to a large extent, epidemics threats are also assessed relative to the 
symbolic capital the WHO can mobilize to effect disease responses.  
 The effects of these regulations have been more than just discursive, producing 
novel technologies of disease surveillance, sanitary passporting and forms of racial 
segregation that would shape the 20th century and beyond. The practice of implementing 
the regulations define who is to be included in the sanitary order, who would be the subject 
of surveillance, which spaces required protection and which spaces required sanitary 
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domination in order to protect others. These divisions become visible in the routines of 
disease control and monitoring required under the regulations.  
 In this introduction I will provide a brief history of international disease control 
before exploring the scholarship and theoretical paradigms on this topic. I will then present 
my theoretical approach to this research as well as an explanation of the data I draw from 
and the methodologies I employ for my research.  
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE CONTROL 
An examination of the history of international responses to disease outbreak 
demonstrates how factors beyond purely epidemic threat have shaped the construction of 
disease historically. Since 1851 when the major European and Asian powers convened the 
first International Sanitary Conferences to establish protocols to limit the spread of plague, 
cholera and yellow fever to Europe, the prevention of transmission of epidemic infectious 
diseases across borders has been the subject of trans-national cooperation (Harrison 2013a; 
Howard-Jones 1975; Huber 2006a).  
Emerging as a concern both for public health within the imperial metropoles of 
Europe and the Ottoman Empire as well as a threat to global trade and economic interests, 
the practice of disease control proved a focal point for global surveillance as well as a site 
of political and economic contestation between nations resulting in many aggressive forms 
of social regulation and political control upon peoples around the world (Baldwin 2005; 
Curtin 1985; Harrison 2013a; van Heyningen 1989a; Huber 2006a; Swanson 1977). As 
medical knowledge developed in the nineteenth century and diseases were isolated and 
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their causes could be traced, the three particular diseases, plague cholera and yellow fever 
reflected in the eyes of these empires the greatest threats to their continued economic, 
political and biological security across the world. For one of the first times, medical 
knowledge was to be mobilized in the management of large populations to prevent the 
spread of disease. As such the International Sanitary Conventions endeavored to safeguard 
the means of international trade and traffic from the threats of disease, ensuring the 
continued operations of these empires. Medical discoveries, economic concerns and 
international rivalries converged to produce a unified vision for disease control and which 
diseases posed the greatest threat.  
 Until the establishment of the World Health Organization, the responsibility for the 
management of international disease threats was the domain of individual nation states or 
regional health bodies operating in adherence to international treaty (Litsios 1997; Packard 
2011; Palmer 2010; Siddiqi 1995). There was no separate global regulatory body or 
facilitator for disease management. Even after the creation of the WHO, the primary focus 
of international health regulations until 2005 was the three diseases (plague, cholera and 
yellow fever) outlined by the first International Sanitary Conventions of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century (Fidler and Gostin 2006; Regulations 1951).  
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Table 1: Diseases Prioritized by International Sanitary Regulations and International 
Health Regulations 
Regulations  Dates of 
Operation 
Governing 
Body 
Notifiable Diseases Agents 
responsible 
for Operation 
International 
Sanitary 
Conventions 
1859-1938 Coalition of 
European 
and North 
American 
Nations and 
Empires; 
Office 
International 
d'Hygiène 
Publique 
after 1926 
Plague 
(Bubonic/Pneumonic); 
Cholera; Yellow Fever 
Colonial 
representatives 
and Diplomats; 
Doctors and 
Medical 
experts; 
Colonial 
administrators 
who 
implemented 
policy 
International 
Sanitary 
Regulations 
1952-1969 World Health 
Organization  
Plague 
(Bubonic/Pneumonic); 
Cholera; Yellow Fever; 
Typhus; Relapsing 
Fever; Smallpox 
WHO Member 
States; WHO 
International 
Health 
Regulations 
1969-2005 World Health 
Organization  
Plague 
(Bubonic/Pneumonic); 
Cholera; Yellow Fever 
WHO Member 
States; WHO 
International 
Health 
Regulations 
(2005) 
2005-
present 
World Health 
Organization  
Notification based on 
contextually derived 
factors and severity of 
outbreak 
WHO Member 
States; WHO; 
Global Alert 
and Response 
network; 
Emergency 
Committee 
Members 
tasked with 
assessing threat 
of outbreaks 
Sources: (Howard-Jones 1975; Mayor et al. 1897; Regulations 1951; Smith 1894; 
Sternberg 1885; Stock 1945; World Health Organization 2008) 
 
The current IHR of 2005 has a broad mandate. The International Health Regulations 
of 2005 greatly expanded the domain of the prior regulations to any potential health threat 
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capable of travelling across international borders. It also established policies and standard 
practices by which to monitor and surveil all outbreaks of disease and assess the risk of 
disease spread. Through its acceptance, the 194 signatory nations acceded to maintaining 
an international minimum standard for disease control and surveillance (Fidler and Gostin 
2006; World Health Organization 2008) The WHO today has the responsibility for 
assessing the relative threats of disease to the global community and ultimately decides 
whether or not any outbreak constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern. Not only did the transition to the 2005 IHR usher in an organizational 
transformation in how international health threats are confronted on a global scale, but this 
transition signified an ontological shift in how international disease threats are constructed, 
diagnosed and managed. In pivoting from a focus on three diseases capable of international 
spread, the WHO and its member nations turned its attention to any emergent or reemerging 
disease capable of presenting an international threat to public health, trade and traffic 
(World Health Organization Dept of Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response and 
United States Agency for International Development 2006:10).  
  Epidemic infectious diseases are governed differently in the global sphere from all 
other health threats. The persistence of infectious diseases that can travel across borders 
presents a challenge to state sovereignty over health care. Since the passage of the 
International Health Regulations of 2005, the monitoring and responses to infectious 
disease operates in a domain of international cooperation and universal standards defined 
by the WHO and its member states. The IHR 2005, maintains the international legal 
significance of a treaty and requires; that all nations adhere to minimum standards for 
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disease prevention and surveillance, the mandatory notification to the WHO of all disease 
outbreaks that potentially threaten international spread, allows the WHO to investigate and 
declare public health emergencies of international concern, issue formal recommendations 
and permits the WHO to accept surveillance information from non-state sources (Hoffman 
2010:514). The IHR 2005 also permits the WHO to limit trade and transit in the interest of 
global health.  
 The IHR 2005 has put in place rigorous protocols to determine whether or not the 
standard of PHEIC has been met by an outbreak event (World Health Organization 
2010:2). The deliberative process of the WHO in assessing whether the risk of a disease 
outbreak constitutes an international threat, demonstrates that the process of determining 
risk is not solely based on scientific or medical knowledge or the type of disease, but is 
also contingent upon both the site of outbreak and its ability to spread (World Health 
Organization 2010). The standards needed to meet the conditions of a PHEIC are guided 
by particular considerations laid out by the WHO and its member nations and certain 
outbreaks either meet the threat level of a PHEIC or are responded to differently. These 
protocols are designed to be standardized and replicable to any circumstance and event that 
might prompt international threat.  
 However, as stated earlier many diseases appear to meet the threat level of a PHEIC 
by their own definition, yet do not receive the final designation. While variation exists 
between the diseases, it is clear that there is no one factor that serves as justification for the 
distinction of PHEIC. While the IHR 2005 is expressly designed to evaluate the 
epidemiological context of an outbreak as well as the pathologies of a disease in order to 
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determine threat, the contextual nature of these determinations highlights the importance 
of interpretation in assessing a PHEIC.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The phenomenon of epidemic outbreaks and the responses to them present a range 
of empirical puzzles for the fields of medical sociology, global and transnational sociology 
and the sociology of race and ethnicity. Outbreaks of acute, incurable infectious diseases 
have, throughout history provoked a recalibration of social behaviors, practices as well as 
religious and customary rituals that linger far beyond the moment of outbreak and the 
demise of the biological threat (Harrison 2004, 2013; Watts 1999). Such responses also 
often seek to justify the emplacement of extreme controls or oppression upon already 
marginalized groups at the site of contagion for the purpose of disease control (Brenner 
2010; Brody 1974; de Chalice 1579; Impey 1896; Swanson 1977; Watts 1999). The effects 
of epidemic outbreak are systemic and produce structures of control not only upon those 
diagnosed with the disease but those at risk of contagion. The story of the social 
construction of disease in relation to how disease understandings are employed in response 
to outbreak tell the stories of social control and dispossession, overwhelming sovereign 
power and colonial domination (Baldwin 2005; Harrison 1996, 2004; van Heyningen 
1989a; Swanson 1977; Watts 1999)- stories that are generally occluded from medical 
sociological engagement.  
An approach to studying epidemics therefore requires an attention both to the 
geopolitical dynamics which govern the assessment of disease risk and the responses to 
outbreak as well as the effects of such responses on those affected. Given how historical 
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moments of disease control shape the present, a dynamic theory of how responses have 
changed over time is also necessary. The study of the responses to epidemic threat and 
international outbreak is a tale not only of the production of scientific knowledge, power 
and global and transnational flows of information, it is also a story of the organizations and 
actors that define the scope of disease threat and organize responses to epidemics.  
I ground my analysis primarily in the exploration of the social construction of 
disease threat. In so doing this work responds and engages most significantly with the 
scholarship on social construction. However, examining these phenomena requires an 
exploration not only of the social constructivist processes through which scientific 
knowledge has been mobilized to assess outbreaks historically but also the larger, global 
forces and actors that have shaped the priorities of health responses since the mid 19th 
century; processes that continue to shape our responses today. In effect a theoretical 
paradigm that engages both the macro and micro mechanisms is required to explore this 
phenomenon in a historical context.  
Theories on the social construction of illness have exposed the significant power 
that the medical community has to shape social interactions (Conrad 1992; Zola 1972). In 
the words of Freidson- 
“The medical profession has first claim to jurisdiction over the label of illness and 
anything to which it may be attached, irrespective of its capacity to deal with it 
effectively.”(Freidson 1988). 
 
This autonomy of the medical field to make medical the conditions or behaviors considered 
abnormal or unhealthy to medical science captures particular forms and experiences of 
quotidian existence and prefigures the responses to them in distinctly biomedical terms 
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requiring expert physician or pharmaceutical intervention (Conrad and Barker 2010; 
Freidson 1988; Zola 1972). The management of human experience through the lens of 
medicine dictates how the social experience of illness and the effect of diagnosis alter the 
social states of those within it. The social constructionist argument asserts that there exists 
a break between disease as a biological experience, and illness as the social performance 
of disease and treatment (Conrad and Barker 2010). Freidson (1970) was one of the earliest 
researchers to recognize the social implications of the constructions of illness.  
“But when a physician diagnoses a human's condition as illness, he changes the 
man's behavior by diagnosis; a social state is added to a bio-physiological state by 
assigning the meaning of illness to disease. It is in this sense that the physicians 
create illness just as a lawmaker creates crime, and that illness is a kind of social 
deviance analytically and empirically distinct from mere disease.” (Freidson 
1970:223) 
 
Freidson describes the nature of illness not only as created at the site of diagnosis but also 
as similar to other symbolic claims to social order such as criminality and deviance. The 
meanings and claims of each disease vary, but as disease can be conceptualized as deviance 
from the normalized biological experience, illness is perceived as other to that normalized 
social experience, subversive of the existential project of the self and potentially harmful 
to those within society (Parsons 1951; Freidson 1970). This nexus of socio-biological 
considerations informs a unique articulation of the ill experience that is both socially 
constructed and biologically determined. Theories on social construction have 
demonstrated how the diagnosis of illness transforms the identities and experiences of the 
ill and how medical knowledge is situated within cultural and political frameworks that 
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transform the ill experience (Conrad and Barker 2010; Genberg et al. 2009; Parker and 
Aggleton 2003).  
 While an enduring and important theoretical claim, the theory of social construction 
is rooted in a distinction between disease, (a biomedical reality) and illness (the social 
meaning of the condition) (Conrad and Barker 2010:S67). Critics of social constructionism 
have challenged the presumption, implicit within this literature, that the biomedical reality 
of disease is free from social construction (Timmermans and Haas 2008). Scholarship on 
the sociology of knowledge has demonstrated how the bifurcations of scientific world and 
the social produces limited understandings of the role of social phenomena in the 
production of science (Jasanoff 2004; Latour and Woolgar 1986; Mitchell 2002). 
Scholarship in history, anthropology, and science and technology studies show how the 
production of scientific knowledge, linked and implicated within larger systems of power 
and networks of international actors, affects the nature of knowledge produced, as well as 
in whose name scientific authority can be leveraged. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, in 
their field defining work Laboratory Life demonstrated that in the formulation of scientific 
knowledge that can achieve consensus support within the larger scientific community, that 
knowledge must undergo a process through which it dislodges itself from the social 
constructions and historical contexts that were integral to its formulation (Latour and 
Woolgar 1986:106). The process of scientific knowledge production and its subsequent 
acceptance is contingent upon the very decoupling of that knowledge from the social 
environment of its conception. In turn an acceptance of the separation of the natural world 
(the domain of scientific thought) and the social (the domain of human social discourse) 
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omits the ways in which these domains are co-produced (Jasanoff 2004). Implicit within 
the production of scientific knowledge is the assumption that in creating verifiable 
knowledge, that knowledge has neither been socially constructed nor possesses its own 
history of construction (Latour and Woolgar 1986:106). The historical and social factors 
that inform the responses to disease outbreaks have fundamental implications for the nature 
of these events that provoke international responses. These have gone unaddressed in much 
research on health emergency and are occluded from much social construction literature. 
Visions of a natural reality as distinct from a socially constructed one omits the ways in 
which the power of scientific knowledge renders the social production of reality as univocal 
and objective. 
Alternate theories for why certain diseases may produce global responses while 
others do not explore in greater detail the power of organizations and national actors to 
shape the construction and application of medical knowledge. A theoretical frame that 
incorporates the issues of political structure into the analysis of major health events on a 
more granular level is the more recent work that links Biopolitics to particular disease 
dynamics (Bashford 2006; Decoteau 2013; Foucault 2010; Lemke, Casper, and Moore 
2011). Biopolitics, as a particular theoretical frame through which to encounter the 
conglomeration of the biological and the social attempts to locate power within the 
processes of social construction and the application of scientific knowledge. However, it 
remains limited for the most part by a state centric conception that takes the nation as the 
arbiter of biopower. Emergent from the Schmittian conception that the sovereign is defined 
as that which determines the state of exception–the conditions upon which life is 
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maintained and death is accepted or even enforced (Schmitt 2006), Foucault suggests the 
emergence of population based controls, especially with regards to public health and the 
delivery of medical services and vaccines reflect new technologies of power that condition 
the possibilities for life and death in forms different from those in earlier epochs (Foucault 
2010; Foucault et al. 2003). Biopolitics has been an especially effective framework for 
understanding how the experience of illness or disease is modulated through a variety of 
power dynamics, actors and institutions to produce particular forms of embodied 
experience (Bashford 2006; Decoteau 2013; Petryna 2004, 2013). However, much 
biopolitical scholarship focuses upon individual bodies and the management of those 
bodies as somatic selves rooted usually implicitly within a state-based container that is the 
arbiter of biopower. Employing the state as the primary arbiter of power ignores the larger 
international, global or imperial dynamics operating on the formation of biopower.  
 Scholarship on biosecurity presents a third frame through which to view these 
cases. Biosecurity theories would suggest that disease responses and the construction of 
threat are rooted in the concerns and security priorities of the most powerful nations of the 
world. This theoretical frame, while effective at exploring the larger dynamics of power at 
work in the management and assessment of disease risk explores such phenomena as rooted 
firmly in the present with little relationship to historical forms of disease control (Bingham 
and Hinchliffe 2008; Ingram 2010; Lakoff 2010; for exceptions see Brown and Bell 2008). 
This school of thought locates the dynamics of present day disease controls as rooted in 
the geopolitical transformations of the 21st century and linked to the war on terror. Loosely 
defined as any practice aimed at making life ‘safe’ and referring to any pathogenic threat 
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including infectious disease (Bingham, Enticott, and Hinchliffe 2008), the term reflects 
attempts to monitor, regulate or halt the movements of various forms of life in the interest 
of safety (Bingham et al. 2008:1528). Similarly defined by Braun, biosecurity is recognized 
as political responses to the unpredictability of molecular life (Bell et al. 2012; Braun 
2007). The emergence of both SARS and H1N1 in a period when communication 
technology can track disease globally in real time has brought a change in epidemic 
monitoring practices that have altered the responses to them (Bell et al. 2012; Ingram 
2010). But there are limitations to the power of biosecurity theories to explain the divergent 
responses to epidemics. The temporal focus of biosecurity ignores the antecedent moments 
where such concerns were raised throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century. As such, 
this perspective may be anachronistic. Despite exploring the role of empire in the 
production of disease threat (Bell, Brown, and Faire 2006a; Brown and Bell 2008) these 
analyses fall prey to the assumption that the practices and strategies of imperial disease 
control systems disappeared with decolonization or recognize earlier systems of disease 
controls as incidental to the present dynamics of biosecurity. Most biosecurity scholarship 
also sees this particular form of disease management as a totalizing entity and fails to 
consider the material difference between diseases that may prompt divergent responses. 
Instead the focus is mainly upon the sites from where security concerns emerge and when 
health, as a broad phenomenon, becomes a matter of security. Generally biosecurity 
research encounters the phenomenon of disease control after the threat has already become 
a focus of international attention, examining the nature of response while not asking why 
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such an outbreak may prompt such a response in the first place (Bell, Brown, and Faire 
2006b; S Ali and Keil 2008; Smith 2006) 
 
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 My theoretical approach seeks to reconcile the limitations of each of these three 
frameworks. I seek to explore the global and transnational construction of disease risk, 
examining the role of power in the formulation of medical knowledge and its application 
while also exploring the historical legacies that shape both contemporary and past disease 
responses and the perceptions of threat. My dissertation seeks to expand the explanatory 
power of each of these theoretical fields by engaging them in conversation with both 
Postcolonial thought and Bourdieusian field dynamics. Postcolonial theory and, most 
influentially Orientalism, as well as field theory, expose the imperial legacies at work in 
the shaping of global health regimes as well as the relational dynamics that structure the 
present-day practices of infectious disease control. Orientalism, while providing a theory 
of subject formation, provides a framework for understanding how dynamics of power 
beyond the world of medicine also shape the construction of ill subjects or those 
interpolated under the medical gaze expanding the potentialities of traditional social 
constructionism in medical sociology. This line of theorizing connects it to the central 
questions within studies on the social construction of illness. Postcolonial theory also 
provides a grounding for understanding the role of trade and capital in shaping the 
constructions of disease threat. 
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 Understanding the processes by which pandemics were treated in historical 
contexts is crucial to understanding present day formations of global health policy. In 
tracing a genealogy of global health, many are quick to note the focus on global health 
concerns in the era of globalization, in which increased trade, communication and travel, 
as well as the rise of transnational organizations and institutions like the World Health 
Organization (WHO) have generated a deeper understanding of global connectivity and 
vulnerability between persons on a planetary scale (Beck 2009; Borowy 2013; Calain 2007; 
Figuié 2013; Gislason 2013). The focus on recent pandemic threats, such as SARS and 
H1N1 (Chien 2013; Hoffman 2013; Porter 2013), as well as emergent health risks from 
environmental factors such as climate change, reflect rising trends in global awareness 
consistent with the analytic frame of globalization research (Brenner 1999). Both Stuart 
Hall (1991, 2005) and Warwick Anderson (2000, 2006, 2014) have argued that the rise of 
global research framed through globalization as a temporally distinct set of phenomena 
occurring over the last seventy years occludes established postcolonial genealogies and 
perspectives on globalized discourses.  
The Durability of Empire 
I employ postcolonial theory2 to explain how disease controls and ideologies rooted 
in imperial traditions, affect and orient our present. Postcolonial scholarship has for some 
                                               
2 Readers familiar with postcolonial thought may feel I am painting a large and diverse 
body of literatures with a very broad brush. I use the term “postcolonial theory” to 
describe any theories that locate empire and histories of colonialism as important actors 
in the creation of modernity. While this perspective may be taken as given or even as an 
accepted assumption in areas of the humanities, anthropology and area studies such as 
Black and Africana studies, the limited purchase of this perspective in the discipline of 
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time demonstrated how the enduring power of ideas and governance rooted in the 
management of empire affect social hierarchies and racial categories (Essed and Goldberg 
2001; Gilroy 1995; Hall 2000), state formation, the production of rights (Goldberg 2004, 
2001) as well as the roots of liberal democracy and the civil sphere today (Hammer 
Forthcoming; Tinsley 2018). In confronting the occlusion of empire from contemporary 
causal analyses I draw mainly on the postcolonial canon to engage how imperial forms 
structure social relations, and how these relations rooted in imperial dynamics of rule 
explain the problems of our present. Postcolonial thought, while manifold and diffuse 
within scholarship in the humanities and anthropology (as well as within area studies has 
a relatively short history in sociology and has been generally limited despite notable calls 
for its greater inclusion into the discipline (Bhambra 2011; Bhambra, Shilliam, and Orrells 
2014; Go 2013, 2009, Magubane 2003, 2005). This is not to say that I wish to view 
postcolonial theory as monolithic. Rather, in its exploration of imperial forms, rule and 
practice, postcolonial scholarship represents an ontologically and epistemologically 
divergent perspective which locates the role of empires as a structuring and important force 
in world history whose effects persist and are reproduced today. In embracing a 
postcolonial approach, I also embrace an ethnomethodology that sees a historical 
understanding of empire as critical to analyzing the present.  
While distinctions between ‘postcolonial’ and ‘anti-colonial’ scholarship and 
arguments about the relative merits of such titles abound in academic circles more attuned 
                                               
Sociology suggests that any critical analysis of colonialism and its role in the modern day 
may, for the time being be considered Postcolonial.  
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to these questions (Bhabha 2004; Gilroy 1995; Glissant 1997; Hall 2000; Mbembé 2001; 
Naipaul 1981; Spivak 1996; Walcott 1993)3, I consider postcolonial thought to be a 
theoretical orientation that locates empire and colonialism as an object of critical inquiry 
representing a response to the effects and practices of empire broadly. Postcolonial 
scholarship has demonstrated that systems of thought produced in the European 
Enlightenment reliant upon a positivism and metrocentrism (Eze 1997; Go 2014a; Sala-
Molins 2006) that assumed the social mechanics that governed European spaces to be 
universal. Much postcolonial thought has demonstrated how these systems of thought are 
responsible for constructing racial distinctions as well as modes of governance expressly 
devoted to the management of populations outside of Europe (Césaire 2000a; Lindqvist 
1996). Sociology, arising as a field of study from an emergent interest in the workings of 
industrial metropoles has generally occluded how this scholarly tradition is implicated in 
the practices of empire and has failed to engage how the dynamics of empire, rooted in the 
maintenance of domestic power through the capture and exploitation of foreign dominions 
                                               
3 For critical analyses by scholars and writers on the cultural effects of colonialism see 
debates between V.S. Naipaul, Derek Walcott and Eduard Glissant. For critiques of the 
emancipatory power of postcolonial scholarship see Spivak (1988) and (Erksog 2014). 
Critiques of this nature generally examine the limits of postcolonial thought to decolonize 
forms of thought and inquiry that are implicitly tied to intellectual conventions rooted in a 
colonial epistemology. Engagements with this exact question have produced entire 
schools of thought including Subaltern Studies (Chakrabarty 2007; Chatterjee 1993; 
Guha and Spivak 1988; Spivak 1988), Creolization theory (Benitez-Rojo 1997; Cohen 
and Toninato 2009; Drabinski 2013; Glissant 1997; Hall 2009; Palmé 2009). These are 
just two examples of the many debates within what most would consider a very 
established field.  
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has structured and continues to structure global social phenomena (Achebe 2016; Brenner 
1999; Go 2008, 2016; Hall 2000).  
Epidemic Orientalism 
Most significantly, I draw upon Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism to explain 
why certain diseases are prioritized as threats over others. Orientalism is the discourse that 
motivated and mobilized the practices by which the world colonized by European empires, 
could be managed, dominated and understood-creating the idea of the Orient in opposition 
to the Occident-the site of European civilization. 
“Therefore as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a 
tradition of thought, imagery. and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence 
in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent 
reflect each other.” (Said 1979:5) 
 
 Orientalism, in short is ‘the Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having 
authority over the Orient’ rooted in the practice of claiming an understanding and thereby 
the authority to control it (Said 1979:3). Orientalism represents foremost a colonizing 
worldview rooted in a perspective of Western superiority that allows for distinctions and 
divisions to be drawn and claimed between the Occident and Oriental cultures, peoples and 
spaces. It is through the process of creating the Orient as an ontologically distinct alter-
space, separate from the West, that orientalism establishes its power over colonial space. 
By claiming the power to name, define and construct a vision of the Orient that the 
Orientalist can define its spaces and peoples for the purposes of colonialism. Said argues 
that without an understanding of the discourse of orientalism it is impossible to 
comprehend the systems of domination through which colonialism operates. Locating the 
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theoretical roots of Orientalism in Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, Said recognizes the 
relationship between the Orient and Occident, the colony and colonizer as a relationship of 
power and of domination (Said 1979:7), and operates as a mode of ‘holding down’ the 
Oriental world, rendering it legible only through the discourse itself. It is this orientalism 
that enables the practices of domination and control connected with empire and thereby 
structures all relationships between the Orient and Occident.  
 Embracing this theory, I propose the concept of epidemic orientalism to describe 
that discourse and viewpoint, rooted in Europe’s first engagements with the rest of the 
world as colonizer, through which Europe recognized itself in relation to its colonies and 
the disease threats they posed. This epidemic orientalism takes as its root the ontological 
separation between colonized and colonizer, which obliterates any subjectivity of the 
colonized beyond their relation to the colonizer (Said 1979:27). The colonized is in 
extension defined for, and only for the legibility of the colonizer. Epidemic orientalism 
emerged out of the encounters between Europeans and non-Europeans in colonial zones in 
the 17th, 18th and 19th century. As diseases encountered by Europeans for the first time 
began to spread in new colonies and return to Europe, the continent began to relocate its 
understanding of itself relative to the rest of the world and the disease threats within it, 
repositioning the colonial world as a locus of disease threat from which the colonizer and 
empire needed to be protected. This orientalist gaze structures and prioritizes the concern 
for diseases emanating from colonial and post-colonial sites, rendering them more 
threatening than those diseases that diffuse around the world in the opposite direction.  
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Orientalism is effective for understanding the construction of disease threat for 
several reasons. Orientalism demonstrates how ideas operating at the level of discourse 
produce and reproduce material effects through the employment of this discourse in the 
practices of governance, control, the application of scientific knowledge and oppression. 
Orientalism as it operates at a discursive level, patterning all levels of interaction between 
colonized and colonizer resolves the bifurcation between science and the natural world as 
it assumes these constructions to be subsumed within the larger discursive frame. As such, 
epidemic orientalism is always already structuring the activities and application of medical 
knowledge as the discourse, emergent in the 17th century largely preceded the formulation 
of that scientific knowledge with which it is served. It is the common-sense logic that 
structures how diseases are perceived relative to the concerns of the dominant group. 
Orientalism also explains how all disease concerns come to be seen through the interests 
of empire, namely trade and travel. Epidemic orientalism as a theoretical intervention 
questions the causal direction of traditional social constructivist explanations. Social 
construction of illness suggests the shift in the illness experience occurs at the site of 
diagnosis, producing a new ill subject position. Shifting the subject formation from the 
liminal space of the doctor’s office to the level of discourse interrogates how social 
constructions of disease are produced separate from the point of diagnosis, in the co-
production of scientific knowledge and wider concerns of those who produce scientific 
knowledge and apply it. Further, epidemic orientalism explains how pre-existing racial and 
ethnic subject positions may structure the dynamics of illness construction prior to 
diagnosis and affects the perception of disease threat. Orientalism as a theoretical frame 
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also demonstrates how scientific knowledge of disease, rather than hermetically sealed 
from the social world, is deeply implicated in histories and discourses of racism and 
colonialism.  
As I show in this dissertation, epidemic orientalism is the mode through which 
disease threat is understood, appraised and in turn this discourse structures the nature of 
disease responses. Secondly, as orientalism exists and is reproduced discursively as well 
as through material practices, the enduring power of its vision does not disappear with the 
end of empire. Said explores how orientalism maintains as a dominant world view even in 
the absence of empire. For this reason, it provides a very useful theoretical frame for 
considering how imperial perceptions endure beyond formal empire. Finally, orientalism, 
in demonstrating how discourse can affect the formation of individual subjects brings an 
understanding of the dynamics of power and ideology at work within the social 
constructions of illness. Epidemic orientalism as I will show determines who is and who 
cannot be recognized as a disease threat and the victim of disease, and how responses differ 
as a result, as well as how various spaces are read and interpolated into various regimes of 
disease control.  
Theorizing Capital Through Postcolonial Thought 
 A central causal explanation of this dissertation is that the threat of diseases to 
colonial trade and later to global trade in general has been critical to constructing the threat 
of certain diseases as more serious than others and prioritizing international responses to 
them. In linking world systems assumptions on the role of global trade in structuring social 
phenomena and postcolonial theory I aim to read the causal forces of trade and epidemic 
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orientalism with one another as, in many ways, linked. Traditional theories of the World 
System would suggest that global capitalism structures relations between spaces across the 
world through relationships of exploitation and dependency (Frank 1990, 1979, 
Wallerstein 1974, 2011). A central and enduring contribution of world systems theorists is 
the historically and globally rooted analysis of global capital. World systems theory shifts 
the traditional Marxist unit of analysis from the nation to global flows of capital to explain 
processes of capital accumulation and social phenomena around the globe structured by 
capitalism. While world systems theory rightfully interrogates the global flows of modern 
capitalism and explores the imperial roots of present day capitalist exploitation, it fails to 
consider the salient roles of race, gender and a host of other subject positions in the 
structuring and motivations of global capitalism. It also fails to examine how racial 
hierarchies were formed out of the necessities of colonial capitalist expansion. Critiques 
located in postcolonial theory and black Marxist traditions demonstrate the central role that 
the formations of racial orders and hierarchies play in the formulations of labor systems 
under capitalism (Gilroy 1995; James 1989; Robinson 2000). These legacies are largely 
occluded in world systems historiographies and theoretical explanations. While 
encountering exploitation as a necessary mode of capitalism, examining the role of trade 
and political economy without an engagement with how orientalist discourse or racial 
orders constitute global capitalism fails to encounter the racist dynamics at work in 
structuring our modern economic systems. Therefore, while suggesting that both concerns 
for trade and epidemic orientalism are causal factors in the construction of disease threat 
and structure responses to outbreaks, they are not mutually exclusive. They in fact 
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constitute each-other and the force of their explanatory power is connected. Postcolonial 
histories have shown how capital accumulation is a deeply rooted requirement of the 
colonial project and necessary for the continued existence of empire (Dubois 2004; 
Linebaugh 2013; Robinson 2000; Todorov 1996). Integral to the colonial project was also 
the formulation of racial difference, hierarchies, subjugation, enslavement and oppression 
of colonized subjects (Biko 2002; Césaire 2000a; Fanon 2004, 2008; Mbembe 2017). 
Though trade concerns were and are integral to the perception of disease threat, these 
concerns cannot be extracted from the racial and orientalist discourses in which they 
themselves operate. In situating this research within this particular postcolonial 
epistemology I am able to show the connections between epidemic orientalism, racist 
motivations and economic concerns, not as purely distinct but co-constructed by one 
another.  
Bourdieu And Imperial Durabilities 
In exploring how the dynamics of the imperial regime produced and structure 
present day disease controls I employ a Bourdieusian Field Framework. While epidemic 
orientalism explains the discourse through which epidemic risk is framed and disease 
threats are prioritized, it cannot explain fully the divergence in responses to global 
outbreaks in the present. In chapter 5 I discuss in greater detail how and why a Bourdieusian 
field emerged in the late 20th century and why field dynamics, as well as epidemic 
orientalism and trade concerns explain how disease threats are constructed in the present 
day. Prior to the 1990’s the authority for global disease control existed largely uncontested. 
During the 19th and early 20th century, various imperial actors acceded to the regulations 
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in the International Sanitary Conventions and managed their colonies accordingly. 
Similarly, for much of the latter half of the 20th century the WHO operated as the 
uncontested arbiter of disease control. In the early 1990’s as new diseases emerged from 
the southern hemisphere, the capacity for the WHO to manage global disease threats was 
challenged by new actors. This space of competition emerged as a nascent field of 
International Infectious Disease Management. As a result, in the contemporary moment, 
the anxieties and priorities of disease control, still motivated by the discourse of epidemic 
orientalism are mediated by the symbolic power and capitals of this new field.  
A field, in Bourdieu’s conception is a ‘social space of relations’ marked by 
competition between actors over a variety of resources (Bourdieu 1993; Go and Krause 
2016). They are not static entities but are rather defined by the relations between actors, 
the hierarchies between them and united by a shared acceptance of the illusio- the 
recognition of the stakes and rules of the game (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:117). The 
illusio defines which capitals are of value for accumulation within the field and through 
the acquisition of which will boost their position in the field relative to others. In certain 
fields this may be cultural capital, or economic or juridical capital or it may be a 
multiplicity of capitals. As such capitals are often field specific. The rules of the game are 
usually set by the dominant actors who, through the accumulation of capitals and their 
ability to employ them, legitimize their nomos- their symbolic power and the capitals they 
employ (Decoteau 2008:56, 2013). Symbolic power is ‘the power which can be exercised 
only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or 
they themselves exercise it’ (Bourdieu, Thompson, and Raymond 2003:164). Symbolic 
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power in effect is the power to construct a vision of reality as common sense, unchallenged 
and accepted. When the symbolic power and rules of the game are universally accepted 
within a field it is a doxic one, which operates unchallenged by the actors within the field. 
Dominant figures within fields strive to maintain this doxic order if they themselves sit 
atop the hierarchy of the field.  
Fields provide a nuanced way of exploring the relations between actors over 
struggles for power between one another. While usually employed in a nation-state context 
to explore fields operating under state sovereignty, recent developments in field theory 
have explored the international dimensions and possibilities of field theory (Barman 2013; 
Go 2011; Go and Krause 2016; Krause 2014). However, limitations remain. While field 
theory has become much more common-place within contemporary sociological 
theorizing, understandings of how fields emerge are far less developed (Dromi 2016a, 
2016b). In chapters 5 and 6 I explore the emergence and map the operation of this current 
field of disease control. In these chapters I also seek to expand upon and challenge aspects 
of Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power and the ways in which it operates beyond the 
nation state. Through an exploration of the colonial roots of global disease management 
that has produced its dominant discourse and an exploration of the development of the field 
of disease control I am able to chart the modes through which disease management has 
changed, priorities have shifted and how threat has been globally managed over the last 
150 years, showing how the logics of empires still operate and persist in the present.  
DATA AND METHODS 
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 Data for the four historical chapters were gathered from archival sources spanning 
roughly 200 years and five different physical archives as well as digital collections from 
the Library of Congress and the WHO Institutional Repository for Information Sharing 
(IRIS). Archival data for the first two chapters which explore strategies of disease control 
prior to the emergence of the WHO were drawn primarily from the British National 
Archives at Kew, The British Library, and The Wellcome Library in London as well as the 
Western Cape Archives in Cape Town. Supplemental primary material on the drafting and 
operating of the International Sanitary Conventions was also drawn from online journal 
archives of the Lancet and other medical journals operating during the period. These data 
drawn from these archives consist of the physical drafts of International Sanitary 
Conventions minutes from the drafting conferences. Official memos and reports, colonial 
communications and correspondence between colonial officers across the British Empire, 
namely British India, and the Cape Colonies provided insight into the ways in which the 
operation of the International Sanitary Conventions affected and produced novel systems 
of relations between British colonial forces and the peoples under their authority. Chapter 
six draws from both interview data collected from members of contemporary Emergency 
Committees tasked with assessing the threat of infectious diseases and advising on the 
declaration of PHEIC’s4.  
In exploring these data, I focused in particular upon the ways in which expert 
scientific knowledge was mobilized, often in support of the interests of certain actors or 
                                               
4 A more detailed examination of my interview method can be found in chapter 6 of this 
dissertation 
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powers to justify the inclusion or exclusion of particular forms of disease control. My 
analysis is also rooted in comparison. Through an examination of why certain diseases are 
or became the focus of international regulation I am able to uncover how certain diseases 
threaten structures of global power, capital flows or expose racist anxieties at various 
moments. In doing so I demonstrate that disease threat and international responses to 
outbreaks are conditional upon an epidemics’ potential to disturb economic and political 
dynamics. 
 The reason for a historical approach is also methodologically informed and 
evidence based. In interviews with members of the WHO Emergency Committees it 
became clear that in the management of the responses of their member nations to the 
PHEIC designation the logics and responses of earlier systems of disease control were still 
evident. These committee members regularly confronted resistance to, or actively 
maintained the practices and perspectives embedded in earlier sanitary regulations. In 
effect, the past often rises to meet the present.  
 
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The organization of this dissertation is chronological demonstrating the rise of 
sanitary orders to combat infectious disease spread across borders to the present. This 
dissertation traces the history of international coordinated responses to epidemic outbreaks, 
analyzing the development of regulations and their application uncovering the political and 
symbolic struggles over the definitions and categories of epidemic disease threat. 
Exploring the system of international epidemic control as a system, mobilized in large part 
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by the creation of the first International Sanitary Conventions, this work examines how the 
production of regulations and their implementation have affected and altered responses to 
epidemic outbreaks and fashioned drastically different experiences for those at the focus 
of the regulations.  
 The first empirical chapter (chapter 2) asks why did infectious disease emerge as a 
focus for international cooperation and how did this novel set of regulations operate? I 
chart the process through which the first systems for internationally regulated infectious 
disease control were formed. In examining the factors that led to the first International 
Sanitary Conferences to the instantiations of the major Conventions in the 1880’s through 
early 20th century I suggest a new epidemic orientalism emerged that would structure how 
disease threat is perceived. The major world powers of the nineteenth century constructed 
a Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus, a structure for disease control made up of sovereign 
nations, Imperial States and their colonial dominions that operated to replicate existing 
relations of trade for the purposes of capital accumulation in Europe and proliferated a 
certain discourse that allowed for those relations to maintain themselves in light of a 
pandemic threat. This Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus, buoyed by an orientalist 
perspective that positioned the effective and safe maintenance of trade to Europe as critical, 
facilitated the effective continuance of world trade from colony to metropole and within 
Europe. This apparatus, facilitated by consensus both on scientific understandings of 
disease and on standardized modes of sanitary control through the International Sanitary 
Conventions, established a global disease management system for policing the spread of 
three diseases around the world. Central to its operation was the export of traditional forms 
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of sanitary controls away from European ports to colonial points of departure, prompting 
massive disease and sanitary monitoring systems in colonial spaces. While the actors at the 
WHO tasked with revising the conventions would later suggest that these International 
Sanitary Conventions primarily provided a standardized model for defending unaffected 
ports from the spread of disease, this chapter shows how these regulations proliferated 
specific responses to the diseases covered in the conventions. These colonial systems of 
disease control in turn reproduced and exacerbated existing orientalist anxieties around 
race and facilitated novel, repressive forms of population management to prevent economic 
isolation from Europe.  
 Chapter 3 asks how did these first conventions produce divergent responses to 
diseases covered by the international sanitary conventions relative to other infectious 
epidemics? This chapter explores two simultaneous epidemics that, despite similar 
pathologies, prompted significantly varying responses from public health actors in 1901 
Cape Town: the bubonic plague and smallpox. The Cape Colony responded to the plague 
with racialized quarantining, forcibly removing all black Africans from certain poor 
neighborhoods and transferring them to a camp on the outskirts of the city. It was the most 
significant segregationist act in Cape Town’s history to date and foreshadowed the actions 
of governments in post-unification and Apartheid South Africa. Conversely, smallpox, 
though highly contagious and deadly, did not prompt similar aggression. This differential 
treatment was the result of a global medical concern for the spread of plague to Europe that 
imposed external demands upon any region affected by plague that were nonexistent for 
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smallpox. These demands aligned with local ideologies that equated state control with 
racial discipline to produce the first urban township in South Africa.  
Chapter 4 examines how the International Sanitary Conventions transformed under 
the control of the World Health Organization in the mid 20th century and how this affected 
the management and control of epidemic threat. I argue that in the transformation of the 
International Sanitary Conventions to the International Sanitary Regulations, the WHO 
attempted to implement a global vision for the organization of the natural world to facilitate 
the sanitized transmission of goods and bodies across space. Maintaining the mission of 
the International Sanitary Conventions to provide maximum protection for public health 
with minimum restrictions to travel and trade, the International Sanitary Regulations re-
invigorated the epidemic orientalist gaze, and consolidated its power. The additions to the 
International Sanitary Conventions in the updated regulations were novel. Rather than 
operating as multi-lateral agreements between nations and imperial actors as the sanitary 
conventions did prior, the member nations of the World Health Assembly formed a 
covenant between themselves and the WHO directly. Thus, the WHO became the arbiter 
of the regulations and the disseminating agent of disease surveillance knowledge. 
Chapter 5 examines the most recent process of revision of the International Health 
Regulations. Prior to 1995, the IHR’s had largely remained unchanged since the birth of 
the WHO and focused primarily on the policing of three diseases- plague, yellow fever and 
cholera. The revisions of the IHR beginning in 1995 and ending with the formation of the 
2005 IHR transformed global responses to infectious disease outbreak drastically. In 
shifting from a focus on three diseases capable of international spread, the WHO and its 
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member nations turned its attention to any emergent or reemerging disease capable of 
presenting an international threat to public health, trade and traffic thus producing massive 
demand for disease surveillance and control. I argue that significant challenges to the 
authority of the WHO and the emergence of new global health actors in the early 1990’s 
provoked a need within the WHO to reestablish its dominance in the emergent field of 
global disease control. Drawing on archival evidence from the WHO archives I show that 
the rise of global disease surveillance systems, challenges to the WHO’s airport insect 
controls and an outbreak of Ebola in then Zaire greatly conditioned the move towards 
reform and influenced the nature of policies developed in the most recent iteration of the 
IHR that determine how disease risk is constructed and responses conceived. In claiming 
dominance in this emergent field, the WHO re-established the orientalist vision and the 
role of disease surveillance as doxic to the field, maintaining a constant medical gaze upon 
those same spaces and peoples that were the focus of disease controls under the regulations.  
Finally, Chapter 6 asks how are disease threats assessed in the present day under 
the regulations? The chapter explores how the risk of epidemic outbreak is determined and 
which threats trigger international responses through an analysis of the determination 
process of the World Health Organization’s highest disease threat level –Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern. The designation mandates that the WHO and its 
member nations commit resources and impose extraordinary measures to combat a threat. 
Through interviews with health experts involved in the PHEIC assessment process, this 
chapter explains why certain diseases receive more attention from global health actors. 
Extending Bourdieu’s concept of Symbolic Power beyond the nation-state frame, I show 
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how those responsible for PHEIC designations manage the symbolic power of the 
classification to produce desired outcomes for the WHO, demonstrating that the 
mechanisms by which symbolic power is mobilized beyond state contexts rely on 
conscious negotiated processes by those holding symbolic capital to manage the larger 
field.  
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CHAPTER II: DISEASE THROUGH IMPERIAL EYES5 
 
While researching the long-term impact of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD; Ebola) on 
quotidian social interactions in Liberia, I was struck by the dynamics of disease control at 
Monrovia’s Roberts International Airport. It had been two months since the World Health 
Organization (WHO) had declared the outbreak over in Liberia though the Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), the highest threat designation an outbreak 
can achieve, was still in place. While the threat of Ebola had subsided in the eyes of the 
people that I had interviewed in the city, the experience of biomedical control and 
surveillance at national borders while travelling to and from Liberia reflected a totalizing 
anxiety over the spread of the disease. The urgency surrounding the pathogen could not 
have been more prevalent.  
Roberts International Airport is situated in an area near the Firestone Rubber 
Plantation and the terminal is a small, single story building with one gate. At the time only 
four commercial flights arrived and departed per day. Upon disembarking the aircraft, we 
passengers were lined up on the tarmac and required to rinse our hands with chlorinated 
water from a tank emblazoned with "EBOLA IS REAL" on it in red tape. After this, we 
                                               
5 Elements of Chapter 2 have been published in previously published as  
White, Alexandre I. R. “Global Risks, Divergent Pandemics: Contrasting Responses to 
Bubonic Plague and Smallpox in 1901 Cape Town.” Social Science History, November 
2017, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2017.41. ã Social Science History Association, 
2017. The link to this article can be found below.  
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-science-history/article/global-risks-divergent-
pandemics-contrasting-responses-to-bubonic-plague-and-smallpox-in-1901-cape-
town/20F3E49CF8B45CF26C5B3F30E4BB57BB 
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processed in single file to the entrance of the terminal where the airport staff took each of 
our temperatures with an infrared thermometer. Once we cleared customs our temperatures 
were taken again and we were screened passively by a thermal imaging camera connected 
to a large television monitor prior to collecting luggage in the terminal.  
Upon leaving Monrovia, the process of screening was even more significant. 
Arriving at the airport and still outside I, along with all my fellow travelers, was required 
to fill out a detailed questionnaire with 12 questions regarding personal health, whether I 
had suffered a fever in the last 21 days, if that fever was higher than 100 degrees Fahrenheit, 
whether or not I had been in contact with any Ebola victims or interacted in any way with 
infected materials. I was then funneled over to a plastic drum filled with chlorinated water 
to clean my hands and have my temperature taken for the first time. As I did not have a 
fever I was allowed to pass through a very short corridor between the outside and the 
terminal delineated by a corrugated tin wall. At the end of this corridor was a thermal 
imaging camera attached to a large flat screen TV. My heat signature emitted a white glow 
against an all-black background. If a fever is present, more vibrant colors appear in the 
image. At the end of this corridor I turned in my questionnaire and my temperature was 
taken again with an infrared thermometer. A medical officer wrote the temperature of the 
scan on a little white sticker and put it on the back of my passport. 
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Figure 1. Photo of My Passport showing sticker reflecting my internal temperature 
of 36.3 degrees Celsius and World Health Organization approved vaccination 
certificate 
 
 I then proceeded through the normal routines of check-in. At security there was a 
second thermal imaging camera/TV apparatus. A final temperature scan awaited me at the 
boarding gate. In an airport that lacked the capacity to print boarding passes, and logged 
seating plans by drawing the layout of the plane on a piece of lined paper and divvying up 
assigned seats, the technological infrastructure for health security was immense: 4 thermal 
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imaging cameras (that were visible), roughly 24 thermometers between arrivals and 
departure areas and a staff of about 10 handling these procedures, as well as the paperwork 
from the health cards. Upon arrival in Casablanca en route to London, all passengers on 
my flight were screened by infrared thermometer once more before being allowed to enter 
the departure lounge.  
*** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
While this experience of biomedical surveillance may be familiar to those who 
followed news reporting on the West Africa Ebola outbreak and extraordinary to those who 
have never traveled to sites of major epidemics, these practices of control, though 
technologically advanced, would be quite recognizable to travelers on Hajj one hundred 
years ago, or to black Africans in the Cape Colonies in 1901 or to Indians under British 
rule in the late 19th century.  
Much scholarship attests to the novelty of global flows of communication and 
coordination in infectious disease management (Bingham and Hinchliffe 2008; Fearnley 
2008; Ingram 2005; Lakoff and Collier 2008) suggesting that the present day management 
of epidemic outbreaks is rooted in the linkage between globalization and the war on terror. 
However, the International Health Regulations of the present are grounded in the 
International Sanitary Conventions of the late 19th and early 20th century. This chapter 
traces the emergence of these first international disease controls. While later chapters will 
chart the evolution of the International Sanitary Conventions into our present day 
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International Health Regulations, this chapter examines the justifications for and 
production of the first International Sanitary Conventions in the mid and late 19th century.  
 The guiding puzzle of this chapter is why, given significant competition between 
European empires and the Ottoman empire in the 19th century, did these major world 
powers choose to band together to produce a binding set of international conventions for 
the prevention of the spread of disease. Further, why, amongst a constellation of significant 
disease threats in Europe did these conventions solely prioritize the control and 
management of plague, cholera and yellow fever? These regulations represent some of the 
earliest internationally ratified standards. The first International Sanitary Conferences to 
discuss the creation of internationally accepted conventions for disease control predated 
the creation of the International Bureau for Weights and Measures by almost 25 years and 
the first International Sanitary Conventions were ratified less than ten years after the 
establishment of global time zones at the Prime Meridian Conference in 1884 (Ogle 
2015:14). Shortly after the world had organized time zones, standards and regulations were 
set to control and prevent diseases from crossing borders. 
  A purely political economic answer would suggest that perhaps these three 
diseases represented the greatest threats to international trade thus interrupting capital 
flows across the world (Frank 1990; Wallerstein 2011).The mandate of the International 
Sanitary Conventions were to maximize the protection from disease with the minimum 
effect on trade and traffic (Smith 1894). While these diseases were certainly highly 
disruptive of trade, there were many diseases both in Europe and in their colonial domains 
that halted global capital flows in the 19th century. Historical scholarship demonstrates that 
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diseases such as typhus, smallpox, syphilis, malaria, dengue fever among others limited 
the movement of colonial forces across Africa, south Asia and the Americas and were 
responsible for thwarting conquest (Alden and Miller 1987; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 
1997, Curtin 1998, 1985; Harrison 2004). Though the concerns for global trade were 
significant they are not sufficient for explaining this revolutionary moment in global health.  
 While I argue that the production of the International Sanitary Conventions, 
focusing on the control of cholera, yellow fever and plague were motivated by concerns 
for international trade, they were organized according to an emergent epidemic orientalist 
discourse which constructed a new ontology of disease threat that recognized epidemics 
emanating from colonial spaces and bodies that threatened the pursuits of empire as more 
significant and warranting more attention than those spreading from European space. This 
produced divergent responses to epidemic threats in the 19th and early 20th century, 
heightening responses to diseases threatening the lives of colonial actors such as yellow 
fever and cholera, while diminishing actions against diseases brought by empire such as 
smallpox.  
 In this chapter I trace the genealogy of the International Sanitary Conventions, 
showing how the emergence of this epidemic orientalism in the expansion of European 
Empires overseas developing in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries reorganized perceptions 
and responses to epidemics in colonial spaces. As this epidemic orientalism spread as a 
discourse back to Europe, disjointed quarantine practices that threatened global trade 
compelled the major empires of Europe and the Ottoman empire to convene International 
Sanitary Conferences aimed at coordinating responses to epidemic threats emerging from 
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their colonial sites. These materialized in the International Sanitary Conventions which 
coordinated a vision of disease control amongst European empires aligning the entire 
continent under a new epidemic orientalism, with the objective of establishing a permanent 
sanitary border between the colonized and colonizer. I then demonstrate how these 
conventions produced radically different responses to these diseases at the sites of 
outbreak.  
 Through these conventions and a unified European response to disease, non-white 
colonized bodies became the signifier of the perpetual, potential vector of disease-spread 
while Europeans represented the perpetual, potential victim. The effective application of 
these regulations was made possible by the emergence of global communication via 
telegraph and the rise of epidemiological knowledge that could trace the root of disease 
threats. This allowed for the formerly inward-looking quarantine methods of Europe to be 
made external, pushing the practices of quarantine to colonized sites and establishing a 
Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus to maintain the effective operation of the International 
Sanitary Conventions for the prevention of disease spread to Europe. This apparatus 
required aggressive sanitary controls to be imposed upon any colonial sites exhibiting 
outbreaks of plague, cholera or yellow fever or suffer trade and economic isolation for the 
duration of the epidemic. This produced novel forms of disease control and racial 
surveillance at the sites of outbreak.6 
                                               
6 This particular aspect of disease control will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
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I support these findings by exploring archival documents and reports from the 
International Sanitary Conferences of the 19th century as well as medical research from the 
period. To explore the effect of the International Sanitary Conventions upon Europe’s 
colonies I look primarily at the effects of the conventions upon British India and disease 
controls surrounding the Hajj. I focus upon the British empire and India most specifically 
as India was seen in the latter 19th century as the reservoir of both plague and cholera and 
thereby the greatest disease threat to Europe. India’s important role in trade with Britain 
also made its position contentious as I will show. Through an exploration of South Asia’s 
response to the International Sanitary Conventions I am able to trace the relationship 
between disease control, trade and empire not only within these sites but also across the 
trading routes through the Suez Canal, the Middle East and ultimately to the Mediterranean.  
 
THEORIZING IMPERIAL RELATIONS  
The International Sanitary Conventions restructured and organized relationships 
between various empires and their respective colonized and colonial subjects. Considering 
Trans-Imperial Relations invariably requires an explanation of theoretical grounding and 
epistemic position. I argue in this chapter that the formulation of the International Sanitary 
Conventions and the disease priorities of the conventions were motivated by concerns for 
the threat of these diseases to travel and trade and an emergent discourse, epidemic 
orientalism, that recognized the global threat of disease only through the concerns of 
Europe. These two causal explanations cannot be seen as mutually exclusive. In order to 
produce a unified vision of disease control centered around the trade and health concerns 
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of Europe, an ontological shift in how Europe saw itself relative to the world had to occur. 
While a political economy explanation may theorize how trade priorities would come to 
structure how disease threats become seen in economic terms through relations between 
metropoles and peripheries, world systems theory fails to uncover how the production of 
that economic vision is incumbent upon a refashioning of subject relations between 
colonized and colonizer producing racialized hierarchies for the purposes of economic 
extraction through material, political and existential subjugation. Without an understanding 
of the discourse from which these conventions emerge any theoretical explanation is 
impoverished. 
I turn to postcolonial theory to uncover the hermeneutics of these early disease 
controls, to explain how and why this international concern for the spread of disease 
emerges at this time and why it produced the international conventions and disease 
responses that it did. Effective, discreet definitions of empires suggest an empire to be a 
political body that mobilizes its own power and sovereignty upon territories beyond its 
existing borders (Go 2011; Hardt and Negri 2001). Works within the postcolonial cannon 
have shown how systems of political and economic power are maintained through 
domination of colonized subjects (DuBois 2007, 1994; Go 2016; Magubane 2003; 
Mbembé 2001; Mudimbe 1988; Stoler 2008, 2010). Postcolonial theory, invariably sees 
how the practices of empire, while superficially the governance and exploitation of foreign 
territories and their resources requires a re-ordering of relations that fabricates the 
colonized subject only in relation to the colonizer (Fanon 2004). The imposition of colonial 
power, Chatterjee suggests, requires the ‘rule of colonial difference’ where the dominated 
  
48 
within colonial territory are rendered and controlled as inferior by that power (Chatterjee 
1993). The act of colonization necessarily dehumanizes the subjects of empire in the eyes 
of the imperialist (Césaire 2000b). Imperial power, while imposing political domination, 
also commands and emplaces a particular ‘order of things’ maintained through colonial 
education, police and military violence and regimes of labor that subordinate the colonized 
with the aim of negating any existence of the colonized beyond a subservient relationship 
to the colonizer (Biko 2002; Fanon 2004, 2008). This separates the colonizer from 
colonized and metropole from periphery, bifurcating, and rendering invisible the ways in 
which these binaries are mutually constituted (Butler 1997; Go 2014b; Hall 2005; Said 
1979).  
Central to the production of empire has always been the extraction and exploitation 
of colonial sites for the purposes of domestic gain in imperial centers. Supporting the 
extractive practices of empire has been the global trade of people and goods around the 
world, facilitated by free trade and commercial transit. Global trade was the circuit through 
which empires could themselves exist. Across the globe in the 19th century empires relied 
on the constant flow of products from their colonies to maintain their expansionist visions.  
I examine the production and implementation of the International Sanitary 
Conventions as a case of an emergent global order that constitutes the beginnings of global 
health. The International Sanitary Conventions developed through agreements between 
major global empires operated as an instrument for maintaining the circuits of empire 
through sanitary controls and in turn reproduced those empires. While the conventions in 
their objective sought to prevent diseases crossing into European ports it did so through a 
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particular practice of making the borders between Europe and the rest of the world tangible 
through sanitary boundary making. This boundary making relied upon the strict discipline 
and totalizing control of the movement of colonized people at sites of outbreak as well as 
during their travels across colonized space.  
 I employ Said’s concept of Orientalism as a theoretical framework to examine how 
the International Sanitary Conventions emerged out of a colonial discourse that perceived 
infectious diseases emerging from colonial sites as more threatening than those from 
Europe and sought to maintain disease controls through colonial domination. Said 
developed the concept of Orientalism to explain the particular dynamics whereby European 
empires sought to rule over their colonies. Orientalism, Said writes ‘is a style of thought 
based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and 
(most of the time) "the Occident”’ (Said 1979:2). The assumption of the separation of these 
two spaces is the defining characteristic in Said’s understanding of Imperial regimes (Go 
2016; Said 1994a, 1979). The spaces between the Orient and Occident are assumed to be 
separate, and that separateness is thereby enforced through dynamics of power and 
domination that would seek to make these separations material in their effects. It is this 
ontological separation of spaces and the enforcement of that difference that, in Said’s 
vision produces the hierarchies that situate the colonizer as superior and the colonized as 
worthy of subjugation. This ontological frame positions the imperial metropole as distinct 
from colonial periphery and European as distinct from other races, while systematically 
occluding how these positions are actually constituted by one another. An orientalist frame 
is therefore both a powerful analytical concept as well as a method of critique. By exploring 
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how the International Sanitary Conferences and the conventions that emerged from them 
organized new understandings of what constitutes a global disease threat requiring 
international coordination to prevent, I show how the disease controls of the International 
Sanitary Conventions are rooted in an epidemic orientalist gaze.  
  
THE EMERGENCE OF AN EPIDEMIC ORIENTALISM IN COLONIAL SPACE  
  By the late 19th century, three diseases, plague, cholera and yellow fever would 
come to be seen in the major Empires of the world and the United States as the diseases 
which had the capacity not only to bring mass death but also to destabilize the mechanisms 
of trade that insured their global dominance. The experience of colonization around the 
world brought dispossession, genocide, enslavement and oppression on a global scale. 
Colonization also transformed the understanding of Europe’s location in the world vis-à-
vis the rest of the world. It was in the colonial “contact zones” the sites of European 
encounter with the native or colonized other, primarily through relations of subordination, 
that Europe developed a planetary consciousness, defining itself and the rest of the world 
for itself (Pratt 2007:4–6). From these colonial encounters epidemic orientalism emerges.  
 Said, in examining the practices of Orientalism, finds that every author or expert 
on the Orient separates and locates themselves relative to the colonial world producing and 
imposing essential characteristics upon the oriental world to which they claim to speak 
with authority (Said 1979:51–53). This orientation has been central to the maintenance of 
imperialism, even beyond the formal end of empire. Central to the formation of the 
orientalist outlook-the orientalist gaze- is the repetition of discourses and practices aimed 
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at producing distinct ontologies of the colonized subject (Mbembe 2017:28) for the 
purposes of existentially disqualifying the colonized from incorporation in the colonizers 
world. In the colonial encounter the boundary between the colonized and colonizer is 
established in the formation of the colonized subject as an unbridgeable gap separating the 
raw savagery of the colonized from the civilization of the colonizer. This subject formation 
forms the basis of colonial orders and divisions (Fanon 2008; Mbembe 2017; Said 1994b). 
 As colonial expansion spread across the world and especially across the Atlantic, 
imperial actors realized that diseases carried by the colonized threatened to disturb the 
colonial order by permeating that boundary between colonizer and colonized, afflicting 
colonial actors while also disturbing the economic objectives of empire. While colonial 
spaces were often read as impenetrable, “overspread with misery” (Pratt 2007:70) and 
dangerous to European conquerors, diseases came to represent an unwanted piece of the 
colony that could ultimately travel back to Europe. The evidence of this becomes clear in 
the colonial prioritization of sanitary controls for diseases emerging from colonial space 
with limited attention being paid to diseases emerging from Europeans. 
 The recognition of the disease threats of colonial spaces produced in and of itself 
an epidemic orientalism which recognized diseases emerging from the colony as more 
significant than those that were already common in Europe and spread only from colonizer 
to colonized. This epidemic orientalism structured the colonial encounter recognizing the 
colonial world and the colonized as a permanent, perpetual vector of disease, and the 
colonizer and his world as the permanently, potential victims of that threat. This orientalist 
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gaze repositioned the colonial world as a space of disease threat from which the colonizer 
and empire needed to be protected.  
Prior to the mid 19th century disease controls were marked by piecemeal quarantine 
practices, aimed at preventing diseases spreading internally within the bounded territories 
of Europe. The earliest disease controls imposed upon whole populations date back to the 
medieval era to prevent the spread of plague. Despite not knowing the formal cause of 
plague, medieval officials across Europe and the Middle East recognized that pestilence 
was able to travel significant distance and spread death quickly. Mercantile transport was 
an early target for sanitary interventions dating back to 1348 in which the Ordinances of 
Pistoia prohibited the transit of cloth and textiles from any area suspected of a plague 
outbreak (Harrison 2013a:8)7. The term quarantine stems from ordinances of the Republic 
of Ragusa, modern day Croatia in 1397 that permitted the seizure of vessels for up to forty 
days. Venice was the first major city to produce permanent sanitary facilities in 1485 to 
hold and quarantine ships and those passengers and goods potentially carrying disease 
(Harrison 2013a:8).8  
                                               
7 For in depth analysis of medieval to 19th century sanitary controls see Harrison 2013; 
Harrison 2004; Watts 1997. 
8 Florence was notable for imposing particular restrictions of movement in and out of the 
generally poorer areas in which plague spread in the city during outbreaks of plague. These 
included the imposition of emergency powers by the Duchy to require particular burial 
practices, the isolation of the sick and the closure of markets. Merchants, given their 
significant travel and interaction with peoples around the world quickly became associated 
with the spread of disease, as well as Jews, the Romany, foreigners especially from Muslim 
regions, women among others (de Chauliac 1579; Douglas 1991; Harrison 1996, 2013a; 
Watts 1999).  
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As the scope of European colonial enterprise extended across the Atlantic from the 
15th to 18th centuries, disease controls shifted in their priorities. Smallpox spread 
devastatingly from Europe to Central, North and South America, while syphilis amongst 
the European elite was considered to be an unwanted import from their newly conquered 
overseas territories. For the first time, disease was becoming a concern for the maintenance 
of global territory. Diseases were starting to move from seized territories back to imperial 
power centers. This galvanized a concern in Europe for the origin sites of these diseases 
and the tactics by which to prevent them. So significant was the recognition of this threat 
that Montesquieu in his critical work The Spirit of Laws (2001 [1748]) drew on the history 
of leprosy as a basis for exclusion from the civil sphere for the purposes of limiting the 
spread of syphilis, rooted in the Americas, to a previously un-tainted Europe. Montesquieu 
highlights how the prevention of disease spread to European states reflects a major 
responsibility of the sovereign while also associating the threat of disease with the presence 
of foreigners in European space. Positioning the spread of disease in grand historical terms 
as a perpetual battle between the West and other, Montesquieu suggests it is the European 
responsibility to prevent the spread of unwanted invaders, human or biological from 
entering the domains of the West.  
“The croisades had brought the leprosy amongst us; but the wise regulations, made 
at that time, hindered it from infecting the mass of the people. 
We find, by the law of the Lombards, that this disease was spread in Italy before 
the croisades, and merited the attention of the legislature…It is now two centuries 
since a disease, [Syphilis] unknown to our ancestors, was first transplanted from 
the new world to ours, and came to attack human nature even in the very source of 
life and pleasure. Most of the principal families in the South of Europe were seen 
to perish by a distemper that was grown too common to be ignominious, and was 
considered in no other light than in that of its being fatal. It was the thirst of gold 
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that propagated this disease; the Europeans went continually to America, and 
always brought back a new leven of it.  
 As it is the business of legislators to watch over the health of the citizens, it 
would have been a wise part in them to have stopped this communication by laws 
made on the plan of those of Moses. The plague is a disease whose infectious 
progress is much more rapid. Egypt is its principal seat, from whence it spreads 
over the whole globe. Most countries in Europe have made exceeding good 
regulations to prevent this infection, and, in our times, an admirable method has 
been contrived to stop it; this is, by forming a line of troops round the infected 
country, which cuts off all manner of communication.” (de Secondat, Baron de 
Montesquieu 2001 [1748]:253–254) 
 
Montesquieu highlights what would become a central element of epidemic 
orientalism. Situating the site of disease threat externally, with syphilis in the Americas 
and plague from Egypt and reconstituting Europe as the site of concern, Montesquieu 
advocates the establishment of separations, physical and cultural, from the ill effects of 
these spaces in order to maintain the purity of Europe.  
As the trade in slaves grew from the early 17th century onwards, smallpox spread 
rapidly from Europeans to indigenous or unexposed enslaved populations from Africa. The 
effects of this disease, emanating from Europe, were particularly devastating in South 
America. In the early 1560’s a serious outbreak of smallpox in Brazil killed in excess of 
30,000 Amerindians over a period of 3-4 months (Alden and Miller 1987; Harrison 2013a). 
While outbreaks of smallpox were exceedingly common in much of the Caribbean, South 
and Central America, quarantines were rarely employed against the disease. The disease 
rarely affected the colonizing population and despite often affecting slaves, the demand 
was so great for their labor that even dying or morbidly ill slaves were still purchased at a 
rapid pace (Alden and Miller 1987:210). Though quarantines were imposed in times of 
frequent or severe outbreak, in general sanitation controls were lax and despite the 
  
55 
increased pace of the slave trade in the 17th century, such policies were rare (Harrison 2004, 
2013a). Inoculation against smallpox on slave vessels also lessened the effects of the 
disease over time as prevention improved.  
 The dissonance between responses to smallpox, the signifier of European disease 
threat, and yellow fever the signified colonial disease, demonstrate the sanitary divisions 
that would form the basis of later perspectives on disease control. While smallpox, 
emanating from Europe posed few major challenges to the objectives of colonialism, 
diseases such as yellow fever disturbed the networks of trade and threatened the lives of 
colonial actors. Diseases that transferred from colonized to colonizer, slave to slaver, 
represented the diseases which merited coordinated responses. While smallpox rarely 
produced any significant quarantines or responses, yellow fever was met with aggressive 
quarantine across the western Atlantic. Yellow fever presented a significant threat to 
colonial holdings across the Atlantic. After first being documented in Barbados in 1647 it 
spread throughout North and South America within a century prompting significant 
quarantine controls and killing colonizer and colonized alike (Harrison 2004, 2013a). Able 
to travel in water barrels across the Atlantic, yellow fever carrying mosquitos spread the 
disease quite quickly through port cities appearing as far south as Brazil and in severe 
outbreaks as far north as New York City and Boston. Individual American colonies 
imposed significant quarantine measures to prevent the disease’s spread and prior to the 
American War of Independence the thirteen colonies had tallied roughly twenty-five major 
outbreaks of yellow fever (Harrison 2013a:20). Quarantine practices in the colonies 
became much more about enforcing and maintaining borders between the colonized and 
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colonizer while the spread of disease from colonizer to colonized produced no such 
boundaries. The colonized body, the body of the enslaved, the indigenous person, signified 
an always already disease threat that had to be confined, controlled or quarantined to 
prevent contagion affecting colonial missions. The threat of disease in colonial spaces 
becomes at this time synonymous with the colonial encounter and the colonized ‘other’. 
Diseases from without raised concern from colonial authorities while those from within, or 
emanating from Europe, though devastating produced far fewer responses. Though 
epidemic orientalism had rooted itself as a dominant discourse of disease control in the 
colonies, the application of this discourse in Europe was challenging.  
 While quarantine practices in colonial regions established quarantines against 
yellow fever and other diseases, European port cities sought also to mete out the threat of 
foreign disease invasion. Though quarantine was the most widespread method of disease 
control, as the 18th century drew to a close, the method began to enflame international 
relations as European ports enforced quarantines against their colonial sites and one 
another. Recognizing the disease threats from their colonies and beyond Europe, focusing 
upon limiting the spread of disease from without to within, many European nations took 
advantage of the protection afforded by quarantine both medically and economically. 
Concerns for the spread of plague and the subsequent quarantining of merchant ships from 
foreign nations allowed quarantining sites to delay the trading and shipment of goods which 
in turn limited the profits to be made from shipping. Plague, thought to emanate from the 
Levant, or eastern Mediterranean, arrived in France and Italy in the 1720’s and prompted 
swift quarantine responses from western European nations. Foreign merchants were 
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excluded from trade on the basis of such quarantine realizing a form of strict economic 
protectionism benefiting European traders against their North African and Middle Eastern 
counterparts (Harrison 2013a). However, these quarantine ordinances also limited trade 
between Western European nations such as Britain, France, Spain and Portugal. Portugal 
imposed such a significant quarantine that any vessel trading with the Levant was to be 
subject to quarantine in Portuguese ports if it had not passed through sufficient quarantine 
processes at all prior ports of call (Harrison 2013a:33). This especially weakened British 
trading in the region relative to Spain who they were hostile to at the time and almost 
provoked a war between the three states. As plague continued to spread, further aggressive 
measures were placed upon vessels leaving the eastern Mediterranean providing further 
opportunity for trade protectionism under the auspices of sanitation. War similarly almost 
broke out as a result of quarantine measures between Tunisia and the Venetian Republic 
over quarantine and destruction of cargo. Quarantine stations adjacent to bordering 
territories were also used as potential staging points for foreign invasions and military 
facilities in case these resources were necessary (Harrison 2013a:37).  
 The thinly veiled jingoism that quarantine allowed for also poured forth renewed 
feelings of civic responsibility for the management of disease that delineated the role of 
foreign and citizen which would greatly affect the future production of disease responses9. 
                                               
9 Dr. Damillo Samoïlowitz, a noted doctor and Surgeon General of Moscow, in writing to 
Catherine the Great of Russia on the recent plague outbreaks noted that 
“As soon as the plague begins to reign in a city, would it not be unjust to refuse to 
all those who have no duty to fulfill in the civil state, or who are not obliged to 
reside there, some particular necessity, the freedom of exit? This liberty thus 
procures a considerable diminution over the totality of the Citizens, the Plague can 
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As quarantine measures continued to halt trade and invoke nationalist fervor and 
xenophobia, dissatisfaction grew from all parties regarding the policy. Central to the 
recognition of the scope of these disease threats was the origin and the apportioning of 
blame upon the foreign agent responsible for bringing the disease, in many cases 
merchants. Merchants petitioned to have their ships freed from aggressive quarantine at 
foreign ports while sovereign nations lamented that their own exports were halted on 
foreign shores. Diseases emerging from colonial sites were being seen not only through the 
lens physical threat but simultaneously as a foreign agent carried by outsiders and 
warranting of national responses.  
                                               
no longer sacrifice so many victims. Those who are obliged by their duty or by their 
state to remain within their walls, have less to fear, in relation to the Provisions 
necessary for their subsistence; moreover, the police have less details, and it is 
easier to obviate the confusion and disorders which inevitably entail these times of 
fear and mortality. It is not the same with those which their state calls for the public 
good. If they were granted the freedom to leave their Places, who would now 
perform their duties with intelligence and foresight? who would order the necessary 
assistance to the poor peoples? which would ensure the maintenance of order, more 
than ever necessary in these times of crisis? who would oppose to the wicked the 
barriers which they would follow? Soon abuses would multiply on every side, and 
would concur with the plague, to the total ruin of a city so ill-policed, for in that 
time the police did not make use of all its authority; -large disorders therefore, 
having dismissed from the commencement of the invasion of the plague the 
unnecessary part of the citizens, to refuse permission to go out to those who watch 
over the preservation of the Order and the happiness of the States. It is necessary to 
inflame the zeal of the People of Art, who devote themselves daily to the good of 
humanity; we must encourage the efforts of all the true Patriots, in order to procure 
for their fellow-citizens all the reliefs, of which they may have need, we must above 
all, animate and warm feelings by example” (Samoïlowitz 1783:204–6).  
 
While conceding the importance of state powers in managing disease threats, 
Samoïlowitz suggests that this disease was spread significantly by Turkish merchants 
(Harrison 2013a; Samoilovich 1783). 
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QUARANTINE, MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE RISE OF A NEW PARADIGM 
 While quarantine afforded a modicum of protection and satisfied orientalist 
anxieties, it was the disputes that emerged from disjointed quarantine practices that 
provoked the need for a coordinated system of sanitary controls. By the mid-19th century 
every sovereign nation in Europe and within the Ottoman and Persian Empires had some 
form of quarantine law that was subject to change depending upon the severity of outbreak 
(Milroy 1846). While a new epidemic orientalism was emerging across parts of Europe 
and in the colonies of empires, prioritizing the control of diseases emanating from abroad, 
the technologies and methods to prevent the spread of diseases were highly disputed. 
Particular questions regarding the causes of different diseases and their need for quarantine 
became paramount to their effective and fair regulation in the eyes of the European powers. 
A desire for a globally regulated system of disease management was growing, but such 
could only be possible if medical consensus on the cause of disease spread could be found. 
Where the efficacy of quarantine in relation to plague may have been more or less accepted, 
two diseases, cholera and yellow fever would weaken the foundations of the method. For 
the first time, the fate of international relations, politics and disease control centered around 
the effective application of modern medical knowledge. Scientific knowledge, mobilized 
by the diplomatic core of the European and Ottoman empires would become the language 
through which they would justify their sanitary controls and would become the basis of a 
new era of standardized disease control.  
 The spread of cholera in Europe in the early 19th century was disastrous. Cholera 
outbreaks in Britain claimed more than 130,000 lives over the course of the century while 
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claiming 25 million lives in India where it was first discovered (Watts 1999:167). Across 
the whole of Europe, cholera would take over 1 million lives between 1829 and 1851 and 
over 100,000 would die in Mecca alone. Despite quarantines established across the Persian, 
Ottoman and Russian empires, cholera spread largely unabated through Asia and into 
Europe and across the Atlantic. Yellow fever likewise appeared in Europe for the first time 
in 1800 (Harrison 2004:99). As both diseases spread, similar disputes arose from nations 
over the efficacy and penalties of quarantine. One of these disputes occurred between 
Austria and British controlled Greece over the quarantining of Austrian vessels in the port 
of Corfu. Prince Esterhazy of Austria, in claiming punitive measures against his empire’s 
vessels suggested that the contagiousness of cholera was the justification Britain used for 
its aggressive responses.  
“The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria having been informed by 
its Consul at Corfu, of the impediments thrown in the way of the navigation in the 
Ionian Sea, arising from the progress of the cholera in Italy, the Undersigned has 
been instructed to do himself the honor of bringing to the knowledge of His 
Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the following 
circumstances. At the time the cholera made its appearance at Venice and Trieste, 
the quarantine prescribed by the Government of the Ionian Islands was fixed at 
fourteen days, and subsequently increased to twenty-one, upon the appearance of 
the cholera at Ancona;… It follows from these numerous impediments, that the real 
duration of the quarantine is generally forty-two days; and even that period is 
extended, in case where, through stress of weather, the unlading of vessels is 
delayed. Moreover, the lazaretto affording but very little room, a further delay often 
occurs, before the merchandize can take its turn to be admitted for the purpose of 
being fumigated. To the losses caused by these delays are added the expenses of 
the sanatory [sic] taxes, which have not been diminished, and from the 
circumstance of a chemical process being made use of in order to fumigate the 
goods, which are opened and spread for the purpose, they lose, by such means, their 
freshness and the appearance of being new. To such an extent are these measures 
prejudicial to commerce, that the captains of vessels now at Corfu, have, of their 
own accord, had a meeting, and handed to the Consul-General the declaration that 
they would prefer remaining at home without employ, rather than undertake 
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voyages to the Ionian Islands, where the existence of the restrictions in question 
would infallibly occasion their ruin. The steps repeatedly taken for the purpose of 
inducing the Government of the Ionian Islands to lessen the severity of these 
measures have all failed through the apprehension of the Sanatory [sic] Inspector-
General, who considers cholera as a contagious disease.” (Parliamentary Papers 
1843) 
 
As quarantining for plague and cholera were now becoming common practice across 
Europe, these methods caused what many merchants and sovereign states considered to be 
overwhelming delays. While the diseases were significant health threats, the quarantines 
that they provoked incurred a double penalty.  
Cholera was a terrifying disease in the eyes of Europe causing swift death and 
spreading quickly across the continent (Howard-Jones 1975; Rangel De Almeida 2015). 
While the origin of plague according to Europe had its source in the Levant and quarantine 
procedures against plague reflected this opinion, the origin of cholera remained deeply 
unknown. Further, the piecemeal and highly variable nature of quarantine regulations 
between ports left effective controls both weakened and complying with bespoke practices 
onerous (Ersoy, Gungor, and Akpinar 2011; Harrison 2013a; Howard-Jones 1975:11).  
In 1834, after traveling significantly and reporting upon the sanitary regulations 
across the Mediterranean, the Secretary of the Superior Council of Health for France, under 
the auspices of the Minister of Commerce wrote a report highlighting the unnecessary 
challenges that emerge from the differing quarantine methods across the sea. Secretary 
Dupeyron suggested that an international convention be held to establish standard measures 
for disease control. Though France struggled to host a conference on such issues for almost 
twenty years, the Ottoman Empire’s perspective on cholera reflected a similar impulse 
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(Ersoy et al. 2011). Ottoman regulations on plague control, given their western trading 
partners claim that plague emanated from their territories, were very strict. However, they 
had failed to prevent the spread of cholera.  
In 1831 the Khedive of Egypt established a sanitary council governed by a 
committee of European diplomats to prevent the spread of infectious disease to Europe 
(Ersoy et al. 2011:54). In 1838 the Ottoman Empire established 77 new public health and 
quarantine stations across Anatolia, much of modern day Turkey and in 1840 convened an 
international council of representatives from the United States, Germany, Greece, Austria, 
France, Sweden, Norway, Iran, Russia, The Netherlands, Britain and Spain. Ultimately this 
would become the Ottoman Supreme Council of Health consisting of 21 members 
including 13 foreign members (Ersoy et al. 2011:54). At their first meeting in 1840 codified 
regulations were suggested for controlling the international spread of disease. A later 
international meeting of the Istanbul Supreme Council of Sanitation consisting of medical 
experts and diplomats from nine European states and the Ottoman Empire pledged to 
improve and coordinate quarantine efforts at a conference in Vienna in 1845. These 
however produced no tangible, accepted regulations. This direct precursor to the 
International Sanitary Conventions solidified a demand for internationally standardized 
disease regulations.  
THE INTERNATIONAL SANITARY CONVENTIONS 
 It would ultimately be these early concerns for trade and the threat of diseases from 
colonial sites that guided the formation of what would become the International Sanitary 
Conventions. The International Sanitary Conferences, which laid the groundwork for the 
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first International Sanitary Conventions, did more than produce standard and accepted 
regulations. The Conferences themselves served as a powerful vehicle for uniting all of 
Europe under the same epidemic orientalist perspective, firmly linking the threat of global 
epidemic disaster solely with diseases emanating from the sites of colonial encounter and 
requiring colonial containment. As new diseases, misunderstood by medical science 
emerged throughout Europe and Asia like cholera and yellow fever, existing measures for 
plague both halted trade and were ineffective at preventing the spread of these other 
diseases causing significant death in Europe and the colonies of their empires.  
As I will show, from this orientalist vision, two objectives emerged for the parties 
that would ultimately represent the International Sanitary Conventions. The first was to 
prevent the spread of infectious diseases primarily to the European continent while 
minimizing the punitive effects of quarantine to trade and travel. This would prove to be 
the overarching mission of both the International Sanitary Conventions, later the 
International Sanitary Regulations and ultimately the present day International Health 
Regulations. This first objective informed the second which was to halt the spread of 
disease at the source of outbreak in order to limit the possibility of diseases reaching 
European ports, spreading death and affecting trade. The latter objective was facilitated by 
two complementary technologies- the telegraph which provided for swift global 
communication and the rise of modern epidemiology, which allowed for the effective and 
scientific charting of the causal factors of disease. These conferences allowed for the swift 
transfer, discussion and acceptance of scientific findings on the cause and spread of disease 
that could be quickly diffused around the world.  
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 The formulation of these sanitary conventions would be anything but 
straightforward. It would take seven International Sanitary Conferences and over forty 
years before the parties involved agreed upon any formal standards. The first International 
Sanitary Conference was convened by France in Paris in 1851. Eleven European nations 
and Turkey, representing the Ottoman Empire were in attendance. Each party was 
represented by one medical expert and one diplomat (Howard-Jones 1975:12). This is 
notable as it would mark one of the first times whereby medical officials would be directly 
involved in drafting international regulations. Three diseases of colonial encounter were 
the focus of the first conference, plague, cholera and yellow fever. Smallpox, as a 
supposedly ‘universal’ disease in the eyes of the parties in attendance did not merit 
inclusion for reasons discussed earlier. 
These International Sanitary Conferences emerged at a critical turning point in 
international knowledge dissemination. Contemporary to these first conferences, the first 
non-diplomatic international standards were being established on matters from weights and 
measures and time zones as well as agreements on the elimination of the international slave 
trade (Ogle 2015; Rangel De Almeida 2015). What France initially proposed was an 
internationally accepted and standardized system of disease surveillance that would allow 
for the swift dissemination of information on outbreaks. Sanitary councils would be 
established at the local level headed by directors of health. These sanitary councils would 
also be international in character representing envoys from foreign nations. This drew the 
ire of several of the nations represented including Britain, Russia and Austria, who were 
concerned that such an organization would infringe upon national sovereignty. While some 
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nations favored solely regulations, to be abided by globally, the French sought to model all 
sanitary systems on their own vision. This did not sit well with most members of the 
conference. While the infringement of national sovereignty was of paramount concern for 
the European delegates, they were not above requiring more stringent reforms in the 
Ottoman empire to prevent the spread of plague within all of its territories (Rangel De 
Almeida 2015:82–83). 
 A second dispute arising from the first conference that would linger throughout the 
first seven conferences was the cause and mode of transmission of cholera. The great 
divergence between the contagionist and anti-contagionist understandings of cholera left 
the control of the disease off the negotiating table for several parties including Austria who 
was prohibited by its government to discuss the control of any diseases but plague and 
yellow fever (Howard-Jones 1975). Britain likewise agreed that cholera was not worthy of 
quarantine and was only spread through filth and certain other climactic and environmental 
effects and therefore not worthy of quarantine. This understanding of cholera was 
particularly efficacious for the continued trade supremacy of the British Empire. Where the 
Ottoman Empire was largely blamed for the spread of cholera to Europe, Ottoman envoys 
to the conference suggested that it was Indian pilgrims to Mecca that had spread the disease 
to Ottoman lands. If cholera was indeed to be considered a quarantinable disease it would 
have huge trade repercussions upon British controlled India and the empire as a whole and 
drastically affected the achievement of medical consensus for much of the future 
conferences.  
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 The first sanitary conference produced no implementable or accepted convention. 
Despite progress made in the scientific isolation of cholera in Britain, the British delegation 
to the Second International Sanitary Conference of 1859 continued to argue that cholera be 
omitted from the diseases subject to quarantine regulations (Howard-Jones 1975:20). They 
were far from alone in this debate as several of the other parties also supported the anti-
contagion claim regarding cholera.  
These disagreements persisted through the third conference held explicitly on 
cholera in Constantinople in 1866. The purpose of this conference was to halt the rapid 
spread of cholera from incoming pilgrims from Egypt to Mecca and onward to Europe 
(Ersoy et al. 2011). While no international regulations emerged from this conference, the 
European powers once again sought to impose significant measures upon the Ottoman 
Empire while levying no measures upon themselves. However, this conference boasted the 
first effective scientific consensus on cholera. This conference established formally the 
reservoir of cholera to be in India, primarily emanating from the Ganges River (Ersoy et 
al. 2011; Howard-Jones 1975). This was to be the only major outcome of the conference.  
CHOLERA, EPIDEMIC ORIENTALISM AND THE MUSLIM OTHER 
While the British had previously tried to suggest falsely that cholera emerges at 
random from spoiled earth, the formal isolation of the reservoir of cholera interpolated 
cholera through the orientalist gaze as the primary disease of international concern. Of all 
the diseases recognized as grave threats by the International Sanitary Conferences, cholera 
and its threat of transmission via the Mecca pilgrimage represented the apotheosis of the 
imaginative pairing of disease, trade and colonial alterity. Cholera represented a disease 
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emergent from within British Colonial India, spread by human vectors from South Asia, to 
the Middle East and Europe. In traversing the border between colonial space and Europe 
in or on people, it captured the majority of the attention of the members of the International 
Sanitary Conferences and the sanitary management of the Mecca Pilgrimage would 
become its own sub-section of the sanitary conventions. 
Armed with the knowledge of the origin of cholera, the French delegation at the 
conference introduced discussion on a ban on all ship movement between the Arabian 
Peninsula and Egypt to prevent the outbreak of Cholera in Mecca. The anxiety around the 
Hajj emerged from the particular concerns of Muslims travelling from India to Egypt and 
then on to Mecca where they would interact with European Muslims who would transfer 
cholera back to Europe. Rather than focusing upon eradicating the disease at its source, the 
focus of control turned to its prevention of transfer to Europe. The suggestion was for the 
Ottoman’s who controlled Mecca at the time to erect massive quarantine facilities in the 
Red Sea. Britain maintained a reticence to accept that cholera was emanating from its 
Indian Colony but accepted that sanitary measures would need to change in India. The 
focus of these reforms would be placed upon the surveillance and control of cultural 
practices such as the cremation and interment of bodies in the Ganges River (Howard-Jones 
1975).  
The discovery in 1882 of the cholera bacillus by Howard Koch proved to be the 
most major of several deathblows to anti-contagionist arguments. The discovery of a 
causative agent of cholera would prove too significant to ignore for long. By the Venice 
International Sanitary Conference of 1892, a convention for the control of cholera in 
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westbound shipping in the Mediterranean was established attempting explicitly to halt the 
spread of cholera from the Suez through to Europe. These regulations were the maximum 
impositions that a nation or port could take in controlling disease, thereby solving the 
previous problems of differing quarantine practices. The scope of the danger of cholera, 
recognized in orientalist terms to be a global one was illustrated by A. Proust, a member 
of the French delegation.  
“It [cholera] extends into the Far East, in the Gulf Bengal, Burma, Indo-China, the 
treaties of China, Korea, Japan, and all the coast of the seas of China, as far as 
Wladivostock. In recent years, it has been raging in Iraq-Arabia, Mesopotamia, 
Persia, Syria, Arabia (Mecca) and Africa (Massawa). The economic 
transformations that are on the entire surface of the African continent, will further 
aggravate the danger. So the question of the defense of Europe against the cholera 
always stands with a pressing interest and a fearful actuality. The aim of our efforts 
is to intercept all direct communication between the contaminated provenances of 
the Far East on one side; Egypt, the Mediterranean and Europe, on the other.” 
(Proust 1892) 
This statement provides a clear depiction of the discourse of epidemic orientalism. Proust 
in making a claim to the global threat of cholera frames that threat only in its proximity to 
Europe. He presents Europe as threatened on all sides by cholera, with that threat only 
increasing through colonial exploitation in Africa and elsewhere. The protection of Europe 
is therefore only possible through the control of colonized bodies and transports to Europe.  
By the Dresden Sanitary Conference of 1893, the British moved fully in line with 
the contagionist view. The Convention, passed in 1892, was revised in 1893 to include 
measures for notifying other nations of outbreaks and import restrictions. Only cloth-based 
goods and clothing would be subject to disinfection or prohibited and not subject to 
quarantine.  
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The Ninth Conference focused exclusively on policing the Mecca Pilgrimage. By 
the 1894 conference there was scientific consensus that cholera was only spread around the 
world through human agency and that controls on that agency would halt its movement. 
With the full force of near-global scientific consensus on the cause of spread and origin of 
cholera the question of how maximum disease security to Europe could be maintained 
while minimizing the effects to international trade could now be explored in greater detail. 
In the opening address to the Ninth Conference the president of the conference and future 
President of France Jean Casimir-Perier remarked that 
“The modern scientific spirit has proved both its firmness and its flexibility in the 
course of extended efforts to combat the Asiatic pestilence by means of 
international agreement… It is the common labor and the common honor of science 
and diplomacy to acquire and exercise the knowledge necessary to reconcile the 
customs which govern international commerce and the laws on which depends the 
protection of human life.” (Smith 1894:94) 
 
With this prerogative in mind the parties to the conference set out to add an entire section 
of the International Sanitary Conventions to solely resolve the threat of the spread of 
cholera to Europe. Scientific, economic and political concerns had converged around a 
unified understanding that the most pressing threats to Europe emanate from the colonial 
world and the colonial encounter.  
 Interestingly Britain objected to the strict policing of Muslim pilgrims on the Hajj 
suggesting that the convention would be better served to improve the state of health in the 
endemic regions while limiting the control of the disease at ports to a minimum (Smith 
1894:97). This unpopular view was also held by the Ottoman delegation who felt their 
sovereignty was being imposed upon (Huber 2006b). Britain’s motives aimed to avoid the 
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extensive trade effects that further regulations on cholera would have on their Indian 
domains.  
 The regulations placed upon the Hajj were more aggressive and invasive than 
previous controls, requiring both male and female passengers to be stripped searched as 
well as significant sanitary measures to be emplaced upon all vessels carrying pilgrims. Dr. 
Stephen Smith, an American observer to the proceedings suggested in his report that 
 
“It can be stated that the pilgrim is placed under sanitary surveillance of a very 
rigorous character from the moment he announces his intention to go on a 
pilgrimage till his return home. First, he must obtain a sanitary passport from the 
local authority…Before the passport is issued, the intending pilgrim must prove 
that he has compiled with all the conditions necessary for his departure and that he 
has money sufficient for the voyage and to sustain his family in his absence. This 
passport the pilgrim must retain, and show to the sanitary authorities en route; and 
he can enter Hedjaz, the province in which Mecca is located, only on presentation 
of it, and on passing an examination. He is under sanitary observation while at 
Mecca and on his return a new passport is given him, which he must show en 
route.” (Smith 1894:98) 
 
All pilgrims were also subject to medical inspections upon boarding each vessel on route 
and returning from Hajj.  
 The policing of the Hajj was unique amongst the mass migrations of the time 
requiring such a stringent sanitary control highlighting the profound effect of the orientalist 
vision embodied in the International Sanitary Conventions reflecting again upon the 
unidirectional perception of disease threat from colonized to colonizer and not the other 
way around. No Christian pilgrimages required the same level of scrutiny nor did any large-
scale movements of Europeans anywhere in the world attract similar concern. At this same 
conference the members of the American delegation, upon seeing the parallels to their 
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experience with increasing migrants from Europe put forth a proposal that the same 
measures should also apply to Europeans immigrating to the United States. This motion 
was permanently tabled and never accepted (Smith 1894). After the 1894 convention, the 
International Sanitary Conventions were amended again to incorporate both plague 
(Venice 1897) and more marginally, yellow fever (Paris 1912) into their controls. 
 
INTERNATIONAL SANITARY CONVENTIONS IN THE COLONIES- RE-
ORIENTALIZING RELATIONS 
 
The International Sanitary Conventions were to have profound effects upon the 
practices of disease control in colonial sites of outbreak. Where the conventions oriented 
global disease concerns around those threats seen as most pressing to Europe, the burden 
for preventing those diseases arriving on European shores shifted to the colonies of their 
empires. The new system of disease control imposed through the conventions established 
a mode of disease management that shifted the responsibility for containment from 
quarantine practices in Europe to the colonies. These practices produced systems of racial 
surveillance that positioned the colonized as the vector of disease spread who required 
permanent sanitary disciplining in order to protect the networks of global trade and the 
colonizers themselves.  
While epidemic orientalism constructed the priorities of disease threat and medical 
science provided the means to control these threats, the emergence of the telegraph truly 
allowed for a Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus to operate to prevent the spread of disease 
to Europe. Prior to the arrival of trans-oceanic telegraph systems communication between 
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sites like London and India could take a year for correspondence to effectively travel back 
and forth. Telegraph systems, connecting the world by the mid 19th century allowed for 
global communication that would take days rather than months. While spatial isolation 
from their colonies had previously required Imperial actors to anticipate colonial threats of 
all kinds and establish systems by which networks of colonial actors could manage them 
(Norton 2014), the telegraph provided the opportunity for near-instant dialogue and a 
constant surveillance of colonial activities in almost real time. This would allow controls 
at European ports to be put in place to prevent the spread of disease prior to the arrival of 
ships from an infected location. As European ports were now able to anticipate the arrival 
of disease at their home ports the responsibility for disease control could be shifted from 
Europe’s harbor quarantines to colonial cities.  
Under a unified vision of disease control operating through the same orientalist 
gaze, quarantine, rather than isolating European ports from one another and raising 
disputes, could be shifted to enforce borders between colonized and colonizer at the origin 
sites of outbreaks. In this move, quarantine concerned with threats travelling within Europe 
could now be shifted to colonial port cities rather than European ones. Central to this new 
apparatus was also a two-tiered system of intervention and surveillance whereby European 
powers sought to impose aggressive controls upon their colonies and Non-European 
powers while limiting the regulations imposed on one another. The system of surveillance 
imposed through the International Sanitary Conventions provided a way of exerting 
constant disciplinary pressure on suspect populations on an individual level without the 
need for disease to be present amongst them and without exerting direct power at the state 
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level. In order to prevent outbreaks in Europe, a global monitoring project of non-European 
bodies had to occur. This project was supported by bureaucratic regulatory practices of 
exclusion that prevented access into Europe from infected ports without strict scrutiny and 
in depth examination (Mayor et al. 1897). This in turn prompted overwhelming forms of 
control and oppression upon colonized populations in the name of sanitation.  
The first section of both the Paris Convention of 1894 and the Venice Convention 
of 1897 bound all signatory countries to alerting one another in the event of outbreaks 
within their borders (Mayor et al. 1897:9,38). Upon the confirmation of disease within the 
boundaries of the nation, the Convention required all signatories to commit to a 
prophylactic course of public health requiring the formation of a sanitation force to inspect 
infected sites and conduct medical examinations, the quarantine and isolation of all infected 
persons, and the disinfection of all goods, foodstuffs and clothing susceptible to plague 
(Mayor et al. 1897:38–44). Further, all ships bound from afflicted ports were required to 
uphold strict standards of sanitation, disinfection and quarantine both on board, during the 
voyage and in port (Mayor et al. 1897). 
The major empires of the world had successfully standardized their systems of 
disease control to prevent the sort of customs and trade battles seen throughout the 18th 
century. Imperial centers sought to protect themselves by further solidifying the boundaries 
between them and their colonies. However, for colonial sites relying on trade for their 
prolonged exploitation of territory, the burdens of disease control shifted from the 
European quarantine zone to the southern hemisphere port city. The arrival of plague, 
cholera or yellow fever could spell death but also global isolation and the total collapse of 
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colonial economies. This threat produced increased controls over any travel and trade from 
non-European ports and overwhelming surveillance of colonial populations to prevent the 
spread of these diseases. 
By the passage of the Venice International Sanitary Convention of 1897, which 
responded mostly to the spread of plague, it was accepted in the minds of the signatories 
that the reservoirs of both cholera and plague lay beyond the borders of Europe. Plague 
and cholera had their roots in the Himalayas and India while yellow fever was prevalent in 
Africa, and North and South America. The International Sanitary Conventions made 
possible a global effort to prevent disease from ever setting foot in Europe. Rather than 
maintaining the established practice prior to 1888 of quarantining local populations 
afflicted with illness to cordon sanitaires within national boundaries the signatory parties, 
buoyed by the new scientific knowledge of plague and cholera spread, could maintain a 
system of medical monitoring and control before diseased bodies could reach their shores 
(Huber 2006a).  
 The quarantining of vessels and goods travelling across boarders presented a 
commercial threat to many imperial interests and drove demand for standardized practices 
across several empires, most notably within the British Empire. As the dominions of the 
British were the most affected by plague and cholera, the threat of these diseases to the 
empire were particularly significant. Though the conventions only presided over the 
signatory nations, the first notification of the regulation urged that all colonial dominions 
outside of Europe also accept its terms (Mayor et al. 1897:9). The responses to the Venice 
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Convention, which expanded the earlier 1894 Paris Convention to control the spread of 
plague was especially significant for the British Empire. 
On May 24th 1897, the British Government sent out a circular dispatch to the 
governing bodies of each of its self-governing colonies10 detailing the proceedings of the 
Venice conference and requesting that they observe the convention (Ridgeway 1897b). 
Correspondence between Britain and its colonies regarding the Venice Sanitary 
Convention of 1897 demonstrate the economic and political threat posed by the spread of 
plague. Plague within colonial zones represented not only a medical peril, but also the 
threat of isolation from both Britain and the Empire more broadly and most colonies 
accepted the terms of the convention. Certain colonial states like Hong Kong and parts of 
Australia rejected the regulations based on their structural inabilities to maintain the 
necessary facilities for quarantine, while others refused them because they were too lax. 
Ceylon’s Colonial Government saw the potential emergence of plague in their one port of 
Colombo and the economic consequences of having all of their exports delayed, 
quarantined and possibly destroyed, as catastrophic.  
If the plague broke out at Colombo, most vessels would doubtless cease to call 
there, and there would be no means, except at excessively high freight of exporting 
tea and other produce. This would mean disaster if not ruin… Before the Venice 
Convention there was no general agreement even among experts regarding the 
origin of the disease, the manner by which it could be transmitted and the period 
of incubation. Each nation judged for itself and as trade with Europe was far more 
important to this colony than trade with Western India, it was decided to sacrifice 
the latter in order to ensure the former. (Ridgeway 1897a:2,3) 
 
                                               
10 Self-governing colonies had the power to elect executive officials and make most 
domestic decisions without the oversight of Britain. Foreign affairs and defense were still 
controlled by Britain.  
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In later correspondence between Ceylon and Britain, the particular concern of colonized 
populations freely moving across territory drove the colonial administration to prophesize 
the downfall of the Tea Industry. 
“…regarding the proposed adherence of Ceylon to the Venice Sanitary Convention, 
and to state that the principal difficulty in adopting the convention arose out of the 
face that the immigration of Coolies for Tea Estates, even if the Plague should break 
out in the Districts whence they came, could not be stopped without great injury, if 
not ruin to the Tea industry.  
I assumed that the Rules of the Convention of Venice would apply to these arrivals 
in which case there would have been great peril to the Colony for these Coolies 
being free immediately on landing to spread over the island would scatter the seeds 
of disease as they went.”(Ridgeway 1898:65) 
 
In order to maintain trade with Europe the Colonial Government of Ceylon’s restrictions 
on India prior to 1897 were more stringent than those outlined in the Convention largely 
due to a decision to isolate itself from India rather than risk a local epidemic. As the 
correspondence between Ceylon’s government and Britain reflects, the economic penalties 
of such ostracization were most severe. News of plague and cholera spread via telegraph 
took a matter of days to reach all ports in Europe and the long quarantine or destruction of 
goods meant heavy losses to colonial corporations and the colonies themselves. Infected 
port cities would often wait until the last possible moment once all other causes had been 
exhausted to report the outbreak.  
 The enforcement of quarantine practices and the other preventive measures outlined 
in Chapter II of the Conventions had to then be carried out immediately by the colonies 
accepting of it. Though quarantine was no longer a desirable practice in Europe (Huber 
2006a) the acceptance of the International Sanitary Conventions within the colonies made 
such practices a necessity in the sites afflicted by plague, cholera or yellow fever. The pace 
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of information spread by telegraph meant that once one of these diseases had infected a 
new site it was highly unlikely that ships leaving colonial ports in the Southern Hemisphere 
could arrive at their European ports before restrictions were imposed. Clippings from 
public health reports show that within a single week of an outbreak being reported in 
colonial sites, other countries around the world established restrictions in keeping with the 
Conventions (GERMANY. Reports from Berlin as to plague in Cape Town, Africa 1901).  
This system of control reflected epidemic orientalist vision of protecting Europe 
first and foremost from the trade and traffic of colonial sites. The requirements in the 
Conventions were unidirectional, protecting the interests of Europe while leaving their 
dominions without a clear method of sanitary management for ships entering from Europe 
or the management of inter-colonial trade. While the Sanitary Conventions were effective 
in standardizing trade to Europe, the old challenges of quarantine were left for colonial 
sites beyond Europe to negotiate themselves.  
“A careful examination of the Convention discloses two very important lacunae:-- 
the Chapter relating to countries outside Europe contains no rules as to arrivals and 
the chapter relating to countries in Europe contains no rules for departures from 
plague infected ports in Europe… India intended no doubt all along to join the 
Convention and it might be said that rules for arrivals must surely have been 
provided for countries outside Europe. But during the meetings of the Conference, 
the question of the rules to be provided for arrivals in ports outside Europe was not 
discussed and I think that it was never present in any definite manner to the 
Delegates’ minds. They were concerned with keeping the plague out of Europe 
without interfering unduly with navigation and trade… From the purely local point 
of view, I think that a vessel arriving at a port of a Signatory Power from a port 
outside Europe abiding by the rules for departures from plague-infected ports could 
claim Convention treatment, quite apart from the treatment accorded in that port 
outside Europe to arrivals. But if that port imposed on arrivals restrictions greater 
than those declared by the Convention to be sufficient for the protection of public 
health in Europe, I think that a Signatory Power would have very good grounds, 
from what may be called a political point of view, for refusing Convention 
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treatment to ships coming from the port in question. There are no essential, but only 
accidental differences in sanitary matters between countries in Europe and out of 
Europe and it appears to me quite unreasonable, and indeed illogical, that, say, India 
or Ceylon because they are by accident outside of Europe, should expect to obtain, 
in European ports under the convention, a more favorable treatment than they 
themselves are prepared to give.” (Francis Hamilton, Secretary of State for India to 
Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office 1898). 
 
The pressures placed upon colonial dominions to maintain trade while preventing 
the emergence or spread of disease provoked drastic measures of social control by 
governments already well versed in quelling any anti-colonial dissent. India was especially 
active in this respect and drastic action was taken to prevent the spread of plague. British 
India provoked some of the greatest concern from the International Sanitary Conferences. 
The reservoir for cholera was seen to be within its territory and in 1896 a massive outbreak 
of plague beginning in Bombay would ultimately take 10 million lives within 25 years.  
The Indian colonial government faced two drastic problems from the International 
Sanitary Conventions during the plague outbreak-economic isolation and health 
emergency. While the conventions set the maximum standards for quarantine and 
prohibition of particular imports, European concerns over the spread of plague to Europe 
by Indian pilgrims en route to Mecca provoked a concern for both trade and traffic which 
threatened to leave the colony isolated from its Imperial lifelines.  
In response to this outbreak and the overwhelming concussive effects that the 
colonial government feared it may have, the British Government of India formulated the 
Epidemic Diseases act to apply to all of British India in 1897 (Arnold 2015:113; Govement 
of India Home Department 1897). These powers allowed the colonial authority to destroy 
any goods, homes and property potentially carrying plague and cancel any and all public 
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gatherings (Arnold 2015:113). Thousands of homes were destroyed and these control 
efforts were often carried out by the Indian military. The plague regulations under the 
epidemic diseases act reflected a microcosm of the ideologies present within the 
International Sanitary Conventions broadly. All activities of Indians thought to be 
responsible for spreading plague were controlled and private property could be seized and 
destroyed. Anyone suspected of carrying the plague or found in homes affected by plague 
could be quarantined (Govement of India Home Department 1897). Failing to cooperate 
with medical officials was punishable by imprisonment of up to six months in certain areas 
(Govement of India Home Department 1897:23)  
There were also significant controls in domestic travel across India. Railways and 
water routes were heavily controlled. In Madras, medical inspectors at railway stations 
were empowered to detain any person suspected of carrying the plague and any person 
leaving from a suspected plague area were required to hold a passport which the traveler 
was expected to present daily to the sanitary authority of their destination for ten days 
(Govement of India Home Department 1897:24). Local villages were also required to keep 
detailed ledgers of every person arriving from an infected area. Amongst the data required 
in the register was Fathers name and Caste.  
“The Headman of every village shall keep himself promptly informed of the arrival 
of every person from an infected area without a passport, and shall deal with him 
as in the preceding clauses of this regulation to which such person shall be bound 
to submit himself. (vii) A register shall be maintained by each local authority in the 
following form:– 
(1) Date and receipt of Intimation 
(2) Name of traveler. 
(3) From what infected area arriving.  
(4) Date of arrival of traveler. 
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(5) Number, date and place of issue of passport. 
(6) How long kept under observation 
(7) State of health of the traveler and other persons living in the house in which he 
is or has been residing. 
(8) Date of departure to the local authority of the place of destination. 
(9) Date of intimation of departure to the local authority of the place of destination. 
(10) Date of dispatch of the passport to the Tahsildar [Inspector] 
 
(viii) In the case of persons passing through a Railway Frontier Inspection Station, 
the medical officer in charge shall arrange to record the following information in 
respect to every traveler from an infected area who is not detained by him under 
the provisions of Regulation 14 and send it without delay–if possible by the railway 
guard of the same or next train–to the District Medical and Sanitary Officer of the 
district to which such traveler is proceeding:– 
 
(1) Name and Date of arrival 
(2) Name of traveler. 
(3) Father’s name. 
(4) Caste. 
(5) Age. 
(6) Whence Coming.” (Government of India Home Department 1897:25–26) 
 
It was also suggested that carriages holding lower class travelers should be scrutinized 
more aggressively for plague.  
 
Under the auspices of the plague regulations, the British colonial authorities deployed 
novel techniques of biometric surveillance and data collection. Prior to the first effective 
employment of finger print analysis in criminal cases (Cole 1998), fingerprinting to 
ascertain the validity of plague inoculation certificates were enforced in response to the 
outbreak. The first finger print bureau was established in Calcutta in 1897 and was put into 
service quickly to monitor any populations suspected of carrying disease. 
 
CONCLUSION  
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 The implementation of the International Sanitary Conventions in the latter part of 
the 19th century produced a dramatic shift in disease control globally and represent the 
ancestor of all future international disease regulations. The Conventions set out standard 
regulations for the control and management of three diseases considered most concerning 
not only to Europe but to their international relationships and colonial dominions 
elsewhere. The International Sanitary Conferences united Europe’s understanding of 
disease threat under an epidemic orientalism which mediated the construction of disease 
risk and organized responses to threats accordingly. These three diseases, plague, cholera 
and yellow fever through their threat to trade that interrupted the circuitry of empire and 
their ability to disturb the boundaries between colonizer and colonized globally would 
continue to be the dominant diseases of focus for international regulations until 2005 when 
the International Health Regulations were comprehensively reformed. The Conventions 
formulated a new apparatus of disease control, whereby diseases could be monitored and 
controlled at a distance by telegraph and the imposition of strict economic penalties upon 
any port region afflicted. The emergence of these three diseases could spell ruin for colonial 
powers reliant on trade to Europe and as a result they levied aggressive and overwhelming 
systems of disease control upon their colonial populations. Disease further mobilized racial 
and ethnic anxieties about the quotidian actions of colonized subjects, which provoked 
massive responses in the name of sanitation.  
 In provoking such responses, which produced novel forms of population 
surveillance in response to the ever-constant threat of economic isolation, European 
empires were able to remotely determine the strategies of health interventions in affected 
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areas. European powers were able to monitor, through an intensive practice of surveillance, 
the effects of plague, cholera and yellow fever and their proximity to their ports.   
 This chapter has shown how and why the International Sanitary Conventions were 
ratified and the concerns from which they emerged. Global imperial expansion prompted 
a new threat of diseases returning to imperial centers from their colonial domains. These 
strained piecemeal quarantine systems that triggered political crises between trading 
nations and risked economic and epidemiological catastrophe. Scientific knowledge of the 
causes of disease, merging with these wider economic and orientalist concerns provided 
the groundwork for a novel form of standardized international disease control. Europe and 
Ottoman Empires managed to protect themselves from the threat of these diseases, while 
reestablishing their power through the shifting of aggressive sanitary responses from their 
shores to those of their colonies. In the next chapter we will explore how the International 
Sanitary Conventions triggered divergent colonial responses to epidemic diseases, with 
long lasting and devastating results.  
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CHAPTER III: IMPERIAL VISIONS OF THREAT1112- DIVERGENT 
RESPONSES TO PLAGUE AND SMALLPOX IN CAPE TOWN 
INTRODUCTION 
As seen in the previous chapter, the International Sanitary Conventions and the 
epidemic orientalism that they represented threatened economic isolation to any nation 
affected by plague, cholera or yellow fever. This prompted drastic responses from colonial 
agents reliant upon trade with their imperial center for their continued dominance; 
responses which were not required for other diseases. The previous chapter outlined the 
broad global mechanisms through which a new paradigm of disease control was 
constructed. This chapter expands on this to show the ways in which concerns over the 
particular diseases regulated by the conventions manifested divergent outcomes to 
comparative epidemics at the sites of outbreaks. This chapter also explores in greater detail 
how outbreaks of these diseases mobilized medical actors from around the world and 
justified aggressive responses to epidemic threats through the application of medical 
knowledge. Probing deeper into the actions of individual medical actors in structuring 
                                               
11 This chapter, like the published article it draws from is dedicated to Daryl Carr and the 
Carr Family.  
12 Much of this chapter was previously published as White, Alexandre I. R. “Global Risks, 
Divergent Pandemics: Contrasting Responses to Bubonic Plague and Smallpox in 1901 
Cape Town.” Social Science History, November 2017, 1–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2017.41. ã Social Science History Association, 2017. The 
link to this article can be found below.  
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-science-history/article/global-risks-divergent-
pandemics-contrasting-responses-to-bubonic-plague-and-smallpox-in-1901-cape-
town/20F3E49CF8B45CF26C5B3F30E4BB57BB 
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disease responses, this chapter also demonstrates how epidemic orientalism traveled 
manifested itself in disease responses. This chapter considers such a case- the conflicting 
responses to plague and smallpox in 1901 Cape Town.  
The outbreak of plague in Cape Town presents a complex puzzle. While plague 
was indeed a serious and major threat, Cape Town had been experiencing one of the city’s 
largest smallpox epidemics in history prior to the outbreak of plague. Though plague 
produced some of the most aggressive sanitary controls ever seen in the city, smallpox was 
left largely untreated. The different responses to each of these outbreaks can be explained 
by the differing perceptions of their threat of spread to Europe and the threat posed by 
plague to the economic isolation of the Cape Colony. Where plague was a disease marked 
through the International Sanitary Conventions as threatening to its signatory powers, 
smallpox was seen as ubiquitous around the globe and less threatening to Europeans 
(Howard-Jones 1975). The case of plague in Cape Town shows how global networks of 
medical actors were mobilized to respond to threats to the international sanitary regime 
prompting much more aggressive and significant responses than to other seemingly 
destructive epidemics. These divergent responses to these twin epidemics also show how 
powerful epidemic orientalism and the Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus were for 
organizing perspectives on disease threat and structuring responses to diseases that served 
the interests of European authorities.  
As plague spread around the world, its effects on the social make-up of colonial 
space would extend far beyond India. In response to the arrival of plague in Cape Town 
the Colonial authorities imposed a novel urban model of colonial population control that 
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would echo through history as one of the most totalizing and oppressive structures of the 
20th century- the Township13 (Bickford-Smith 1995; van Heyningen 1989b; Sambumbu 
2010; Swanson 1977). On March 12th 1901, the Cape Government forcibly removed six-
thousand black Africans under armed guard and transferred them to Uitvlugt, a temporary 
quarantine site later made permanent as the township Ndabeni. This evacuation occurred 
without concern for actual infection or based on exposure to the disease. Removal was 
conditional upon race and living situation only. Though it was claimed that the segregated 
space of Uitvlugt was a temporary site, the Cape Government deferred the decision to close 
the area until 1902, when the legislature established it as a permanent site. All movement 
in and out of Uitvlugt, later known as Ndabeni, was prohibited without a pass, echoing the 
practices of British India and a bitter precursor of what was to come in the form of the pass 
laws in Apartheid South Africa. The Cape Town plague epidemic marks a pivotal moment 
in which medical practices calibrated with imperial concerns over the maintenance of 
health in white European populations to produce novel forms of racial governance that 
would later be concretized and reproduced across South Africa (Swanson 1977). These 
actions transformed the urban space of the city and produced the blueprint for the first 
state-monitored and regulated, racially delineated, enclosed residential space in South 
Africa–the first township. The responses to the Cape Town plague epidemic of 1901 were 
                                               
13 While racial segregation had been employed against workers in the gold and diamond-
mining camps of the Rand and Kimberley by corporate interests, this was the first time 
that urban racial segregation had been practiced against the general public by the colonial 
government of the Cape. 
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facilitated in large part through the systems of disease control mandated by the Venice 
International Sanitary Convention of 1897.  
Smallpox had been ravaging Cape Town since 1882 when it killed up to 4000 
people that year (van Heyningen 1989). Between 1882 and 1902, the disease regularly 
infected several thousand annually. While smallpox was certainly a serious local threat to 
public health, the emergence of bubonic plague was a global phenomenon eliciting 
widespread concern from various European and Asian empires (Echenberg 2002, 2007; 
Harrison 2013b). It was the global aspect of the disease that produced new forms of disease 
control and led to the aggressive racial quarantining and surveillance in Cape Town. The 
global threat of plague to European economic interests and to the continued success of the 
British Cape Colony provided the justification to enact the local quarantining and 
permanent surveillance of black African persons in Cape Town. These actions were seen 
by the medical actors in Cape Town as necessary for protecting Imperial interests around 
the world. For these reasons the city of Cape Town marshaled vast resources towards 
fighting plague. Medical expertise, rooted in epidemic orientalism from both within Cape 
Town as well as foreign authorities, and understandings of previous plague outbreaks in 
India and elsewhere viewed the arrival of plague in Cape Town as a consequence of racial 
mixing which guided the local responses to the epidemic, ultimately producing the first 
urban township in the city. The response to plague in Cape Town, much in contrast to that 
of smallpox demonstrates the scope of the recently instantiated Trans-Imperial Health 
Apparatus emerging from the International Sanitary Conventions. Where smallpox was a 
localized issue, the response to plague marshaled medical experts from around the world, 
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versed in the management of the disease, prompted global concerns for its spread and cost 
the small colony a great deal financially. It also transformed the racial cartography of South 
Africa forever. International concerns for the spread of plague, which isolated the Cape 
Colony melded with latent racial anxieties to provoke one of the most aggressive disease 
controls of its time.  
CONTRASTING RESPONSES TO PLAGUE AND SMALLPOX  
 The first case of plague was discovered in Cape Town on February 2nd 1901. By 
the 4th of February, Dr. John Gregory, the Acting Medical Officer for the Colony had 
confirmed the diagnosis of plague pending a full bacterial analysis. In order to coordinate 
plague prevention activities, the Cape Sanitary Authority formed the Cape Plague Advisory 
Council and met regularly to provide guidance to the Cape Government and report on 
health activities. This Council was comprised of the Mayors of each municipality as well 
as Dr. John Gregory the chief Medical Officer for the Colony and Dr. William Simpson 
the chief advisor to the plague council. The council met twenty times until the 10th of July 
whereupon the members decided it was no longer necessary to convene as the plague threat 
had dissipated (Cape Peninsula Advisory Board 1901). The Government of Cape Town 
took on the full financial burden for the outbreak, which was at its conclusion to total over 
£300,000 or the equivalent of £30,000,000 today. What resulted was an almost total 
lockdown of the city.  
 From the first case of plague, the acting health authorities, namely Dr. Simpson and 
Dr. Gregory had a significant remit to quickly enact policy and operated largely unchecked 
by other authorities. Upon the announcement of the outbreak, Gregory began circulating 
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pamphlets to the public on the prevention and recognition of plague. These pamphlets 
largely focused on personal hygiene within the home, cleanliness and how to eradicate rats. 
These handbills were delivered by a newly enlisted force of sanitation personnel under the 
authority of a district medical officer. Very early in the outbreak, health responses 
galvanized around a racialized logic that placed heightened levels of disease surveillance 
amongst the city’s poorest while reducing the monitoring of Europeans to a minimum. 
Among the sanitation team’s responsibilities were the eradication of rats and the daily 
inspections “of all lower class houses, and a less frequent inspection of the houses of better 
class Europeans” (Gregory and Simpson 1901:4). Many of these homes were populated by 
recently migrated black Africans from other regions of Southern Africa and inspections 
galvanized around the concerns of overcrowding within houses occupied by blacks. 
 The daily inspections of lower class houses were often carried out in the middle of 
the night, the logic being that the occupants would have a more difficult time hiding the 
evidence of overcrowding (Cape Peninsula Advisory Board 1901:138). Such inspections 
took place on a daily basis for several months after the initial case of plague. The process 
of isolating cases of the plague was equally as swift and forceful. All known or likely cases 
of plague were removed from their homes, along with all other contacts within the home 
as well as from some adjoining houses. Initially they were moved to the newly equipped 
plague hospital. The houses of infected persons were disinfected and sanitized, a process 
often taking several days or weeks. All houses labeled unfit for human habitation were 
permanently shuttered. All infected articles of clothing or goods were either disinfected or 
destroyed at the will of the medical authorities. All Capetonians attempting to leave the 
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city, either by rail or by ship, were stopped and their baggage and their person’s searched 
(Gregory and Simpson 1901). Removals from infected homes were proving disastrous for 
the former inhabitants as those either released from quarantine at the hospital or awaiting 
the disinfection of their homes were forced effectively into homelessness. The Plague 
Advisory Council saw this as a major threat of further disease spread (Cape Peninsula 
Advisory Board 1901).  
 The health authorities ultimately decided that wholesale segregation of the black 
urban population in Cape Town, regardless of health status or proximity to the infected was 
a justifiable response to plague. On March 12th all black Africans inhabiting the city’s 
poorest urban areas were forcibly removed and transferred to the area immediately 
surrounding the Plague Hospital in a former sewage station known as Uitvlugt. By the end 
of May roughly 6,000 black persons were removed to Uitvlugt.  
 The reaction to smallpox was very different, even though it too was deadly. The 
first major outbreak of smallpox swept through Cape Town in 1713. This outbreak wiped 
out a quarter of the European populace and roughly a third of the enslaved population while 
also having utterly devastating effects on the Khoi-San population (van Heyningen 1989b; 
Ross 1977). Later epidemics produced drastic and near-equally deadly consequences in 
1735, 1755 and 1767. Epidemics were also common in the early nineteenth century 
occurring in 1807, 1812, 1840 and 1858 (van Heyningen 1989b:123). In 1801 inoculation 
against smallpox became common practice in Cape Town, however, as the century 
progressed, the challenges in transporting effective smallpox cultures from Britain meant 
that inoculation required a rather painful invasive medical process that proved unpopular 
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(van Heyningen 1989b:127). Due to a lack of healthy cultures drawn from British calf 
lymph nodes shipped to the Cape, most inoculations required tissue drawn from live 
patients and through arm-to-arm inoculation. This process was quite painful for the donor 
(van Heyningen 1989b:127) and the practice of inoculation drew widespread ire and 
coverage in the early 19th century was piecemeal at best.  
 An outbreak of smallpox in 1882 would prove to have the most significant 
consequences upon the public health system of any disease prior to the plague outbreak of 
1901. In 1882 a ship, the Drummond Castle, landed in the Cape with a case of smallpox 
onboard leading to one of the largest outbreaks in the history of the city and the most deadly 
since the first epidemics of the disease in the 18th century (van Heyningen 1989b:132). 
According to various estimates, this outbreak took between 1,000 to 4,000 lives equating 
to a mortality rate within the population of Cape Town of between 2 and 5%14 (Bickford-
Smith 2003:102; van Heyningen 1989b:135; Phillips 2012:157).  
  The Cape government attempted to implement quarantine. However 
disorganization and heavy storms slowed efforts to remove contacts to quarantine sites (van 
Heyningen 1989b). There were, prior to the outbreak, no quarantine centers in and around 
Cape Town and no legislation to coordinate such a large health crisis. The New Somerset 
                                               
14Estimates as to the total number of deaths vary significantly between scholars on this 
matter. While Bickford Smith (2003) suggests that the total mortality was around 400 
during the outbreak, Van Heyningen argues based on reporting from the hospitals and 
news outlets of the time that mortality was likely closer to 1400 (1989b). Phillips (2012) 
argues for the highest estimate of roughly 4000 dead due to this smallpox epidemic. 
While these estimates vary drastically, the small population of Cape Town at the time of 
around 45,000 reflects that even if the outbreak caused as few as 400 deaths, it would 
have reflected a drop of roughly 1% of the total population.  
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Hospital, the main point of treatment, also had no facilities in which to isolate patients. 
Tent cities were established on Paarden Island which became even further isolated due to 
poor weather making it almost impossible to access (van Heyningen 1989:134). A farm 
was offered as a quarantine facility by a local landowner but this area soon became too 
small to support the rising infection rate and had to increase the number of beds at the farm 
by almost 100. The city’s sanitation authorities were overwhelmed. Within the quarantine 
facilities, patients were segregated according to race while smallpox lymphs, used for 
inoculation were only taken from white children (Bickford-Smith 2003:105). 
 Unlike in other outbreaks of smallpox discussed earlier, in Cape Town the disease 
reflected a rising concern for the diseases ability to travel from colonized to colonizer. The 
epidemic orientalist gaze became deeply fixed upon this outbreak and the non-white 
population as its root cause. It was during this outbreak that calls for the segregation, 
primarily of the coloured population reached fever pitch. Letters, both in the Cape Times 
and the Lantern, two prominent periodicals of the time called for the residential segregation 
of the non-white population from Europeans. An anonymous letter published under the 
name ‘Friend of the Free State’ in the Cape Times stated “it is high time that the White 
people of the Metropolis built a town for themselves and left the present town for [a] 
location for the Malays, Mozambiques… et hoc genus omne… to breed fever” (Cape 
Times August 31 1882, quoted in Bickford-Smith 2003:75).  
 Despite the end of the 1882 epidemic, the racial animus surrounding smallpox did 
not cease to exist. When sanitation authorities advocated closing the cemeteries within the 
boundaries of Cape Town in 1885 and 1886, the focus of blame for contagion shifted to 
  
92 
the Muslim burial practices of the Malay15 population. The primarily non-white European 
but racially mixed Malay population mobilized to protest the closing of the cemeteries and 
met with significant resistance from Cape police. Muslim burial ceremonies in Cape Town 
were large and were a central community practice (Baderoon 2004:266). The protests were 
cast in the public media as ‘Oriental Fanaticism’ equating Muslim practice with obstinacy 
in the face of health threats to the larger community and the Malay as insanitary as a result. 
While preventing burial ceremonies, the closures of the cemeteries also eliminated a major 
non-white display of political unity and communal practice.  
 
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENCE  
 Explanations for the imposition of racial segregation as a response to the outbreak 
of plague in 1901 Cape Town have focused primarily on how epidemic emergency and the 
threat of massive urban contagion was employed to justify racial separation. Maynard 
Swanson’s 1977 work The Sanitation Syndrome articulates clearly how the specter of 
epidemic outbreak became a powerful metaphor for rationalizing racially specific urban 
segregation policies in early 20th century Cape Town. Epidemic outbreaks provided an 
opportunity for segregationists to justify their positions by arguing that cohabitation of 
urban spaces by different races presented a public health concern to the European 
population of the city (Swanson 1977:387). Scholarship on this moment of early urban 
                                               
15 Within the colonial imaginary, the Malay, a term used to describe practicing Muslims, 
were seen as a model for the law abiding non-white citizenry; law fearing and industrious 
and much in contrast to the image of the ‘native’ or black African (Baderoon 2004:262–
63). 
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racial separation have primarily explored the role of public health in promoting 
segregationist aims (Bickford-Smith 1995; Bickford-Smith, Heyningen, and Worden 1999; 
van Heyningen 1989b; Swanson 1977). 
 While epidemic moments were indeed periods in which segregationists attempted 
to coopt health concerns with racial animus, not all outbreaks engendered the same 
response. Smallpox is a key example. Calls for segregation had been voiced as early as 
1882, and despite racial animus in response to the threat of smallpox, segregation never 
materialized in response. Instead, as noted above, smallpox was treated with more 
traditional forms of quarantine.  
  Prior to the outbreak of smallpox in 1882, the Cape sanitary and health authorities 
had little power with which to disperse funds to support health responses, or centralize 
activities, this explains why this particular outbreak did not result in segregation.16  After 
the outbreak of 1882 slowed, the Cape Government ratified the Public Health Act of 1883 
and established a permanent position of sanitary health officer and required by law that all 
persons receive smallpox inoculations. The Public Health Act of 1883 was amended in 
1897 to provide significantly more powers to colonial health authorities during epidemic 
events, guaranteeing essentially unlimited government funds to enact reforms and protect 
                                               
16 The cost of forcibly removing and separating the racial populations of the city became 
a pressing reason not to employ such action as it was unclear whether the government or 
other entity would pay for the removals. Segregation would also raise a constitutional 
issue around forcibly removing an enfranchised population (Bickford-Smith, Heyningen, 
and Worden 1999:229) as Cape law at the time guaranteed franchise largely universally. 
Commercial interests raised further concerns that having their labor so far from their 
places of work would unduly encumber production. This may explain why the epidemic 
of 1882 did not result in segregation. 
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the city. The Public Health Act of 1897 No. 15 was ultimately enforced in 1901 to provide 
colonial medical officers the authority to enact a racial quarantine of Cape Town. However, 
after 1883, and most importantly in 1901, the legal conditions to enact segregation were 
the same for both plague and smallpox. During this time smallpox still remained a serious 
threat to the Cape population yet was not met with the responses mobilized against plague 
in 1901.  
Table 2. Number of Cases from Smallpox and Plague in Cape Town- 1896-1901 
 
Caption: All Smallpox data from (Mitchell 1922). All bubonic plague data from (van 
Heyningen 1989b) and (Echenberg 2002) 
 
 From 1897 to 1901, Cape Town reported up to 2000 cases of smallpox per year. In 
1900, there were 2200 cases alone almost equaling case totals from the 1882 outbreak. 
Most of Cape Town’s Public Health legislation was formed to prevent the spread of 
smallpox and the disease was, prior to 1901, associated with the city’s non-European 
population. In spite of increasing infection rates, a legacy of racial stigma towards smallpox 
and the state capacity to enact sweeping reforms to combat the spread of the disease, racial 
quarantine measures were never pursued in the case of smallpox.  
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 Existing medical knowledge drawn from the time also fails to explain why plague 
would be met with these particular forms of racial governance as opposed to smallpox. 
Doctors of the period perceived smallpox to be much more interpersonally contagious as 
opposed to bubonic plague, for which rats were considered the primary vector (Cape 
Peninsula Advisory Board 1901). A memorandum sent to house owners at the outbreak of 
plague in Cape Town suggests that personal interaction was less likely to spread plague 
than smallpox.  
“Plague is not a highly infectious disease in the sense that small-pox, scarlet fever 
and spotted typhus are. There is no infection in the air of a clean and well-lighted 
room in which a Plague patient is lying, nor is there the slightest danger to the 
persons who nurse or move the patient, as long as they are careful to wash and 
disinfect their hands, and to disinfect the discharges of the patient and the cups and 
spoons and other utensils.” (Cape Peninsula Advisory Board 1901:15) 
 
This position is derived from a medical paper written a year prior to the outbreak by Dr. 
William Simpson, the man who would become the consulting medical officer to the Cape 
on plague.  
“Plague is not a highly infectious disease in the sense that small-pox, scarlet fever 
and spotted typhus are and the measures which have proved effective against the 
latter have proved a signal failure in the case of Plague. Why? Because neither 
small-pox, scarlet fever, nor typhus are diseases of house vermin: Plague on the 
other hand is, and therefore unless we can eliminate this element in the sanitary 
problem, all other efforts are bound to be futile.” (Simpson 1900:12) 
 
These statements would suggest a stronger argument for the quarantining of smallpox 
patients rather than those infected with plague, as interpersonal contagion would generally 
mandate a greater need to isolate infected persons capable of spreading the disease through 
their own agency. The Plague Advisory Council was aware that the greater threat of plague-
spread stemmed from both surfaces and rodents, yet the focus of interventions came to 
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center on the removal of black Africans and the prevention of their un-surveilled movement 
around the city and the concealment of cases. 
 
THE 1901 PLAGUE OUTBREAK-THE ARRIVAL OF A GLOBAL THREAT  
 By the time plague arrived in Cape Town in 1901, it had already swept through 
Bombay, and other parts of India as well as Hong Kong. This had crippling effects, not 
only upon the populations affected but also threatened to destabilize global maritime trade 
as the concern for the spread of plague from the Southern Hemisphere to Europe grew in 
the eyes of European nations.  
 
Imperial Controls and the Threat of Colonial Isolation 
 Prior to the emergence of bubonic plague, the Cape Colony was subject to the 
International Sanitary Conventions of 1897 which brought the added economic pressures 
to eradicate the diseases that were discussed in chapter 2. 
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Figure 2. Timeline of the Third Bubonic Plague Pandemic Prior to Cape Town Epidemic 
97 
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Caption: All dates and data from (Echenberg 2002, 2007; Gregory and Simpson 1901; 
Mayor et al. 1897; Simpson 1900) 
 
The Venice Conference of 1897, prompted by the devastating effects of the plague 
outbreak in Bombay that accounted for roughly 15% of all of India’s deaths that year 
(Echenberg 2007:50) and the risk of plague to Europe from India traveling through the 
Persian Gulf and Red Sea, (Echenberg 2007:79) was the first conference to focus solely on 
a single disease– plague. Prior to the Venice Conference there was no formal consensus on 
how plague was transmitted (Ridgeway 1897a).  
 The previous chapter demonstrated the perilous condition any colonial sites found 
itself in during an outbreak of plague, cholera or yellow fever. A greater understanding of 
the pathology of bubonic plague shifted the focus in Europe from containment after 
infection to the prevention of transference of the disease to European locales. The 
convention sought to achieve this through rigorous medical inspections of persons and 
vessels incoming from plague ports and the isolation and quarantine of those infected if the 
disease was found to be present (Echenberg 2002; Ersoy et al. 2011; Howard-Jones 1975; 
Mayor et al. 1897). The presence of an epidemic of one of these three diseases meant 
isolation from necessary trade routes and the elimination of exporting power for the 
duration of the outbreak.  
 
Disease, Epidemic Orientalism and Colonial Dominance: Dr. William John Ritchie 
Simpson and the Cape Town Epidemic 
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 The threat of plague to Imperial interests forced the British Empire to carefully 
monitor plague outbreaks within their domains and mandated responses within colonies to 
be reported back to London (Great Britain Parliament House of Commons 1902; Gregory 
and Simpson 1901, 1901; Nathan 1898; Simpson 1903). The efficacy of responses were 
judged not only by the state of health within distant colonies but by the methods employed 
to fight them by governmental leaders in Britain (Great Britain Parliament House of 
Commons 1902; Nathan 1898).  
 In sites of plague outbreak within the British Empire, medical consultants with 
previous experience tackling the plague were often called upon to develop policies (Boyce 
1901)17. The prestige of such a position, derived from competition amongst other elite 
doctors and researchers from around the world, made their opinions very powerful in 
                                               
17 A letter from the University College Liverpool to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies dated February 12th 1901, ten days after plague was first diagnosed in the Cape, 
suggests the competitive nature of these positions and the desire on the part of research 
institutions to capitalize on these opportunities.  
“Seeing there is a probability of Cape Town becoming infected by Plague I have 
the honour to inform you that we have here Dr. Balfour Stewart who, should 
you require an expert on Plague would be willing to proceed to Cape Town. Dr. 
Balfour Stewart was out in India in charge of Plague operations and was also for 
some time assistant to Professor Haffkine. Since returning home he has been 
attached to this Laboratory and also serves the Liverpool Corporation as 
Assistant Bacteriologist and in that capacity he has more than anyone else 
contributed to preventing the entry of Plague into the port of Liverpool… I need 
not allude to the importance of Bacteriological Diagnosis which in the case of 
plague is sometimes the only method of Diagnosis, and in any case is a final 
proof. I have, &c., (Sgd) Rubert Boyce, Dean of the Liverpool School of 
Tropical Medicine” (Boyce 1901).  
While Dr. Stewart ultimately did not receive the posting, his previous experience of 
treating plague internationally in India, his role as a bacteriologist capable of diagnosing 
plague and his medical relationship to Dr. Haffkine, a noted plague doctor, provided the 
primary support for his candidacy for a medical position in Cape Town. 
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setting policy ( Haynes 2001; Packard 2011). Professor William Simpson who was the 
primary medical supervising consultant on plague in Cape Town was previously the 
Colonial Health Officer in Calcutta as well as a Lecturer and Co-founder of the London 
School of Tropical Medicine. In 1900 Dr. Simpson published a paper titled Memorandum 
on the Influence of Rats In the Dissemination of Plague (1900) which was the first to link 
rats to the spread of plague in scientific terms.   
 Appointed by the Colonial Secretary as the leader of the plague response in Cape 
Town in conjunction with Dr. Gregory the Chief Medical Officer, they operated freely to 
direct Cape funds to their policy directives as a result of the Public Health laws in place in 
the city (Gregory and Simpson 1901). The choice of Dr. Simpson as the primary medical 
consultant to the Cape Government who was given overwhelming responsibility to enact 
disease controls (van Heyningen 1989b; Swanson 1977) was central to the imposition of 
racial quarantine in Cape Town. Simpson’s own experiences in other British dominions as 
well as his perspectives on the role of race in preventing disease spread tessellated with the 
racial anxieties of both the Plague Advisory Council and much of the European population 
of Cape Town. In many ways his own medical prominence and his epidemic orientalism 
allowed him to further very aggressive racist aims in response to outbreaks. Dr. Simpson’s 
role in the Cape Town epidemic and his future endeavors demonstrates the global 
circulation of the epidemic orientalist discourse amongst medical experts and colonial 
spaces. 
 Simpson’s approach at forced removals in Cape Town was not his first foray into 
large-scale evacuations and the racist approach to public health and hygiene taken in the 
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city was not to be his last. In almost every previous and future placement regardless of the 
disease present at the time, Simpson advocated for the separation of the white European 
population from the local one whenever it could be practicably implemented as a strategy 
to prevent any disease spread affecting colonial interests. Simpson was an aggressive 
advocate for the segregation of tropical colonial cities, both in the interest of malaria 
prevention and the ever-present threat caused by what he saw as the insanitary habits and 
environments of the local people.  
 Prior to his posting in Cape Town, Simpson was the Chief Medical Officer of 
Calcutta where he unsuccessfully conducted an evacuation of a plague afflicted area (Great 
Britain Parliament House of Commons 1902:334). Colonial reports on the plague outbreak 
in Calcutta found that infected persons that were removed from their homes “merely 
transferred themselves to other houses” (Great Britain Parliament House of Commons 
1902:334) both spreading the disease and making the widespread evacuations ineffective 
in the eyes of the British Government. The size of Calcutta’s population also rendered the 
wholesale removal of people from a certain area almost impossible. In Cape Town 
however, the scale was far more manageable for such an undertaking.  
 After leaving the Cape, Simpson was stationed in Hong Kong to consult upon the 
continued epidemic of plague in the city. Here he recommended the construction of 
segregated hospitals to accommodate patients.  
“Outside the Sanitary Department and in the domain of hospital which is ably and 
admirably controlled by the Principal Improvement Medical Officer of the Colony, is 
the Government Infectious Hospital, to which the plague patients are sent for treatment. 
This hospital was not originally built for the purpose for which it is now used and is 
consequently deficient, in many respects, in the accommodation necessary for such 
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institutions,… It is necessary in a well-arranged infectious hospital that separate 
buildings be provided for each of these diseases, both for Europeans and Chinese.” 
(Simpson 1903:113) 
 
Soon after his appointment in Hong Kong, Simpson returned to Africa to consult in both 
West and Central Africa on health, sanitation and urban planning in the tropics. It was at 
this time that he wrote several books on the topic of health in the region. Twice more he 
advocated strongly for the segregation of Colonial urban spaces.  
“There are certain important points in connection with dwelling houses in the tropics 
which should be borne in mind when either leasing or building a house. First, the houses 
should not be surrounded by nor close to native huts. Native children are seldom not 
infected with malaria, and hence living in a dwelling house in this position increases 
the risk of infection from that disease. For this reason a dwelling house among native 
huts is an unhealthy house, apart from the fact that it will also always be in the midst 
of other insanitary conditions.” (Simpson 1905:32) 
 
“Secondly, the segregation of the residential quarters of the Europeans away from the 
native town. The business quarters, if in the neighbourhood of the natives, should only 
be occupied during the day.” (Simpson 1908:371) 
 
In this same piece, Simpson calls for strict racial controls akin to the pass laws that were 
later implemented both in Cape Town and throughout South Africa and were previously 
extant during the Cape’s period of enslavement. 
“For Europe and other countries advanced in sanitary organization, these 
regulations secure a very considerable degree of protection, but for tropical 
countries with their different conditions, and often with no proper sanitary 
organization, certain modifications are desirable in order to prevent the importation 
of plague by land or sea. These are, that native passengers from an infected point 
should at the time of embarkation and inspection by the medical officer of the port 
produce a certificate of having been inoculated at least a week previously; and that 
natives from an infected area should not be admitted into healthy areas without 
passports indicating that they have been inoculated.” (Simpson 1908:359) 
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Simpson’s justifications for segregation in response to disease stemmed both from an 
argument about cultural incommensurability as well as biological justifications for why 
European bodies were at heightened risk from local diseases.  
“…it has to be recognized that the standards and mode of life of the Asiatic do not 
ordinarily consort with the European, whilst the customs of Europeans are at times 
not acceptable to the Asiatics, and that those of the African unfamiliar with and not 
adapted to the new conditions of town life will not blend with either. Also that the 
diseases to which these different races are respectively liable are readily 
transferable to the European and vice versa, a result especially liable to occur when 
their dwellings are near each other. In the interests of each community and of the 
healthiness of the locality and country, it is absolutely essential that in every town 
and trade centre the town planning should provide well defined and separate 
quarters or wards for Europeans, Asiatics and Africans, as well as those divisions 
which are necessary in a town of one nationality and race, and that there should be 
a neutral belt of open unoccupied country of at least 300 yards in width between 
the European residences and those of the Asiatic and African.” (Simpson (1915) in 
Curtin 1985:611) 
 
Simpson’s recommendations were ultimately accepted and enacted by the Colonial 
Government.  
 Without the larger global focus upon plague and the significant monitoring imposed 
by the British Empire to prevent its spread, William Simpson would not have been 
appointed as the senior advisor on plague to Cape Town. The circulation of experts to 
plague sites around the southern hemisphere was driven by the larger concerns of Europe 
to halt its spread as evidenced in the perspectives and concerns that drove the Venice 
Convention of 1897.  
RACIAL MIXING AND THE THREAT OF PLAGUE IN CAPE TOWN 
 In Cape Town, the particular threat of plague-spread to all racial groups within the 
city reflected a threat to white colonial dominance that was echoed by the economic perils 
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posed by the continued presence of epidemic in Cape Town. As explored in chapter 2, the 
presence of plague in a port city mandated, under the Sanitary Conventions, an almost total 
embargo of all goods to and from the city and strict quarantines of any vessels arriving 
from that port. This would cause severe financial burden on the colonial city, in some cases 
tantamount to total colonial collapse (Ridgeway 1897a, 1898) This further stoked the long 
held concerns among white Europeans over the racial integration of urban space. It was the 
melding of the Imperial concerns over disease control and the role of racial segregation, 
perceived as a necessary technology for the management of colonial and colonized 
populations espoused by Dr. Simpson that aligned with the long-held White Capetonian 
concerns about how to manage and control an increasing black population in the face of 
epidemic emergency that produced the first township in the city.  
 The concerns of plague both as a threat to health but also to colonial stability were 
evident in the statements made about the disease even prior to its arrival in Southern Africa. 
Nearly two years before the major outbreak of plague in Cape Town, calls for racial 
segregation, as well as limitations to immigration in the hopes of preventing major 
outbreaks, were levied both in government and by the general European public. Drawing 
upon existing language from the Venice Convention, a council made up of representatives 
not only of the Cape Colony but from all of the territories of South Africa addressed the 
particular concern of Indian immigration as a potential cause of plague-spread at an Inter-
State conference on the disease, held in Pretoria in 1899. 
“…this Conference recommends that steps be immediately taken by all South African 
Governments to provide for the prohibition or restriction of immigration into this 
country from countries in which Plague is prevalent; to place under proper , and 
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sufficient restrictions the moving about of persons likely to contribute to the more rapid 
spread of the infection of Plague within their territories.” (van Heyningen 1989b:297). 
 
This position, while not accepted by the Cape Colony delegation, demonstrates the concern 
for plague’s arrival from other ports located with the travel of persons rather than trade and 
goods. Though plague, as stated earlier was less interpersonally contagious, the threat of 
immigration particularly of Indians and Asians was ultimately perceived as a threat (van 
Heyningen 1989:300).  
 The South African League, a British nationalist organization writing in the Cape 
Times, raised comparisons between the hygienic conditions in Bombay and Cape Town 
publicly as justification for outright segregation.  
“In conclusion let me remind your readers that many of the unsanitary conditions of 
Bombay are in evidence in the crowded, dirty, and ill-ventilated dwellings of our poorer 
coloured folk, and that plague, once domiciled amongst us, would lead to an appalling 
mortality and to enormous expense, for no measure short of wholesale segregation, and 
demolition of many houses in toto, would even shorten the epidemic.” Quoted in (van 
Heyningen 1989b:297). 
 
Plague was simultaneously recognized as a threat that can and would spread from far away 
through ports and with people that could radically destabilize the Cape. In drawing 
comparisons between the sanitary conditions in Bombay as cause of the outbreak there, 
and urban non-white poverty in the Cape, plague, and both the medical and economic 
effects it would bring was recognized as the inevitable consequence of racial mixing in the 
city. This particular recognition of plague being a disease, not only preventable through 
racial hygiene and separation but also recognized as a foreign threat to domestic economic 
interests reflects a global comprehension of disease unseen in the language and fears 
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associated with other diseases. This particular fear of disease emerging out of the poorer 
racially mixed or non-European centers of town were further stoked when the disease 
landed on South African shores.  
 The concerns that racial mixing in residential areas might drive and perpetuate the 
spread of plague was reinforced by claims made by foreign plague experts central to the 
development of health responses in the city. Dr. William Simpson himself, prior to his 
appointment to the Cape as the primary advisor on the plague outbreak stated from afar, 
before the epidemic broke that: 
“…Next to Bombay, Cape Town is one of the most suitable towns I know of for a 
plague epidemic… Situated in one of nature's most beautiful spots in the world it 
has grown up uncared for and neglected so that for its size it has an extraordinary 
proportion of filthy slums, full of dirty and unsanitary houses… (Occupied by) a 
heterogeneous population of natives, coloureds, Indians, Malays, and whites of 
almost every nationality.” (Simpson quoted in James 1970:1432) 
  
 While conservative white-supremacist groups stoked racial animus within the white 
European population prior to the epidemic in Cape Town, the epidemiological threat of 
plague only added fuel to the fire. In contrast to smallpox, the racial heterogeneity of plague 
cases was significant.  
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Table 3. Number of Cases from Smallpox and Plague in Cape Town- 1896-1901 by 
Race 
 
Caption: All Smallpox data from (Mitchell 1922). All bubonic plague data from (van 
Heyningen 1989b) and (Echenberg 2002)  
 
As Table 2 shows, while smallpox produced a far greater number of cases, the outbreak 
was largely confined to non-European populations. However, plague cases were far less 
isolated. Plague was a disease of great medical concern to the European population and the 
black African populations were seen as responsible for its spread. Though smallpox at the 
time remained largely isolated to non-Europeans, plague reflected a disease capable of 
transcending the boundaries of race that smallpox did not. It was the threat from racial 
mixing of the disease and the financial perils borne out of the arrival of plague that marked 
it as separate and triggered concerns that had lingered since the emergence of the colony. 
Once plague arrived in Cape Town, responses focused very heavily upon the threat of non-
European populations, both to white Europeans and as vectors of disease spread.  
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 The first case of plague was discovered in Cape Town on February 2nd 1901 at 
roughly the same time that Dr. John Gregory, the Acting Medical Officer for the Colony 
was notified of a large incidence of rat mortality at the port (Gregory and Simpson 1901). 
Public health reports from that week show that by February 9th, London, Berlin and 
Washington D.C. were notified of the outbreak and would have at that time imposed 
restrictions in accordance with the Venice Convention (Germany. Reports from Berlin as 
to plague in Cape Town, Africa 1901)18. From this point, the implementation of the Venice 
Convention as well as more recent methods to stamp out plague went into swift effect. On 
the 14th of February the Cape Peninsula Plague Advisory Council met for the first time.   
 The emergence of plague triggered pre-existing fears of black and coloured 
subterfuge and mendacity, which provided significant justification for the forced removals 
that were to take place. In the minutes of the Plague Advisory Council there were numerous 
references to the threat of free-moving black Africans and non-Europeans: 
“Dr. GREGORY informed the Board that the death at Sir Lowry’s pass of a Kafir 
who recently reached there with a few others, had been reported: that the District 
Surgeon had held a post-mortem and diagnosed Plague as the cause of death; and 
as there were traces of coal dust on the corpse it was probable that the kafirs had 
escaped from the Docks, especially as they gave evasive answers as to where they 
had come from… and he (Dr. Gregory) remarked that these instances supported his 
view that the Kafirs were concealing cases, and emphasized the necessity for 
instituting a daily surprise visitation of all Kafir dwelling-places in each 
municipality.” (Meeting Minutes of the Plague Advisory Council 20th February 
1901 (Cape Peninsula Advisory Board 1901:22) 
 
                                               
18 In keeping with the Convention, the Cape Government was notified from the British 
foreign office that Italy and Belgium had applied restrictions upon their vessels as per the 
Venice Convention on March 9th, 1901 (Telegram of the Foreign Office 1901). 
  
109 
These statements above made by the Acting Colonial Medical Officer for the Cape Colony 
were made in the meeting prior to the ultimate decision to compel the Cape Government 
to remove the black population. The medical knowledge on rats became the justification 
for why existing smallpox regulations were unfit to prevent the further spread of plague. 
In the same meeting of February 20th Dr. Simpson remarked that: 
 
“Plague was primarily a rat disease, but rats could infect human beings, who could 
then in turn affect other persons and also rats. Thus the measures, which were 
sufficient for coping with a smallpox outbreak, were not comprehensive enough for 
an outbreak of Plague… Rats were not great travellers, but of course if infected 
animals were conveyed with goods by ship or train the disease might be spread far 
and wide through their agency.” (Cape Peninsula Advisory Board 1901:23) 
 
 By the meeting of February 27th, it was further agreed by the Council that the slum areas 
populated primarily by the black population was too sodden with both rats and plague 
infected homes and materials to remain, and they were to be razed (Cape Peninsula 
Advisory Board 1901:29). The melding of the three concerns over rats, race and the 
diseases ability to travel, found in the minutes of the Plague Advisory Council guided the 
actions of the Cape Government. Ultimately, the logic surrounding the threat of rats was 
mirrored in the justifications for racial quarantine.  
“He (Dr. Gregory) was of the opinion however, that fresh cases were bound to 
occur, especially as in one house, with forty Kafir inmates, from which patients had 
been removed, most of the remaining residents had scattered before they could be 
collected and isolated. He also represented that a scare had arisen among the Kafirs 
in the town and that numbers wished to go back to their Districts, but that every 
effort was being made to dissuade them and to gain their confidence and that the 
Railway Authorities and Shipping Companies were cooperating by refusing 
conveyance. In conclusion, he reported that the Uitvlugt camp was well staffed and 
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in good working order, and was capable of a substantial enlargement if required.” 
(Meeting Minutes of the Plague Advisory Council 14th February 1901 (Cape 
Peninsula Advisory Board 1901:22) 
Similar concerns about non-European populations as the agents of plague-spread were 
voiced, not only by members of the Advisory Council, but also by corporate interests in 
further reaches of the Cape Colony such as the town of Paarl.  
“The CHAIRMAN [sic] read a letter from the General Manager of Railways, 
enclosing a proposal from the Traffic Manager, Paarl that aboriginal natives should 
not be allowed to travel by rail from the Cape Peninsula.” (Meeting Minutes of the 
Plague Advisory Council 18h February 1901 (Cape Peninsula Advisory Board 
1901:22) 
In the immediate period prior to and during the forced removals, the concerns not only over 
racial mixing but also the un-surveiled travel of black Africans became the primary concern 
of the Cape Government and health actors alike. These concerns formed the focal point for 
the largest and most drastic disease response in the city’s history. For plague, the Cape 
Government imported outside medical support in the form of Dr. Simpson who 
commanded much of the city’s response and enacted a civic transformation that deprived 
many of the Cape’s residents of rights and movements previously recognized and tolerated.  
 The continued presence of plague in Cape Town presented a clear and present threat 
to the greater Cape economy. So long as plague was present, all vessels and shipments 
leaving from Cape Town would continue to be subject to the scrutiny, quarantine and 
controls laid down by the Venice Convention. This would have the effect of delaying 
shipments or losing them to sanitary destruction all together. As the Plague Advisory 
Council deliberated, it became very clear that to them, the un-surveiled travel of black 
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Africans was a foremost concern in shaping plague prevention policies. So significant was 
the concern for racial mixing that the desires for segregation in the aftermath of the 
epidemic reflected a regret that such separation was not enacted within the European 
populations as well as with out. Simpson, in justifying his perspective on the dangers of 
racial mixing argues in his summary of the plague responses in the Cape after the epidemic 
that:  
“There can be little doubt that, if it had been possible for a similar measure on a 
more extensive scale to have been undertaken with regard to some of the most 
overcrowded, most insanitary and most infected quarters inhabited by Malays and 
the poorer class of Europeans and coloured people, the disease could have been as 
effectually stamped out among these as it has among the natives. These Europeans 
are seldom of British origin, but are foreigners from every part of the Continent, 
consisting largely of Portuguese, Italians, Levantine and Polish Jews. They are 
extremely dirty in their habits, live under the most insanitary conditions and herd 
together with the poorer coloured people, who are equally dirty and insanitary.” 
(Gregory and Simpson 1901). 
 
CONCLUSION: EPIDEMIC ORIENTALISM AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS IN THE 
COLONIAL ENCOUNTER 
 The case of plague in Cape Town reflects the micro-dynamics of epidemic 
orientalism and colonial concerns for their economic stability structuring epidemic 
responses. Prior to the outbreak of plague disease, Cape Town did not have state-mandated 
urban racial separation (Swanson 1977; Trapido 1964) and though racial inequalities and 
de-facto segregation did exist (Bickford-Smith 1995; Deacon 1996), Cape Town was 
largely an outlier amongst other African Colonial cities. The forced removals and 
establishment of Ndabeni was not the creation of a racially determinist order but rather the 
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re-inscription of it linking latent racist motivations with medical authority. Prior to 1834, 
The Cape Colony had maintained a labor system organized significantly around slave labor 
(Baderoon 2004; Watson 2012; Worden 1985).19 The conditions of slavery established a 
racialized system of economic and social engagement. Slavery at the Cape was marked by 
a system of “constant surveillance” (Baderoon 2014:11; Mason 2003:110) as well as 
anxiety regarding the potential actions of unsupervised and unattended enslaved peoples. 
The Cape Slave Codes, first established in 1754, required all those enslaved to carry passes 
to enter town. Such acts are reminiscent of later regulations as well as some other more 
literal forms of discipline that provided a level of visibility to the enslaved. After dark, all 
enslaved persons were required to carry torches to prevent them from having 
“conspiratorial conversations in darkened corners” (Baderoon 2014:10–12). 
 When slavery was fully abolished in 1838, anxieties over the free movement of 
former enslaved persons grew within the landholding community. By the 1840’s academic 
literature and local Cape newspapers began reporting on the threats of degeneration that 
could emerge from new European immigrants living in close proximity to the Coloured 
population in Cape Town: 
 “They will “become mixed up with, and run the risk of their children imbibing the 
 filthy, immoral, and degraded habits of the much to be pitied coloured 
 population”  (Zuid Afrikaan March 27, 1840 in Watson 2012:246).  
 
 Prior to the emergence of plague and spurred largely by the South African war 
raging in other parts of the country, large numbers of predominately black refugees had 
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entered Cape Town seeking employment and housing. According to reports of the time, 
1500 migrants were living in barracks along the docks and 8000 lived in overcrowded and 
cramped conditions elsewhere (Bickford-Smith et al. 1999:19). This rise of black migrants, 
seeking refuge from war and uncertainty elsewhere, were interpreted by colonial 
authorities as vectors of contagion and a threat to empire more broadly. Comments such as 
those made in the Zuid Afrikaan mirrored those made both by members of the public local 
government, and notably, foreign medical elites such as Dr. Simpson over half a century 
later.  
 Cape Town’s formation primarily as a port, relying from an early period on slave 
labor that prompted Europeans, Asians and Africans to live in close proximity to one 
another differed greatly from that of other contemporary African Colonial cities. Most 
colonial cities in West Africa were initially designed to enforce segregation so as to prevent 
malarial spread, placing European settlements at higher altitudes than those of the local 
population (Curtin 1985). The threat of plague to societal order and colonial stability made 
present not solely through disease but the global responses to that disease made a re-
inscription of governmentally controlled and monitored racial order a justifiable solution 
on the part of the Cape Plague Advisory Council to the epidemic of plague. This threat of 
residential racial mixing to both the public and economic health of Cape Town, as a result 
of the global scrutiny placed upon infected sites meant that plague was no longer solely a 
Capetonian problem but a British Imperial one, that in the minds of the medical authorities 
mandated a racial solution in order to maintain white control of the colony. The Cape 
Medical authorities were very conscious of how plague had damaged the global esteem of 
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Bombay and hindered its economic output greatly. Cape Town could ill afford such 
restrictions.  
 What ultimately made plague so different from smallpox in Cape Town was that it 
was a disease capable of destabilizing the existing colonial order where smallpox could 
not. The focus upon the disease through the International Sanitary Conventions encouraged 
an aggressive and rapid response to the outbreak. Through copious inoculation and since it 
was a disease common to Europe, smallpox rarely produced high rates of mortality within 
the European population of Cape Town (Echenberg 2007; van Heyningen 1989b; Mitchell 
1922). In effect it was a disease that maintained or failed to shake colonial power. Plague 
however in two strikingly divergent ways threatened the legitimacy of the colonial elites 
of the Cape, both in the high European mortality rates as well as through the threat of 
isolation from a global economy that they relied upon. It also threatened to permeate the 
assumed boundary between colonized and colonizer. Plague was, in effect understood as 
an anti-colonial disease that had the capacity to challenge existing economic, political and 
social power relationships where smallpox was not. The threat to the existing social 
relations of racial mixing was about more than racial anxieties but about the inability to 
control, monitor and constrain non-white persons in the ways previously available during 
slavery. The township model provided both a way to limit the spread of disease that was 
acceptable to international medical regulations and the consulting medical officials and 
reestablished a racialized system of labor control. The pass laws issued for those within 
Ndabeni, that allowed for travel out of the zone for work while restrictions were made for 
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all other movements, (Cape Peninsula Advisory Board 1901:57) reflect a reemergence of 
the control and regulation over non-white Europeans that occurred under slavery.  
 The case of the responses to plague in Cape Town demonstrates the far reaching 
affect that the International Sanitary Conventions and the Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus 
had upon disease responses at the points of outbreak. Aggressive reactions to plague 
generating racially motivated responses were also seen in Hawaii and San Francisco 
(Echenberg 2007). Outbreaks of the three diseases of concern in the conventions prompted 
swift and overwhelming responses to them in order to prevent an economic isolation which 
could threaten the viability of colonial sites as much as the physical threats of the disease 
itself. Plague in Cape Town not only mobilized racial anxieties which aligned with 
concerns over the economic and biological effects of disease, but also a global network of 
scientists to advise upon the response. Due to all of these factors, plague, once it arrived in 
Cape Town was enveloped in a constellation of dense global networks of knowledge, 
global trade and travel, significantly altering the nature of the responses to it.  
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CHAPTER IV: THE WHO AS EPIDEMIC AUTHORITY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter charts how the WHO in assuming authority over and reforming the 
International Sanitary Conventions reproduced the orientalist discourse that guided the 
earlier conventions while in the process incorporated new forms of disease control into the 
operations of the regulations. The first half of the twentieth century was a fractured time 
for the international management of infectious diseases. By 1951 when the first 
International Sanitary Regulations were ratified under the authority of a new global health 
body- the World Health Organization (WHO) the world had suffered two world wars and 
a dramatic transformation in world powers. As empires were declining in direct power, a 
variety of different priorities were emerging. However, the International Sanitary 
Regulations under the WHO would adopt much of the same principles of the earlier 
conventions as well as the same overarching orientalism that produced the International 
Sanitary Conventions. Further, in spite of significant epidemiological developments and 
several opportunities for reform, the regulations under the WHO maintained its focus upon 
plague, cholera and yellow fever as three of the primary diseases of international concern. 
As much of the international health community transitioned towards a ‘humanitarianist’ 
model for health engagement, prioritizing local general public health improvements and 
development strategies in the later 20th century (Fidler 2005; Siddiqi 1995) the 
International Sanitary Regulations, later renamed the International Health Regulations, 
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remained very similar in form to the International Sanitary Conventions until the 21st 
century.  
This chapter will examine this puzzle by exploring how the International Sanitary 
Conventions transformed under the control of the World Health Organization in the mid 
20th century and how this affected the management and control of epidemic threat. I argue 
that in the transformation of the International Sanitary Conventions to the International 
Sanitary Regulations, the WHO reasserted a global vision for the organization of the 
natural world to facilitate the sanitized transmission of goods and bodies across space. 
Maintaining the mission of the International Sanitary Conventions to provide maximum 
protection for public health with minimum restrictions to travel and trade, the WHO 
through their International Sanitary Regulations re-invigorated the dynamics of the Trans-
Imperial Health Apparatus, reproduced the Epidemic Orientalist gaze and consolidated its 
power. The additions to the International Sanitary Conventions in the updated regulations 
were novel. Rather than operating as multi-lateral agreements between nations and imperial 
actors as the sanitary conventions did prior, the member nations of the World Health 
Assembly formed a covenant between themselves and the WHO directly. Thus, the WHO 
became the authority over of the regulations and the disseminating agent of disease 
surveillance knowledge. This, as we will see in following chapters will have far reaching 
effects for how diseases are managed and disease threats are prioritized.  
 Drawing on archival data collected at the WHO archives from the drafting process 
of the International Sanitary Regulations, as well as materials concerning the weaknesses 
of the regulations after ratification, I argue that the authorities governing the regulations 
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within the WHO, facing challenges to the acceptance of the regulations themselves, 
retained the orientalist vision of the world produced during the establishment of the first 
international sanitary conventions. This in effect replicated many of the particular systems 
of global disease control discussed in prior chapters. This chapter demonstrates how the 
orientalist discourse maintained itself in the absence of formal empires through the 
formulation of new disease regulations under a new authority-the World Health 
Organization.  
INTERNATIONAL SANITARY AUTHORITY UNDER THE WHO: TAMING SPACE AND 
BODIES 
 What marked the most significant difference between the International Sanitary 
Conventions and the International Sanitary Regulations under the authority of the WHO 
was their approach to the application of sanitary controls. While the International Sanitary 
Conventions, through the threat of strict quarantine controls and embargoes from fellow 
signatory empires and nations, motivated the imposition of brutal sanitary controls in 
colonized sites exhibiting outbreak, the International Sanitary Regulations sought the same 
ends but through different means. The ability to impose the orientalist vision laid out in the 
International Sanitary Conventions was made possible through the massive power of the 
Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus which pushed quarantines, formally located at European 
ports to colonial sites and mandated aggressive responses to plague, cholera and yellow 
fever at sites of outbreak in order to avoid economic isolation. In what would ultimately 
become the absence of formal authority over colonial spaces under direct or indirect rule 
of imperial authorities, the responsibility for coercing nations to adhere to sanitary order 
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transitioned to the WHO. This in turn shifted the nature of the application of power to a 
mode of rule devoted to maintaining the sanitary controls of the past through the cleansing 
of frontier spaces, ports and the vessels leaving them and rendering the potentially infected 
traveler visible and subject to sanitary manipulation.  
Under the conventions, empires imposed strict disease surveillance through swift 
telegraphic reporting of outbreaks around the world, aggressive local responses against 
colonized populations and port sanitation. However, without the rule of empire, not all of 
these tactics were available. The WHO, lacking the ability to impose direct controls upon 
entire nations focused upon the management and sanitation of areas and bodies at ports and 
national borders as well as the management of those bodies in transit through the interstitial 
spaces between nations. In turn the WHO shifted in its strategy, narrowing the sanitary 
gaze and concentrating racist and xenophobic anxieties, made material into the sanitary 
conventions, upon these areas in the International Sanitary Regulations.  
In the following sections I will outline the transformations in international disease 
management between 1901 where our last chapter left off and the emergence of the WHO. 
I demonstrate how the WHO committees tasked with the revision of the conventions, in 
producing the new International Sanitary Regulations, like their predecessors before them, 
sought to establish a particular ordering of the world that extended well beyond the 
auspices of disease controls. Jasanoff suggests that boundary conflicts over the production 
of knowledge and impositions of standards never emerge out of a tabula rasa but rather at 
moments when competing epistemologies seek compromise (2004:19). Like the 
International Sanitary Conferences before them, the WHO revisions of the conventions 
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were an exercise is world-making, the establishment of a novel sanitary paradigm that 
dictated not only the diseases which were to be subject to regulations but also the practices 
of controls and the managements of persons required to maintain the sanitary boundaries 
envisioned by the regulations themselves. In order to standardize a new universal set of 
sanitary regulations, the WHO member nations as well as actors within had to achieve 
consensus upon several issues necessary for the formulation of standards. The member 
nations of the WHO had to agree to standard definitions not only of diseases, the scale of 
epidemics and sanitary practices, but also definitions for infected areas, infected persons 
and categories of travelers who would be as a result, subject to divergent levels of 
surveillance and controls under the conventions. Several member nations of the WHO 
actively disputed the stated aims and methods of the International Sanitary Regulations 
prompting division. The International Sanitary Regulations, once passed represented the 
melding of a variety of differing approaches to disease control that would ultimately 
synthesize into an overarching and globally accepted set of controls.  
COUNTERVEILING TRENDS IN GLOBAL HEALTH PRACTICE 1902-1947 
 
 While the International Sanitary Conventions endured until their incorporation 
under the authority of the WHO in 1947, global health practices were being standardized 
around the world in addition to the formal mechanisms imposed by the conventions. Two 
largely competing visions for the global management of disease were being developed in 
the period between the turn of the century and the Second World War in parallel to the 
International Sanitary Conventions. One was the disease eradication model, used most 
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notably by the United States in its overseas territories and at home by American 
international sanitary bodies. This model prioritized the imposition of strict disease control 
and sanitation practices to eradicate the agents of particular diseases notably malaria and 
yellow fever. These practices were often imposed by military authorities for the 
maintenance of colonial projects and protection of foreign authorities in sites where these 
diseases occurred (Packard 2016). The second vision was focused around holistic 
development of public health systems. This model known at the time as “social medicine” 
(Borowy 2007), was articulated primarily by the League of Nations Health Organization 
(LNHO) and at the Pan-African Health Conferences of 1932 and 1935, and the Bandoeng 
Health Conference of 1937. Each of these global health strategies needed to be considered 
and incorporated by the initial framers of the WHO International Sanitary Regulations in 
the mid-century as they posed a challenge to the model of the conventions.  
Complementary Orientalism- American Responses to Infectious Disease Management 
The role of sanitation in the Americas and within the American empire has received 
thorough and important treatment from many scholars such as Randall Packard (2011, 
2016), Warwick Anderson (1995, 2000, 2006), John Lindsay-Poland (2003) among others 
(Gladwell 2002; Litsios 1997; Palmer 2010; Siddiqi 1995). Rather than explore in as great 
a detail as these important scholars have previously, I will summarize the activities of 
American sanitation authorities and the International Sanitary Bureau in order to 
demonstrate the relations of these actors to the International Sanitary Conventions.  
From the end of the 1907 until the formulation of the WHO in 1947, the 
management of the International Sanitary Conventions fell under the authority of the Office 
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International d’Hygiène Publique (OIHP). The Office was primarily responsible for 
maintaining, updating and standardizing the conventions as well as disseminating disease 
surveillance information to the signatories of the convention. However, the particularly 
European focus of the International Sanitary Conventions meant that the diseases plague 
and cholera received far more attention at international sanitary conferences and in the 
conventions themselves than yellow fever, the major threat in the western Atlantic 
(Howard-Jones 1975; Packard 2016). This left the Americas and the International Sanitary 
Bureau based in Washington, whose primary concern was yellow fever, to deal with the 
management of the disease priorities of the Americas.  
 Where the International Sanitary Conventions advocated for the control of diseases 
crossing international borders through trade and travel while imposing aggressive sanitary 
regimes upon colonial sites outside Europe, the International Sanitary Bureau in 
conjunction with the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Board were moving 
steadily towards disease eradication policies in the Americas. 
The success of American colonial actors in eradicating mosquito-borne diseases 
from Panama during the Panama Canal excavation as well as in American colonial sites 
such as Cuba and the Philippines (Anderson 2006; Gladwell 2002; Packard 2011, 2016) 
provided the justification for this approach. Employing primarily a military sanitation 
regime by which soldiers would drain standing water and distribute pesticides to eradicate 
the mosquito vectors of disease, American sanitary practices began to operate on the same 
or larger scale as European actions taken in Africa and Asia (Anderson 2006; Lindsay-
Poland 2003; Packard 2011). Architects of malaria and yellow fever eradication campaigns 
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such as the American doctor William Gorgas, became significant health actors in global 
conversations around disease control.  
These strategies of disease control employed the same epidemic orientalist 
discourse that bound the actions under the International Sanitary Conventions. The 
practices of disease eradication focused very significantly on the control and management 
of non-white and native populations and implicitly upon the understanding that indigenous 
actors in malarial or yellow fever zones were incapable of maintaining a sanitary order. 
This discourse motivated and was critical to the application of sanitary practices. Packard 
notes that these early disease eradication strategies imposed unilateral sanitation regimes 
that were aimed at protecting the health of colonial personnel while leaving broader public 
health concerns to missionaries and non-colonial actors (2016:22). These practices took on 
a larger racial dimension as the architects of disease eradication saw them as critical to 
establishing permanent white settlement in tropical areas. Gorgas, noting in his book 
Sanitation in Panama remarks on the last page that  
“The discovery of the Americas was a great epoch in the history of the white man, 
and threw large areas of fertile and healthy country open to his settlement. The 
demonstration made at Panama that he can live a healthy life in the tropics will be 
an equally important milestone in the history of the race, and will throw just as large 
an area of the earth's surface open to man's settlement, and a very much more 
productive area.” (Gorgas 1918:292). 
 
In American colonial incursions in the Philippines it was also suggested that the survival 
of certain races was largely specific to the environment in which they originated. Thus 
tropical areas were seen as uninhabitable to white people for long durations so long as the 
afflictions of the tropics remained (Anderson 2006:41). Similar to the motivations of the 
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International Sanitary Conventions which saw plague and cholera as capable of 
destabilizing the colonial project both economically and epidemiologically, American 
visions of disease eradication viewed malaria, yellow fever and to a lesser extent 
hookworm as critical to the success of the imperial project. It was medical officers like 
Gorgas, Selskar Gunn and others, who developed their sanitary acumen through American 
governmental and Rockefeller Foundation projects that would go on to produce the policies 
and strategies of the Pan-American Health Organization and later still the WHO.  
Where the strategies of disease eradication and the International Sanitary 
Conventions differed in their responses to infectious diseases much of their ideological 
underpinnings were very much the same. Both American sanitary campaigns and the 
International Sanitary Conventions had, at their roots a vision of infectious disease control 
composed of targeted interventions against specific diseases seen to be dangerous to actors 
external to the environments from which they emerged. Located within this vision was the 
same orientalist discourse and distinct racist approach that privileged interventions for the 
protection of white persons while imposing increased sanitary scrutiny upon non-white 
people for the purposes of disease control.  
 
Social Medicine, Rural Hygiene and the League of Nations Health Organization 
 As the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau melded philosophically with the 
perspectives of the Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus reliant upon the International Sanitary 
Conventions, a new strand of public health emerged outside of the Western Imperial 
nations. While the OIHP was devoted to the management of quarantine and disease 
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controls, and the Pan American Health Organization, imposed a particular vision of health 
that benefited foreign actors, the League of Nations began a movement towards social 
health between World War I and World War II.  
 The League of Nations Health Organization was the first world health organization 
with a vision to address a vast array of health issues (Borowy 2007). While the LNHO 
suffered from less funding and lacked several prominent member nations including the 
United States (Packard 2011) it was at times able to present innovative practices for health 
around the world. While largely still understudied by scholarship, Borowy (2009) has 
written the comprehensive history of the organization, while other scholars such as Litsios 
also reflect that little has been written about the role of social medicine in the early 20th 
Century ( 2014). Social medicine, focusing on health care that targets the social 
determinants of ill health became a major priority of the organization due to demographic 
transitions and from an emerging understanding of the health effects of poverty brought on 
by the Great Depression. Rather than focusing upon the health factors and diseases critical 
to maintaining systems of empire and networks of trade, the LNHO put forward an agenda 
that sought to explore which social conditions would be needed in order for people to live 
healthy lives. This priority would not return to the world stage again until the formulation 
of the WHO and even then not be formalized effectively until the 1978 conference in Alma-
Ata (Borowy 2007; Packard 2011).  
A notable focus of the LNHO’s social medicine objectives was rural hygiene. 
During the 1930’s the LNHO facilitated several major conferences on rural health and 
social medicine. Two of these conferences were Pan-African in scale held in Cape Town 
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in 1932 and later in Johannesburg in 1935. The first of these conferences suggested an 
altogether different modus operandi for colonial health management that focused upon 
preventative health measures and targeted diseases unlikely to spread outside of their areas 
of endemicity such as sleeping sickness, tuberculosis and malaria (Packard 2016:47;55). 
These two conferences suggested economic uplift as a mode by which disease must be 
controlled.  
“…it must not be forgotten that, without raising the economic status of the vast bulk 
of the population of Africa as a whole, there can be no hope of applying successfully 
on a continental scale the results of research or of markedly improving the position 
of great populations with regard to malaria as a disease”. (Report of the Pan-African 
Health Conference in Packard 2016:47) 
 
The conferences also suggested the involvement of local populations in the management 
and treatment of health issues. The Johannesburg Conference of 1935 explored both yellow 
fever and plague while suggesting responses also inclusive of social uplift as a method of 
sanitary control and management. While still driven by the force of colonial authority, these 
conferences, by focusing upon diseases carried between animals and humans as well as 
typhus and malaria, prioritized diseases of importance to colonized subjects and not only 
the colonizers themselves (Pan-African Health Conference 1936). The third major 
conference held in Bandoeng, Indonesia in 1937 further stressed the importance of social 
issues to effective health policy. At this conference, attended by over 100 participants from 
the LNHO member nations as well as participating organizations, recommendations were 
made for the improvement of rural housing through education initiatives, cheap credit 
facilities for the support of farmers and sanitary reform, wholesale sanitary land reform 
akin to that used to drive out malaria in Italy and the provision of large scale health services 
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across states (Brown and Fee 2008; Litsios 2014). These conferences not only addressed 
access to health care but also challenged the fundamental issues associated with ill-health 
(Brown and Fee 2008). Such measures while novel and distinct at the time are certainly 
familiar to most scholars of medical sociology and global health today as these concepts 
form the bedrock of contemporary global health and development initiatives. Their roots 
in these particular international and colonial legacies however have often been overlooked. 
The long term effects of these conferences to direct health policy prior to World War II 
were scuttled due to turbulent relationships with the Pan American Sanitary Bureau 
resulting in a significant defunding of the LNHO which limited any significant 
transformation of health practices (Litsios 2014; Packard 2016). 
 The final International Sanitary Convention was drafted in 1926 and ratified by 
over 50 countries in 1944. The conventions continued to require the automatic reporting of 
any cases of plague, cholera and yellow fever found to be present within a nation and 
compelled both the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau and the League of Nations Health 
Organization to comply with any and all disease surveillance demands. However, the 
International Sanitary Conventions’ power had waned due to an inability to effectively 
provide controls for the burgeoning domain of air travel. The Pan-American Sanitary 
Bureau sanitary codes found wide spread support as their air regulations, passed in 1933 
were ratified by all the nations involved in their drafting and provided clear systems for the 
control of plague, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox and typhus (Stowman 1952). The 
applications of the Pan-American sanitary codes were complicated by the air travel 
regulations in the 1944 revised International Sanitary Conventions. By the establishment 
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of the WHO in the late 1940’s there were thirteen conventions relating to management of 
disease spread (World Health Assembly 1952). Much like in the time prior to the first 
International Sanitary Conventions, sanitary regulations were fracturing and disjointed. In 
addition to the philosophical differences evident in the divergent strategies of the globes 
three major health regulatory authorities, the International Office for Public Hygiene, the 
Pan-American Sanitary Bureau and the League of Nations Health Organization, the WHO, 
upon its instantiation also faced the task of bringing the divergent sanitary codes under one 
set of regulations.  
 
FROM CONVENTIONS TO REGULATIONS 
 
Of all the major battles faced in the early drafting of the International Sanitary 
Regulations, the debate over whether the Regulations should facilitate disease eradication 
within nations or solely sanitary controls at borders was the most significant. It is in this 
moment in the drafting of the International Sanitary Regulations that a major component 
of the Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus becomes formalized into standard global 
regulations. In Chapter II and III I demonstrated that the nature of the conventions shifted 
the management of sanitary controls from European ports of entry to the colonial points of 
departure imposing significant economic restrictions upon colonial sites. These in turn led 
to overwhelming and punitive controls upon colonial subjects in those areas in order to 
protect colonial interests. In the battles over how the International Sanitary Regulations 
were to approach disease control, the transfer of the responsibility of disease measures 
shifts formally to the dichotomous relationship established by earlier colonial relations. 
  
129 
Where previously imperial metropoles compelled their territories to adopt and manage their 
colonized populations with a focus on limiting the presence of disease and thereby 
economic effects of outbreak, the International Sanitary Regulations as an agreement 
between the WHO and its member states reproduced this system of relations by imposing 
similar controls on countries exhibiting outbreak, albeit through different methods. In this 
respect, the WHO, supported by its member nations assumed the position of that imperial 
authority, reproducing epidemic orientalism as the central discourse of the International 
Sanitary Regulations. In reproducing this set of relations, the drafting members of the 
International Sanitary Regulations established new definitions for the purpose of 
standardized controls for the management of infectious disease, thereby introducing a 
vision for a sanitized international sphere.  
 The Second Interim committee of the World Health Organization ultimately 
provided the authority for the WHO to reform the International Sanitary Conventions in 
1946. The organization of the revision was conducted under the authority of the Expert 
Committee on International Epidemic Control and Quarantine (World Health Assembly 
1952). Reporting to this committee were a set of separate committees devoted to exploring 
the ways in which the epidemiological state of the world had changed since the last full 
drafting of the conventions in 1926. The first meeting of this committee was attended by 
members of the major international health agencies; the International Office of Public 
Hygiene, the Pan American Sanitary Bureau and the International Civil Aviation Authority 
(ICAO), Brock Chisholm, the first director of the WHO, as well as representatives from 
Norway, France, the United Kingdom, Brazil, India and Egypt (Interim Commission 1948). 
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The committee was tasked with revising the regulations and updating them to the latest 
epidemiological knowledge and sanitary controls, while also consolidating existing 
regulations under one uniform code. For these reasons the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau 
was represented as well as the ICAO reflecting the importance placed on effective air-
travel controls to the new regulations. It was at this first meeting that the mandate of the 
International Sanitary Regulations, to insure the maximum security against international 
transmission of infectious diseases with the minimum interference to trade and traffic was 
re-invoked from the sanitary conventions to form the basis of the revised regulations. In 
these early expert committee meetings, the members started to situate themselves and their 
regulations in amongst the constellation of other activities taking place at the WHO. 
Namely, the expert committee saw itself in coordination with disease eradication strategies 
taking place within the other areas of the WHO. In a draft forward to the International 
Sanitary Regulations written by the Secretariat of the WHO in 1949, the remark that  
“The final aim of the International campaign against epidemics is the eradication 
of pestilential diseases. It is only by maintaining an offensive against the permanent 
seat of these diseases that this result will be obtained. Prolonged efforts will be 
required and until success has been achieved, it will be necessary to maintain a 
sanitary organization similar to that which has so far rendered it possible to limit 
the extension of the major epidemic diseases throughout the world. Nevertheless, 
this sanitary organization should be progressively adapted to take account of all 
substantial progress in the field of health.” (WHO Secretariat 1949). 
 
While this framing of the regulations situates it within a larger trajectory of disease-free 
health for all, the vision implied by the secretariat pertained solely to the eradication of the 
diseases representing a threat to international concerns by their particular valences to trade 
and traffic. These continued to be the three central diseases, plague, cholera and yellow 
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fever as well as the 20th century additions of smallpox, typhus and relapsing fever. While 
the development of internal controls was seen as critical to this long term project, it was 
very clear that the maintenance of effective sanitary controls at the borders of nations was 
the primary concern of the regulations. This placed the expert committee at odds with 
several of its member nations who saw a possibility for the international sanitary 
conventions to move beyond reproducing the orientalist gaze of the past and shift from 
their focus on surveillance and travel controls to more health development services. 
 Directly referencing this aspect of the preamble, Venezuela, criticizing the 
historical agenda of the International Sanitary Conventions to establish defensive borders 
against the spread of disease, sought to eradicate diseases at their source, thereby rendering 
costly quarantine practices unnecessary.  
“The notion of attack against communicable diseases should replace the conception 
of defensive barriers against them. WHO should be entrusted with the task of 
delineating the endemic areas and with that of attempting, at the same time, in 
collaboration with the countries concerned, to eliminate foci of infection- a less 
costly method than maintaining quarantine barriers.” (Expert Committee on 
International Epidemiology and Quarantine 1949:3). 
 
Once the major drafting committees were convened this vision of disease eradication was 
suggested as representative of the most modern epidemiological knowledge. Certain 
members of the committee suggesting that diseases like cholera, plague and yellow fever 
had all been rendered curable or preventable through vaccine, argued that the practice of 
quarantine was no longer a desirable response in light of effective public health measures. 
At the second meeting of the drafting committee in 1951, Dr. Gear, a representative of the 
South African delegation suggested that raising the standard of health in all nations would 
  
132 
render quarantine unnecessary, especially given the relative unimportance of the major 
diseases covered under the existing conventions. The delegation of Egypt however 
suggested this vision was utopic in scope and could not be achieved under the 
organizational constraints of the regulations.  
“Dr. EL-HALAWANI (Egypt) said that the Utopia referred to by Dr. Gear of 
raising the standard of health in all countries, while desirable, could not be achieved 
so rapidly as was hoped and, therefore, international sanitary regulations could not 
be dispensed with. It should be remembered that the diseases covered by the draft 
Regulations caused a high mortality and disorganized trade and traffic in countries 
in which they broke out, as had been demonstrated by the cholera epidemic in Egypt 
in 1947. In his opinion, countries should be protected against epidemic diseases by 
tightening up certain articles in the present draft.” (World Health Assembly 
1952:39). 
What would become notable is that the International Sanitary Regulations of 1951 make 
no dispensation for the institution of long-term effective health care systems but rather 
established the requirements for effective and constant disease reporting from areas where 
outbreaks of the quarantinable diseases occur or are endemic. In the same discussion over 
the principle interventions to be taken over disease control, the United States delegation 
suggested the method for imposing global disease surveillance over all sites affected by six 
quarantinable diseases.  
“Mr. STOWMAN introduced a proposed amendment to Article 3. The United 
States Government con-sidered that complete epidemiological information was 
essential for preventing the spread of diseases with the minimum of restriction on 
traffic. The United States proposals were therefore intended, first, to extend to the 
whole world a reporting system for international port and airport cities similar to 
that of the Singapore Epidemiological Intelligence Station, which had proved 
invaluable for twenty-five years; secondly, to give smallpox, which at present was 
more widespread than the other diseases mentioned, an equal rating and, thirdly, to 
omit relapsing fever. The third point might be discussed in connexion [sic] with 
Articles 87 and 88. It was proposed that Article 3 read as follows:  
Article 3 1. Each health administration shall notify to the Organization by telegram:  
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(a) the first case of plague, cholera, yellow fever, or smallpox recognized in its 
territory, designating the location of the case;  
(b) the occurrence of a foyer of typhus de-signating the area, or areas, affected;  
(c) the first discovery of rodent plague in an area which has been free from this 
infection during the previous six months.  
2. Any such notification shall be made by the health administration as soon as it is 
informed of the occurrence and at the latest within twenty-four hours of the receipt 
of such information. Each first case notified shall be confirmed by laboratory 
methods as far as resources permit.  
3. In addition to the notifications required under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, 
each health administration shall report to the Organization by telegraph the number 
of cases of epidemic diseases and deaths therefrom which are known to have 
occurred during the previous week in each of its seaport or airport cities open to 
inter-national traffic. The absence of such cases shall be reported, and such negative 
reports may be sent by airmail.” (World Health Assembly 1952:42). 
 
This draft article would form the basis for establishing the sanctions and embargos 
necessary to impose sanitary restrictions. It required the establishment of definitions for 
what would be considered an infected area, an infected person and the threshold of disease 
burden necessary to impose restrictions upon sites of outbreak. This practice delineated the 
world into areas afflicted by any of these diseases, and those regions unaffected. Any 
outbreak of these diseases was required to be reported to the WHO and in so doing any 
nation suffering an epidemic subjected itself to sanitary controls deemed necessary to 
protect the rest of the world from the outbreak. In order to facilitate the effective 
implementation of the regulations, the persons within these affected areas were defined in 
relation to their disease status or potential for infection. This is significant as this method 
of determination imposed a subject position that rendered persons in areas of outbreak 
visible to control solely on the basis of potential disease threat. These practices also 
provided the modes through which ports were rendered sanitized and therefore open to 
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trade and traffic20. In the definitions section of the International Sanitary Regulations, the 
WHO redefines disease episodes of global significance only in terms of the epidemic 
diseases covered in the ISR and its victims solely in relation to these regulations.  
“" foyer " means the occurrence of two cases of a quarantinable disease derived 
from an imported case, or one case derived from a non-imported case; the first case 
of human yellow fever trans-mitted by Aëdes aegypti or any other domiciliary 
vector of yellow fever shall be considered as a foyer ;  
" health administration" means the governmental authority responsible over the 
whole of a territory to which these Regulations apply for the implementation of the 
sanitary measures provided herein;  
" health authority " means the authority immediately responsible for the application 
in a local area of the appropriate sanitary measures permitted or prescribed by these 
Regulations;  
" imported case" means a case introduced into a territory;  
" infected local area" means- (a) a local area where there is a foyer of plague, 
cholera, yellow fever, or smallpox ; or (b) a local area where there is an epidemic 
of typhus or relapsing fever ; or (c) a local area where plague infection among 
rodents exists on land or on craft which are part of the equipment of a port ; or (d) 
a local area or a group of local areas where the existing conditions are those of a 
yellow-fever endemic zone ;  
" infected person" means a person who is suffering from a quarantinable disease, 
or who is believed to be infected with such a disease” (World Health Assembly 
1952:336). 
                                               
20 “ Article 20 
Every port situated in a yellow-fever endemic zone or a yellow-fever receptive area, and 
the area within the perimeter of every airport so situated, shall be kept free from Aëdes 
aegypti in their larval and adult stages.  
2. Any building within a direct transit area provided at any airport situated in a yellow-
fever endemic zone or in a yellow-fever receptive area shall be mosquito-proof.  
3. Every sanitary airport situated in a yellow-fever endemic zone-  
(a) shall be provided with mosquito-proof dwellings and have at its disposal mosquito-
proof sick quarters for passengers, crews, and airport personnel ;  
(b) shall be freed from mosquitos by systemati-cally destroying them in their larval and 
adult stages within the perimeter of the airport, and within a protective area extending for 
a distance of four hundred metres around that perimeter.  
4. For the purposes of this Article, the perimeter of an airport means a line enclosing the 
area con-taining the airport buildings and any land or water used or intended to be used 
for the parking of aircraft.” (World Health Assembly 1952:339).  
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(RE)ORIENTALIZING THE PILGRIM 
Where these particular definitions and the associated articles that dictated the 
sanitary responses required to prevent the spread of disease were significant, nowhere were 
they more totalizing in their sanitary control than in the management of pilgrims during 
Hajj. Much like previously under the International Sanitary Conventions, the discourse 
surrounding disease control interpolated the Muslim Pilgrim as the greatest threat to 
western sanitary order. Prior to the drafting of the final International Health Regulations, 
the major Arab nations represented especially by Egypt voiced objections about the 
orientalist gaze of the International Sanitary Conventions and the provisions pertaining 
solely to the Hajj. In the official suggested revisions, Egypt argued that the new 
International Sanitary Regulations should 
“Incorporate all provisions concerning the Mecca pilgrimage in the new Sanitary 
Regulations without grouping them under a special chapter, in order to do away 
with a discriminatory procedure which the Moslem people find unacceptable.” 
(Expert Committee on International Epidemiology and Quarantine 1949:4).  
 
While this reservation was recognized in the drafting process, nevertheless a 
separate section of the International Sanitary Regulations was devoted to the Mecca 
pilgrimage in isolation and an expert sub-committee devoted to the Hajj was established to 
draft their regulations. In doing so the WHO inserted itself significantly into all aspects of 
the pilgrimage itself, reproducing the Muslim pilgrim as the always already disease vector 
threatening the globe. Where the International Sanitary Conventions primarily covered the 
transit of pilgrims on Hajj travelling through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, the 
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International Sanitary Regulations expanded its dictates to require increased sanitary 
surveillance of all Muslims participating in the Hajj from anywhere in the world. These 
particular regulations existed in addition to those in the general sanitary regulations. The 
failure to submit to regular sanitary checks of all vaccination certificates, or the provision 
of any and all required stool or fluid samples could result in quarantine for the duration of 
the pilgrimage at any of the required sanitary outposts between Egypt and Mecca. All 
pilgrims were required to be immunized at ports before departure or would be unable to 
take part in the pilgrimage. Where in other cases only persons travelling from or to sites 
where one of the six diseases was in epidemic form were required to be vaccinated and 
require such sanitation measures, the pilgrimage regulations required it of all participants 
(Expert Committee on International Epidemiology and Quarantine 1949). In order regulate 
the pilgrimage to Mecca, the routes, means of transportation and the definition of the 
pilgrimage and pilgrim itself had to be redefined through the lens of epidemic orientalism: 
“" pilgrim" means a person making the Pilgrimage, and, in the case of passengers 
on board a pilgrim ship, includes every person accompanying or travelling with 
persons making the Pilgrimage ;  
" pilgrim ship" means a ship which- (a) voyages to or from the Hedjaz during the 
season of the Pilgrimage ; and (b) carries pilgrims in a proportion of not less than 
one pilgrim per 100 tons gross ;  
" Pilgrimage" means the pilgrimage to the Holy Places in the Hedjaz” (World 
Health Assembly 1952:336). 
 
These definitions, as stated earlier, affected whether or not an individual could actually 
fulfill the pilgrimage itself. If travelling by ship all pilgrims were required to stop at Port 
Said on the northern end of the Suez Canal for inspection (Article 3A, World Health 
Assembly 1952:360). If a single case of one of the quarantinable diseases is found on board, 
  
137 
the ship would be forced to stop at an intermediate port for further inspection on route to 
Hedjaz, the final port before Mecca. Any persons found to be without the vaccination 
certificates against yellow fever and the other diseases required for transit to Mecca would 
be vaccinated and detained until the vaccine was deemed to be effective. These measures 
applied to any intermediate port or Hedjaz itself. All pilgrims on route to Mecca underwent 
several sanitary screenings during their passage to and from Mecca. These modes that 
controlled the movement of persons also applied to their vessels, which had to maintain 
strict sanitary codes in order to pass through ports to and from Mecca. While many of these 
regulations were reproduced from earlier sanitary conventions, the strict passage and 
control of pilgrims, to the point of redefining the pilgrimage through sanitary eyes was a 
product of these new International Sanitary Regulations. While the definition of pilgrim in 
the regulations was meant as a form of bureaucratic short hand, it produced very real 
effects. Refusal of any of the regulations set out for the Hajj would likely result in detention 
A pilgrim became thus one who consented to the power of the regulations and thereby, 
through fulfilling their obligations, could participate in the Hajj. It would not be until the 
passage of the International Health Regulations of 1969 that the explicit and separate 
controls for the Hajj were dropped from the regulations.  
 
AFTER RATIFICATION: THE EFFECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SANITARY 
REGULATIONS 
 
The International Sanitary Regulations were ratified unanimously by the 60 
governments of the World Health Assembly in 1951 thereby establishing a global and 
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unified set of sanitary regulations for the control of epidemic diseases across borders 
(World Health Assembly 1952). These regulations ensured the reproduction of epidemic 
orientalism as the guiding discourse of global disease control and imposed the systems of 
relations that informally existed under the International Sanitary Conventions and 
globalized their scope. The passage of the regulations also set up long standing divisions 
between the International Sanitary Regulations and the broader operations of the World 
Health Organization. In the years after the passage of the regulations this approach was 
embraced by the members of the committees active in the management of the ISR. The 
salience of maintaining the system of colonial relations extant in the International Sanitary 
Conventions and replicated by the International Sanitary Regulations under the authority 
of the WHO became even more desirable by members of the quarantine committees. As 
formerly colonized nations shook free from their former colonial rulers, the committees 
recognized a sudden vulnerability of developed nations in relation to their newly 
independent counterparts. The removal of colonial authority, especially in tropical areas 
where the quarantinable diseases were active, posed a threat to the existing modes through 
which the WHO and Imperial powers had previously imposed their will. Decolonization 
quickly became justification to impose further scrutiny upon formerly colonized subjects. 
In a review of the International Sanitary Regulations in 1967 the Expert Advisory Panel on 
International Quarantine highlighted the threat to sanitary controls posed from 
decolonization: 
“The continued existence in the developing countries of the communicable diseases 
in general and the quarantinable diseases in particular, still present a threat to all 
countries because of high speed traveling of aeroplanes with more passenger load 
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and capacity… The following Suggestions are made for improving the operation of 
the International Sanitary Regulations:  
(1) There is a need to stir up interest in national quarantine services. This can help 
to eliminate the excessive measures which some states feel bound to take.  
(2) The responsibility of Governments to ensure the hygiene and sanitation of ports 
and frontier stations open to international traffic needs stressing to ensure the more 
effective institution of control measures within the over-all context of community 
health care.  
(3) Improvements in the collection, analysis and dissemination of epidemiological 
information to and from Governments in respect of the quarantinable diseases 
especially smallpox, cholera and yellow fever.” (Expert Advisory Panel on 
International Quarantine 1967:4) 
 
This became justification for the maintenance of the standardized epidemic surveillance 
system, which replicated the existing model of disease control that dated back to the turn 
of the century.  
This was especially critical to countries concerned with the importation of yellow 
fever. The definition of what constitutes an infected area had been of great concern in the 
drafting of the International Sanitary Regulations to the drafting members and their 
representative nations (Expert Committee on International Epidemiology and Quarantine 
1949; World Health Assembly 1952). These concerns were especially acute for South 
Asian nations whose region was home to the mosquitos capable of carrying the disease but 
had never had a significant outbreak. Many nations lobbied to consider an entire nation an 
infected area so as to provide for the maximum sanitary scrutiny, quarantines and controls 
to be placed upon all goods and peoples travelling from a region where the disease was 
endemic. So significant was this concern that Ceylon, in voicing its reservations, much like 
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it had over 50 years earlier21, suggested the threat of a single un-surveiled traveler 
represented an economic and epidemiological disaster.  
“Therefore when the Additional regulations come into force, it is possible that the 
countries or areas which fall into the yellow-fever endemic zone may not be 
declared as infected local areas, or may subsequently be declared as free from 
infection after a period of three months has elapsed… The periods now prescribed 
for determining freedom from yellow-fever infection are too short… The 
information provided in this publication indicates that, year after year, yellow fever 
is a constant and continuous problem in various parts of Latin America. Secondly 
the possibility of a person getting out of a jungle area, leaving by plane and arriving 
at an airport in a receptive area within he incubation period, has always to be borne 
in mind.” (Reservations of the Government fo Ceylon, Committee on International 
Quarantine 1956:2). 
 
These particular concerns, not only voiced by Ceylon but also South Africa and Australia, 
provided justification for increased controls on all persons leaving tropical areas for yellow 
fever receptive zones.  
However, the orientalist vision for global health control established by the 
International Sanitary Regulations dictated an ordering of the world largely incongruous 
with other disease management strategies that fell beyond the scope of the regulations. This 
set up a series of palace wars in the period after ratification between various members of 
the communicable disease community within the WHO. By targeting solely six diseases, 
the regulations legitimated these pathogens as worthy of international cooperation to 
prevent their spread. The International Sanitary Regulations compelled nations to act 
aggressively to prevent the spread of infectious disease or face international consequences. 
While without the ability to sanction, the regulations dictated very specific and, in some 
                                               
21 See pages 35-36 
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cases, totalizing responses to diseases considered to be a global threat. In maintaining the 
diseases previously associated with the International Sanitary Conventions as the primary 
diseases slated for control, these diseases reflected almost exclusively a level of economic 
and sanitary protectionism that benefited solely nations not exhibiting outbreak while 
prioritizing the management of these diseases in the nations suffering an outbreak.  
In the intervening years between the passage of the International Sanitary 
Regulations of 1952 and the International Health Regulations of 1969, the next major 
reform of the regulations, this concern was often raised. In prioritizing the control of the 
six diseases in the regulations, the nations exhibiting outbreaks ignored the management 
of other public health crises for the explicit control of the regulated diseases. However, the 
epidemiological importance of these six diseases continued to wane in the first two decades 
of the International Sanitary Regulations.  
The lessening epidemiological importance of the six diseases prompted the WHO 
Division of Malaria Eradication and the Communicable Diseases Division more broadly to 
call for the reform of the regulations. The Malaria Eradication division lobbied 
aggressively in the 1960’s for inclusion into the International Sanitary Regulations as a 
notifiable disease suggesting that the particular imperial perspective inherited from the 
sanitary conventions limited the efficacy of the regulations.  
“The International Sanitary Regulations, as they stand at present are still tinged 
with the out-dated motives and health policies which produced the original 
International Sanitary Conventions and similar arrangements. By outdated health 
policies we mean the defensive aspect which appears in the Regulations against the 
introduction of disease into clean and usually developed areas from other areas 
notoriously infected and under-developed. The current trend in health policy is not 
defensive. The positive approach to health clearly defined in the Constitution of the 
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WHO indicates that an attack on the diseases where they exist and the strengthening 
of the general health services is the greatest safeguard against the spread of disease. 
By out-dated motives we mean the unjustified priority that still continues to be 
given to the six quarantinable diseases which no constitute only a minor threat to 
the lives of people and against which efficient prophylactic measures at present 
exist. Moreover, for four of them effective curative measures are now available.” 
(Division of Malaria Eradication 1967:1) 
 
While the Malaria Eradication Division leveled this critique as justification for malaria 
being incorporated as one of the notifiable diseases under the regulations, other bodies saw 
the particular defensive orientation of the regulations as justifications for full-scale reform. 
Citing the rapid increase in populations and the increased pace of trade and traffic, others 
suggested that the International Sanitary Regulations allow the WHO and its member to 
take a more active role in managing international outbreaks of any important epidemic 
threat not limited to the six quarantinable diseases (Raška 1967). Largely ignored at the 
time, this approach would ultimately form the later basis of the International Health 
Regulations of 2005.  
 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS TOTAL SURVEILLANCE 
 
At the height of Imperial power in the late 19th and early 20th century and even into 
the mid-twentieth century, totalizing controls akin to the India plague regulations and the 
Cape Town forced removals could be readily applied by authoritarian colonial regimes. As 
decolonization swept the world in the mid twentieth century, the dilemma of how to 
effectively police the masses seen as agents of global disease-spread without imperial 
authority became one of the central concerns of those responsible for drafting the 
regulations. In the deliberations over the International Sanitary Regulations and later 
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instantiations as the International Health Regulations disease, surveillance for this reason 
became a central concern of the Members of the divisions of communicable diseases at the 
WHO responsible for the management of the International Sanitary Regulations. Practices 
for sanitation and hygiene, developed in sites such as India, the Red Sea and South Africa 
returned and were incorporated by WHO actors into the International Sanitary Regulations. 
K. Raška, Director of the Division of Communicable Diseases encapsulates this orientalism 
in a document charting the future disease threats for the globe.  
“The tremendous development of science and technology has provided means for 
the efficient control and prevention of most of the communicable diseases of the 
world. In practice, however, recent developments in the control and prevention of 
communicable diseases had materialized to a varying degree depending on different 
socio-economic and cultural situations in different parts of the world, and 
discrepancies between the developed and developing countries in the health field 
are steadily increasing. The problems of communicable diseases are also 
continually changing. In several well-developed countries some diseases are 
approaching the stage of disappearance but in the developing countries the same 
diseases flourish, without systematic application of known control measures 
(vaccination against diphtheria, whooping cough, poliomyelitis, etc.). The public 
health services in most developing countries have still not sufficient trained staff 
and material resources. In some of the countries all existing communicable diseases 
are not yet recognized and it is not known what is the relative importance of each 
diseases in the given country per se in relation to possible control and prevention 
measures.” (Raška 1967:2). 
 
The effective adherence to the International Sanitary Regulations demanded the 
taming of space and bodies deemed, by their proximity to outbreaks of the six diseases, to 
be unsanitary. Shifting from the total controls of all territory, incumbent upon colonial sites 
under the International Sanitary Conventions, the International Sanitary Regulations 
moved their focus to the sanitation and cleansing of areas around frontier ports for trade 
and travel. This practice of making land safe for international enterprise has its roots in 
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colonial medicine but more recently explicitly in the disease eradication practices of the 
Panama Canal and the American Empire which focused upon making tropical geographies 
safe for colonial enterprise but not for those subject to colonial power (Anderson 2006; 
Gorgas 1918; Packard 2011, 2016). These were in keeping with the major developments 
that had occurred since the drafting of the first regulations. 
The sanitation of ports and frontier spaces through both effective disease 
surveillance of all vessels and persons leaving or entering ports, and surveillance of any 
areas in which an outbreak is occurring preserved these spaces as open for global trade and 
travel. While the policies for the sanitary control of ships and persons entering foreign ports 
untouched by the six diseases may have appeared to shift the responsibility for controls 
from colonial or formerly colonial sites back to Europe and American metropoles, the 
International Sanitary Regulations maintained the focus of scrutiny on these sites through 
a more significant development of disease surveillance.  
What the new International Sanitary Regulations of the WHO would produce was 
a universally accepted and rationalized vision for the management of disease in the 
international arena. Where the International Sanitary Conventions dictated a particular 
vision for the management of disease and populations across the globe, the revisions of the 
International Sanitary Conventions into the International Sanitary Regulations of the WHO 
reconsidered the existing codes of sanitation and a desire to impose a new system of 
standards and practices to routinize all of the existing regulations under one global set of 
regulations. While 17 of the most economically significant global powers were signatories 
to the most recent 1944 Sanitary Convention, the myriad other regulations extant across 
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the globe failed to consolidate any standard agenda for disease control. In order to facilitate 
global consensus under the aegis of the World Health Organization a new model had to be 
devised. This model ultimately reified the epidemic orientalism first emergent in the 18th 
and 19th century and imposed by the International Sanitary Conventions, while drastically 
increasing the scope and application of the regulations by insuring total universal 
acceptance across the member states of the World Health Assembly. However, as we will 
see in the next chapter, the limitation of the power of sanitary controls and a focus only on 
a small number of infectious agents would ultimately challenge the WHO’s full authority 
as the dominant actor in the field of international disease management.  
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CHAPTER V: THE BATTLE TO POLICE DISEASE: REFORM OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF A 
GLOBAL FIELD OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE MANAGEMENT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the previous chapters we saw how the discourse of Epidemic Orientalism and 
the Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus was first formed, how it affected responses to 
diseases, and how it was incorporated into the new structures of the International Sanitary 
Regulations. In this chapter I examine how, in the reform of the International Health 
Regulations, the ideologies and practices involved in disease management were expanded 
in scope once more. I have shown how the power of surveillance and border sanitation was 
strengthened to incorporate the discourse of epidemic orientalism and the practices of the 
Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus into a world lacking explicit imperial rule. Without the 
totalizing systems of colonial rule, the WHO lost the ability to police populations directly, 
and therefore focused its power upon port and border spaces. In this chapter I show how 
the WHO expanded its grasp as the authority on disease control, re-establishing those 
dynamics of total disease surveillance, previously only available through colonial 
governmental authority, once again becoming the arbiter of a global network of disease 
surveillance.  
Between the passage of the first International Sanitary Regulations in 1951 and the 
early 1990’s, the International Health Regulations remained largely unchanged, save for 
one period of reform in 1969 which removed smallpox, relapsing fever and typhus from 
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the list of quarantinable diseases. This reform also changed the name of the International 
Sanitary Regulations to the present day International Health Regulations. The International 
Health Regulations of 1969 returned the three original diseases of the International Sanitary 
Conventions back to primacy as the only diseases covered. In 1995 the WHO passed 
resolution WHA 48.7 calling for a revision of the IHR and ushered in a 10-year reform 
period that drastically changed the nature of international disease control and management.  
Where previously only three diseases fell under the purview of the IHR and 
warranted compulsory reporting on their outbreaks to be delivered to the WHO, both the 
early drafts as well as the final IHR 2005 requires the reporting to the WHO of all unusual 
or potentially epidemic disease outbreaks that could spread internationally. Further, the 
WHO in the IHR 2005 placed itself at the center of both disease surveillance and response 
by establishing, within the regulations, a decision matrix by which reported outbreaks 
would be assessed for overall global threat and subsequently categorized by the WHO. If 
an epidemic appears to be spreading beyond the initial controls emplaced, the Director 
General of the WHO can determine the threat to be a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC). The designation of this term under the International Health 
Regulations of 2005 allows the Director General to issue non-binding recommendations 
and call aggressively for international interventions and aid into areas of outbreak as it has 
done in the cases of Zika virus in 2016 in Latin America and the West African Ebola Virus 
Disease outbreak from 2014 to 2016 among others22.  
                                               
22 A deeper investigation of the PHEIC designation and the rationale for declaring a 
PHEIC will be investigated in detail in Chapter 6.  
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In reforming the IHR, the framers of the new regulations greatly expanded their 
mandate and scope, giving the WHO power to classify and assess international epidemic 
risk while also reasserting itself as the clearing house for all disease surveillance 
information from around the world. This was a major transformation from the previous 
tradition of prioritizing the control and management of a few individual diseases seen to 
be a threat. The IHR 2005 expanded the scope of the regulations to consider any potential 
international threat thus leaving the WHO with the definitional power to assess outbreaks. 
This maintained and greatly expanded the scale of interventions imposed in previous 
international regulations under the WHO. What would ultimately arise from these revisions 
was a novel model and global shift in how the world confronts epidemic threat. But why 
were the International Health Regulations revised at this time and why were these revisions 
so drastic, upending over 100 years of established practice and disease priorities? This is 
the puzzle this chapter seeks to explore.  
Dominant arguments for why the WHO chose to begin transforming the IHR at this 
time suggest that the continuing HIV/AIDS pandemic had shown the weakness of the 
organization to respond to emergent threats and new infectious disease outbreaks such as 
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD; Ebola) that were provoking concern from member states. The 
increased pace of trade and traffic around the world due to globalization is also a cited 
factor in the decision to reform (Bashford 2006; Fidler and Gostin 2006). However, earlier 
outbreaks of EVD dating back to the 1970’s failed to provoke any actions from the WHO 
or the World Health Assembly. While the calls for reform that emerged in 1995 may have 
reflected a continued concern on the part of the international community to act, the nature 
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of the reforms and ultimate revision cannot be explained in their entirety by this.  
My argument incorporates these frames while also suggesting that this puzzle can 
be explained through Bourdieusian Field dynamics. Under the orientalist discourse that 
pervades international disease controls, the international health regulations were no longer 
effectively maintaining the sanitary borders that separated the diseases of the tropics from 
the northern hemisphere. The three original diseases under the purview of the regulations, 
plague, cholera and yellow fever, were no longer as great a threat to the globe while 
emergent infectious diseases such as Ebola and HIV/AIDS tested the capacity and utility 
of the existing regulations given their inability to assess or respond to threats beyond the 
three quarantinable diseases. The emergence of these epidemics, and the IHR’s limitations 
in disease surveillance allowed for new actors to enter the space of international disease 
control, challenging the WHO for its authority in this realm on the basis of their inability 
to contain the threats of the global south. Finally, the mishandling of an epidemic of plague 
in Surat, India and challenges to the implementation of airborne pesticide requirements laid 
out in the regulations, weakened the authority of the WHO as the arbiter of disease controls. 
These attacks upon the WHO’s dominance produced a new field of global infectious 
disease control in which member nations of the World Health Assembly as well as other 
international organizations sought to claim the dominant role within it.  
In reforming the IHR, the WHO sought to take advantage of what I term 
‘surveillance capital’ a particular form of knowledge that made the WHO indispensable in 
its central role as the global authority on infectious disease response. The ultimate reform 
of the IHR into the IHR 2005 made the WHO the center of the knowledge apparatus that 
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collects information on infectious disease and organizes responses to threats, claiming 
expert knowledge that only they are capable of assessing. In turn the WHO retains authority 
over that capital and assumes dominance within this field.  
As early as the first informal meetings in which reform was discussed, the future 
trajectories and departures from the old IHR model became evident. The IHR would no 
longer be a set of regulations for limiting isolated diseases but would become a formal 
apparatus for locating, surveilling and responding to any potential international threat as 
defined by the WHO. The decision to revise the IHR in 1995 and the ensuing 
transformation of the regulations signaled a radical shift in international disease response 
and was a vehicle by which the WHO could cement authority and maintain power over the 
field of infectious disease control, no longer solely through the management of control 
measures at ports and borders but through disease surveillance and the strategic 
employment of expert knowledge. Employing Bourdieu’s concept of Fields and symbolic 
power (Bourdieu 1993; Bourdieu, Thompson, and Raymond 2003) I show how the WHO, 
through the reacquisition of its primary form of symbolic capital- surveillance capital- 
assumed the authority to define and classify infectious disease risk on a global scale. This 
power to define is central to the maintenance of the WHO’s authority in the field of 
infectious disease control and conceals a system of power relations that exists between 
international organizations, relevant international actors and their member states.  
UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL DISEASE MANAGEMENT AS A BATTLE FOR THE DOXA 
AND SYMBOLIC POWER OF THE FIELD 
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 Fidler and Gostin note that the ratification of the IHR 2005 represents a moment 
when “public health, security and democracy have become intertwined at the highest levels 
of government.” (2006:85). However, why and how the particular formulation of these 
regulations emerged at this time presents the dominant empirical puzzle of this chapter. 
Bourdieu provides a useful model for analysis in this case. I argue that the WHO 
implemented reforms to the IHR as a response to particular threats to their authority. By 
the early 1990’s the WHO found its dominance tested in an emergent field (Bourdieu 1993; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) of infectious disease control. A Bourdieusian field is a 
social space of relations defined by a struggle over symbolic or material capitals deemed 
valuable to the actors within it according to the ‘rules of the game’ (Bourdieu et al. 2003; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Decoteau 2008:55; Go and Krause 2016:8). The acquisition 
as well as competitions over these capitals defines the hierarchical relationship between 
the actors within the field. The belief in the fundamental principles and the capitals of the 
field is known as the illusio. As stated in the introduction, every actor within a field seeks 
to establish their own order, or symbolic power (nomos) as hegemonic, or common sense 
(Decoteau 2008:55). In addition to the goal of establishing its own symbolic power as 
common sense, the dominant actor or actors within a field must also legitimize their brand 
of capital as doxic. The doxa of a field is “the universe of possible discourses” (Bourdieu 
2010:168) which goes un-questioned by the actors within it. It is the common-sense 
understanding of the field reproduced by the existing systems of power relations between 
the actors within it.  
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 While field theory has received a great deal of attention of late, examinations of 
how fields emerge is relatively more limited (for exceptions see Buchholz 2016; Dromi 
2016a, 2016b). A central tenant of the emergence of a new field is the development of 
horizontal autonomy -the differentiation of social space from pre-existing spaces such that 
this new domain develops its own nomos and capitals (Buchholz 2016; Go and Krause 
2016:20). I will show how, both through challenges to the doxa of the field set down by 
the WHO and outright challenges to the dominance of the organization as the arbiter of 
global disease management the WHO, in reforming the IHR sought to reclaim control over 
this emergent field by reclaiming the symbolic power to define what constitutes a disease 
threat.  
Bourdieu understands power as forms of capital; a social relation to power that 
differentiates the holder of capitals from those without (Swartz 2013:51). Symbolic power, 
in the words of Swartz, “is the capacity to impose classifications and meanings as 
legitimate” (Swartz 2013:38)- the ability to impose a particular understanding of the social 
world as common-sense. Capitals therefore are related to one another and obtain 
significance relative to one another and thereby gain their power. Most notably perhaps, 
Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power also alerts us to the ways in which such power is 
mobilized in seemingly, invisible, naturalized ways so as to obscure the force of its effects.  
“Symbolic power – a power of constituting the given through utterances, of making 
people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, 
thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power 
which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force 
(whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization – is 
a power that can be exercised only if it is recognized, that is, misrecognized as 
arbitrary” (Bourdieu et al. 2003:170).  
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 These symbolic capitals can be seen as relational to economic or material capitals 
that contribute to an organizations power. The accumulation of, or claim to, symbolic 
capital provides greater justification for the dispersal of economic capital from member 
states or funding agencies but also allows for the actor to be trusted as an autonomous 
entity without having its motives questioned. As I will show, the reformers of the IHR, 
recognized the revision process as an opportunity to establish and control this particular 
form of symbolic capital to retain the WHO’s significance and authority in the management 
of international infectious disease control.  
Much scholarship has shown the importance of classification as a formal mode of 
understanding the natural world (Abeysinghe 2013; Barman 2013; Bloor 1982; Durkheim 
and Mauss 1967; Latour 2005; Messeri 2010; Steingart 2012). The authority and power to 
classify, especially within scientific contexts is often taken as “common sense”, an 
objective reflection of a quantifiable reality (Abeysinghe 2013:903). In classifying the 
natural order, classifications are meant to reflect and are also themselves reinterpreted 
through these classifications (Abeysinghe 2013; Bloor 1982; Durkheim and Mauss 1967). 
In classifying distinct objects and phenomena of inquiry, the classifications simultaneously 
define the phenomena and construct that phenomena hereafter by that classification, 
changing its ontological form (Durkheim and Mauss 1967; Saussure and Harris 1998). The 
act of classification requires the formation of different categories and delineations between 
phenomena (Barman 2013).  
THE EMERGENCE OF A FIELD OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE MANAGEMENT  
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 While a coherent global regime, the practices of international disease control was 
not a field in the Bourdieusian sense prior to the 1990’s. Bourdieu, in Rules of Art is quick 
to state that a field, in distinction from other social spaces should not be misunderstood as 
being a domain connected solely by legal regulations (Bourdieu 1996; Buchholz 2016:37). 
Rather, fields are spaces governed by their unique logics and rules of competition. As stated 
earlier, actors within fields compete amongst each other for capitals deemed to be 
important to the other actors within the field. A field requires in itself a unique autonomous 
vision of division- a nomos. Bucholz, in defining the characteristics of a global field states 
that  
“Still, a social field emerges not only on the grounds of a kind of ‘division of labor’ 
or specialization. In Bourdieu’s approach, this would constitute only a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition. What matters analytically is what I call the autonomy 
criterion: a stage when a social sphere of specialized practice institutionalizes 
categories of ‘vision and division’ that construe its law (or logic) of competition as 
relatively independent from the logics of other social spheres or the broader 
environment. This subtle but important distinction is crucial to keep in mind 
throughout the sections in which I discuss how to define and delineate a field at a 
transnational or global scale.”(Buchholz 2016:37) 
 
Field autonomy requires an autonomous ideology which defines a system of belief that 
legitimates itself intrinsically to the actors within the field and independent of outside 
material forces acting upon it (Buchholz 2016:38). Secondly, a field requires the creation 
of its own symbolic capital that conveys legitimacy to the actors holding it within the field. 
This allows for the formation of hierarchies between actors within the field. Finally, a field 
also requires a ‘distinctive set of institutions’ (Buchholz 2016:38) through which the 
principles of vision and division are reproduced.  
 While as I argue, epidemic orientalism, the guiding discourse of disease control 
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since the 19th century forms the underlying doxa of this new field of International Disease 
Management, the dynamics of the International Sanitary Conventions and International 
Health Regulations do not satisfy the criteria of a field. Under the International Sanitary 
Conventions, there was no competition between actors nor was there a symbolic capital 
that empowered certain imperial actors above others. Competition between imperial actors 
only occurred economically through trade or militarily and while the International Sanitary 
Conventions preserved this order and somewhat coordinated action, there were no capitals 
or distinct actors that perpetuated a distinct field. Similarly. There was no field organizing 
the first sanitary and health regulations under the authority of the WHO. The WHO 
maintained itself as the unchallenged authority over disease control and though it 
maintained and perpetuated the orientalist discourse of prior regimes, there was no 
competition from other actors over the management of infectious disease control. The 
WHO facilitated the regulations and existed untested. As I demonstrate in this chapter it is 
only in the late 20th century that actors emerge that contest the authority of the WHO 
through their ability to acquire forms of capital prized by other actors within it. As disease 
surveillance became more critical to the management of disease, actors like the US Centers 
for Disease Control (CDC) and the Canadian sanitary authorities claim that their ability to 
police disease through surveillance was more significant than the WHO. Previously state 
actors implemented regulations as set down by the WHO but in the 1990’s the very power 
of the regulations to maintain sanitary order was questioned by the emergence of a new 
capital-surveillance capital. This organized a new competition between sub-state and non-
state actors devoted solely to producing and acquiring disease surveillance information. 
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These actors, in competition with one another over surveillance knowledge were able to 
question the authority of the WHO by challenging its ability to impose the epidemic 
orientalism which forms the doxic belief of the field. These actors in turn represent the 
‘distinct set of institutions’ responding directly to the field and finding legitimation in the 
acquisition of the symbolic capital of the field-surveillance capital. These conditions and 
as such, a field did not exist prior to this period. The dynamics of this field moreover, 
explain how, in spite of maintaining the imperialist, orientalist gaze of prior eras of disease 
control, operates differently from these earlier moments.  
 
THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ENVIRONMENT 
After the successful eradication of smallpox in 1980, there was great optimism that 
the era of infectious disease may well and truly be ending for the human race (Health and 
Medicine 1992; Morse and Schluederberg 1990). While deaths from reemerging or newly 
discovered infectious diseases were on the decline globally in the 1970’s, since the late 
1980’s new infectious diseases have been discovered at the rate of roughly one per year 
(Davies 2008:298). The emergence of HIV/AIDS and the ensuing devastation brought on 
from its ongoing pandemic, as well as the rise of other diseases such as hemorrhagic fevers 
like Ebola causing outbreaks in the 1970’s 80’s and 90’s dampened expectations for the 
demise of infectious diseases. Reflecting upon the lack of understanding over the cause of 
AIDS, Dr. Anthony Fauci, one of the central HIV/AIDS researchers responsible for the 
discovery of the virus and its treatment, suggested in 1982 that examining illnesses for 
familiar syndromes (clusters of symptoms) may be an effective response to combatting 
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new and reemergent diseases for which their cause is unknown-  
“Because we do not know the cause of this syndrome, any assumption that the 
syndrome will remain restricted to a particular segment of our society is truly an 
assumption without scientific basis” (Fauci 1982). 
 
The emergence of HIV/AIDS and Ebola provided a clear signal that the era of infectious 
diseases was far from over and that the looming constant threat of disease emerging from 
formerly colonial sites remained. Further, these diseases, entirely separate and heretofore 
unmonitored by the WHO existed well beyond the purview and reporting network of the 
IHR. epidemic orientalism, the discourse that focused upon the threat of new diseases 
transmitted from people traveling from far-flung tropical lands once again, like it had in 
the 1960’s and the 19th century before that, spurred concern over the efficacy of the present 
disease controls maintained through the IHR.  
An emergent group of global health experts began developing the case for global 
disease surveillance. Dr. Joshua Lederberg, the Nobel laureate microbiologist, was one of 
the first to call for a shift from the ways in which the international community had 
responded to infectious diseases. This shift was actually not a shift at all, but rather a 
reproduction of the orientalism of the earlier International Sanitary Conventions and 
International Health Regulations and the methods which ensured their success-the constant 
monitoring and policing of black and brown bodies within spaces of former European 
colonial domination. Re-presenting the same orientalist gaze and noting the increased 
spread of humans into previously untouched areas and the increased rate of travel and trade 
Lederberg stated in 1988 that the- 
“Opening of wild lands to human occupation has exposed people unaccustomed to 
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viruses… Such research should be done on a broad international scale to both share 
the progress made in advanced countries and amplify the opportunities for 
fieldwork at the earliest appearance of outbreaks in the most afflicted areas. No 
matter how selfish our motives, we can no longer be indifferent to the suffering of 
others. The microbe that felled one child in a distant continent yesterday can reach 
yours today and seed a global pandemic tomorrow. “Never send to know for whom 
the bell tolls; it tolls for thee” (Lederberg 1988:685) 
 
The quickly shifting terrain of international health risks away from the three reportable 
diseases under the IHR and the realization of the potential global risks from infectious 
disease not only threatened the planet but challenged the capacity of the IHR to respond to 
threats and by extension questioned the authority of the WHO as the arbiter of infectious 
disease response between nations. As mentioned earlier, this period represents the first time 
that actors outside of the WHO had actively contested the authority and role of the IHR. 
At this moment the WHO found itself within a contested space, battling for its central role 
as the Global Health authority of first and last resort. In the eyes of the WHO’s member 
nations, it could no longer be relied upon to provide effective and practical outbreak 
information or establish effective sanitary protocols to prevent the spread of threatening 
diseases. The rise of new forms of national disease surveillance systems challenged the 
WHO’s ability to maintain the orientalist doxa of the field- that the greatest threats to global 
disease-spread emerge from the un-surveilled masses in the now formerly colonized world 
and that total surveillance was the most effective response to these threats.  
  The late 1980’s produced several critical conferences organized outside of the 
purview of the WHO that reassessed the medical and international communities’ role in 
the prevention of epidemic spread. In May of 1989 the Rockefeller Foundation and 
National Institutes of Health hosted a conference on Emerging Viruses: the evolution of 
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Viruses and Viral diseases which aimed to “consider the mechanisms of viral emergence 
and possible strategies for anticipating, detecting, and preventing the emergence of new 
viral diseases in the future” (Morse and Schluederberg 1990:1). The conference concluded 
that rapid, constant surveillance to identify and categorize threats worldwide through a 
network of integrated research and health centers was of vital importance (Morse and 
Schluederberg 1990:4,5).  
The results of this conference were distilled and published in a book entitled 
Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the United States, which laid out both 
a plan for disease surveillance and re-contextualized the threat of infectious disease in new 
terms.  
 There is nowhere in the world from which we are remote and no one from whom 
we are disconnected. Consequently some infectious diseases that now affect people 
in other parts of the world represent potential threats to the United States because 
of global interdependence, modern transportation, trade and changing social and 
cultural patterns…Rather than organize the report around specific diseases the 
committee decided to focus on factors that are implicated in the emergence of 
infectious diseases in the US (Health and Medicine 1992:v). 
 
At the same time, Canada and other nations around the world were also questioning the 
IHR’s focus solely on only three diseases and set about developing a method for disease 
surveillance as well (Carter 1991). In 1987 the Canadian advisory committee on 
Epidemiology established a subcommittee to review which communicable diseases should 
be surveilled by their medical authorities (Carter 1991). Suggesting that the existing IHR 
reporting criteria was inadequate by focusing solely on cholera, plague and yellow fever, 
Canada developed a points scoring system by which threats would be assessed.  
 The presence of disease surveillance systems that not only expanded upon but also 
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increased the surveillance character of the IHR posed a serious challenge to the efficacy 
and regulatory scope of the regulations. For the first time in nearly a half century, the WHO 
found its role as the central figure in international disease management challenged by its 
member states. Major member nations such as the United States and Canada were actively 
attempting to protect their borders and contain diseases beyond the scope of the existing 
regulations, compromising the utility of the WHO in matters of infectious disease control.  
DIRECT CHALLENGES TO THE WHO AND IHR ADHEARENCE 
 Where the rise of parallel disease surveillance systems, operating outside of the 
bounds of the IHR represented a threat to the WHO’s dominance by challenging the 
WHO’s ability to maintain the doxa of the field, the regulatory capacity of the IHR against 
its three primary diseases remained largely unchallenged until the early 1990’s. While 
Canada and the United States’ proposals to expand their disease surveillance criteria looked 
beyond the IHR for disease controls, they did not directly contest the existing components 
of the regulations themselves.  
 One of the primary mechanisms of disease control, was the management and control 
of diseases at ports and airports. In the early nineties the means by which vector borne-
insect diseases were managed at airports became a controversial element of the IHR. The 
countervailing factors of the ineffectiveness of the surveillance scope of the IHR and the 
dispute over the sanitary policing of disease at air and seaports challenged the WHO on 
two fronts. The WHO found itself in competition over its disease management authority 
over adherence to the IHR, not only from its member states, but from corporate entities and 
international airline associations.  
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 In 1992 a number of cases came to light of civilian airline passengers becoming ill 
from airborne pesticide spraying in planes shortly before flights to control for disease 
carrying insects. This practice, known as “blocks away” disinsection, whereby pesticide is 
sprayed in passenger cabins directly before take off was the recommended practice of the 
IHR (Gratz, Steffen, and Cocksedge 2000; World Health Organization 1969). Under article 
Articles 25 and 67 of the IHR 1969 any port in a nation in which the mosquito capable of 
carrying Yellow Fever is found must actively disinsect any craft leaving for foreign ports: 
2. Every aircraft leaving an airport situated in an infected area shall be disinsected 
in accordance with Article 25, using methods recommended by the Organization, 
and details of the disinsecting shall be included in the Health Part of the Aircraft 
General Declaration, unless this part of the Aircraft General Declaration is waived 
by the health authority of the airport of arrival. States concerned shall accept 
disinsecting of aircraft by the approved vapor disinsecting system carried out in 
flight. 3. Every ship leaving a port in an area where Aedes aegypti still exists and 
bound for an area where Aedes aegypti has been eradicated shall be kept free of 
Aedes aegypti in its immature and adult stages.” (World Health Organization 
1969:32). 
While this practice explicitly aims to control yellow fever spread, disinsection also guards 
against any mosquito borne disease carried by the yellow fever mosquito Aedes aegyptii 
including dengue fever, chikungunya and Zika Virus. As the regional overlap of yellow 
fever and malaria is quite significant, this method also aims to protect against cases of 
malaria either spreading or disseminating within and beyond ports of entry (Gratz et al. 
2000).  
 In 1994 American newspapers reported on several cases of chemical sensitivity and 
illness in American passengers visiting countries practicing blocks away disinsection 
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(Bonvie and Bonvie 1994a, 1994b; Healy 1994). Citing breathing difficulties and in some 
cases, neurological disorders that lasted for years, American passengers such as Julia 
Kendal complained that while the practices of disinsecting airplanes once fully boarded 
was eliminated as a method in the United States, US and foreign airlines as well as travel 
agents did not notify passengers ahead of time that they would be sprayed with pesticide 
on board when departing from countries that actively spray on planes. British passengers 
also complained of similar effects and even deaths associated with the spraying of 
pesticides during travels to and from Australia (Bonvie and Bonvie 1994a). 
 The concern by passengers over the potential health hazards of blocks away 
disinsection produced a number of medical and regulatory dilemmas for WHO member 
nations airlines and their organizing body and signatory to the IHR, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), over how to administer and interpret the IHR. In the case 
of the United States and its airlines, contradicting the IHR demands for disinsection put 
them in a difficult position. While no American passengers were being sprayed on US soil, 
the US government, Environmental Protection Agency or Centers for Disease Control 
could not challenge the authority of sovereign nations to spray within aircrafts at foreign 
ports, thus putting American passengers at risk. The only way to protect form these 
pesticides on American carriers would be to eliminate all routes to such destinations, 
ostensibly eliminating all travel to much of the Caribbean, South America, Southern and 
South East Asia, Australia and New Zealand and much of Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
economic implications for airlines would be disastrous (Bonvie and Bonvie 1994a) This 
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was a contested issue amongst the WHO member states. Countries with especially fragile 
or yellow fever susceptible environments such as India, Pakistan, China, New Zealand and 
Australia actively endorsed the practice of blocks away disinsection to protect their 
populations from the spread of disease (Williamson 1999).  
 In May of 1994, this issue came to a head in the United States when the US 
Congress passed a concurrent resolution urging that ICAO end all in-flight spraying 
(Association of Flight Attendants AFL-CIO 2001). 
 "The overwhelming support, both in Congress and the administration, for ending 
this unnecessary chemical exposure should be a clear signal to the international 
community that American travelers will not travel to countries that welcome them 
with an insecticidal spray.” (Association of Flight Attendants AFL-CIO 2001:8). 
On May 18th 1994 Congressman Peter DeFazio and Senator Patrick Leahy drafted a letter 
to President Clinton on behalf of Congress requesting the President to suggest reforms to 
the IHR and directly confront the WHO on this matter.  
“We respectfully request that you take the most expeditious steps possible, to 
change the World Health Organization (WHO) regulations which endorse the 
spraying of insecticides on international commercial flights…This policy is based 
on WHO regulations which endorse the spraying of insecticides on boarded aircraft 
for pest and disease control. We believe the WHO policy regarding in-flight 
spraying of insecticides is ineffective as a means of pest control and potentially 
harmful to human health…. Countries across the world look to WHO for guidance 
when establishing public health protection policies. The labels on airline 
disinsectants themselves use WHO's regulations in describing the proper use of 
those products. It is imperative that those regulations provide public health 
protection.” (United States. Congress. House. Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation. Subcommittee on Aviation 1994:10–11). 
 
While the scope of the IHR was being tested by individual nation states, this particular 
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challenge by the United States to disinsection and the general confusion caused by the 
international nature of this problem directly questioned the IHR’s legitimacy in the eyes of 
its member states. The ambiguity as to how and when to apply blocks away disinsection as 
well as what sort of information to provide to passengers prior to spraying showed the 
regulations to be ineffective in the modern environment (Steffen 1995). The increased pace 
of travel and the sheer volume of commercial flights meant that the rare neurological effects 
of disinsection could not be ignored in the face of a rapidly growing jetset population and 
massive airline and tourism industry. These regulations that had existed for so long in a 
framework developed in the 1960’s were no longer workable.  
A WEAKNESS IN CONFRONTING OUTBREAKS 
 
 By the time the decision to ultimately reform the IHR was made in May of 1995 at 
the World Health Assembly, the WHO’s foremost international infectious disease 
regulations had come under major international strain and de-legitimized the WHO as a 
regulatory body. Outbreaks of plague in India had proven the existing regulations weak at 
managing the spread of the diseases established within its protocols while threatening and 
high profile outbreaks of Ebola in Zaire evaded the scope of the regulations altogether 
(Steffen 1995). Each of these outbreaks were being reported by news agencies, often faster 
than by the WHO, which also increased the perception of the weakness of the WHO to 
respond to crises. Reporting from new disease surveillance entities such as the global 
surveillance network ProMED also highlighted the limitations of the WHO’s surveillance 
capacities in cases of outbreaks. The outbreak of Ebola in Kikwit, Zaire was in large part 
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the final nail in the coffin of the previous regime of the IHR. A key drafter of the IHR 2005 
and one of the authors of the resolution that called for the reform of the IHR, in speaking 
on the Kikwit outbreak said in an interview with me that 
“And the stimulus for this (Resolution WHA 48.7) was the 1993 Kikwit outbreak 
of Ebola and I think folks at WHO, I was at WHO then I was seconded there from 
CDC. And my job was to help internationalize the response to, the strategy for 
responding to infectious diseases. And this all goes back to the 1992 Institute of 
Medicine, or national academy of sciences report on Emerging Infectious diseases 
(mentioned earlier). So CDC had taken up this cause and very quickly realized they 
needed an international component to it so I was seconded there to help set that up 
and over the course of the 4 years, I was there from 92-96, there was a number of 
internationally important outbreaks of emerging diseases that really drew 
international attention and set the stage for a receptive audience to realize that the 
existing IHR were too limited in their scope and pretty inflexible as far as what 
could be done to coordinate an international response. So I think all of this then led 
to the passage in 1995 of the resolution then for literally the next decade the 
negotiations over what the new IHR should be and what the context should be. But 
at the end of the day that allowed the WHO greater flexibility both in terms of 
identifying what was appropriate to respond to and actually initiating response, 
even in spite of governments perhaps reluctance to share key information. And then 
you know I guess another element just in setting the stage this was about the time 
that ProMED23 was coming on line and information was becoming available much 
more rapidly and without the bureaucratic hurdles that had hampered official 
reporting previously. And it was also the change in technology. You might recall 
that during the ‘93 Kikwit outbreak there were real news reports from the front lines 
so what had previously been an unknown exotic disease became common 
knowledge because it was being reported in real time in the news…. Certainly the 
Kikwit outbreak was certainly the highest profile incident but you'll recall that was 
about the same time that plague occurred in India that caused a tremendous amount 
of economic impact. That was the discovery of the Hendra virus and nipah. So there 
was a lot of diseases that appeared that had not only public health implications but 
significant economic drawbacks as well. So all of these things got peoples' attention 
                                               
23 “ProMED - the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases - is an Internet-based 
reporting system dedicated to rapid global dissemination of information on outbreaks of 
infectious diseases and acute exposures to toxins that affect human health, including 
those in animals and in plants grown for food or animal feed. Electronic communications 
enable ProMED to provide up-to-date and reliable news about threats to human, animal, 
and food plant health around the world, seven days a week” (ProMed 2018)  
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even beyond the health sector.” 
 
 These emergent outbreaks without an effective entity to coordinate international 
responses left a power vacuum that was being filled in limited capacities by the American 
CDC among others as the WHO appeared ineffective. Embarrassed by the rise of novel 
disease surveillance groups like the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED) 
and the ability of 24 hour news teams to arrive on the scene of outbreaks prior to the WHO, 
the organization through the reform of the IHR needed to find a way to reestablish itself as 
a key agent over these disparate actors and knowledge sources. The global battles over 
disinsection also directly threatened the authority of the existing regulations. 
WHO REFORM STRATEGIES 
 In reforming the International Health Regulations beginning in 1995 and ultimately 
ending in 2005, the WHO undertook a radical transformation of a set of regulations that 
had largely gone un-challenged for over 100 years. The WHO, in their reform, developed 
a plan to confront the challenges to the IHR head on but also in so doing return the WHO 
to a central authority on disease control across borders. Ultimately what emerged was a 
much larger mandate for the WHO and a redefinition of the environment of international 
disease control and management. The WHO expanded its mandate by consolidating the 
authority to assess disease risk that emerges from disease surveillance systems (World 
Health Organization 2008a). In the new IHR and through the reform process the WHO 
developed a novel disease risk criterion which would be managed by the WHO secretariat 
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and mandated that all disease threats meeting its criteria be submitted to the WHO for 
review.   
The limitations explained earlier of the IHR presented several obstacles to the 
reform of the document. The scope of the IHR being limited to only three diseases was 
inadequate to the variety of infectious threats around the globe but the WHO also suffered 
from poor reporting on infectious disease outbreaks. Surveillance over outbreaks would 
have to be greatly strengthened if the WHO were to expand its mandate. Further, the role 
of the IHR as a toolkit for sanitation authorities at ports and border crossings had become 
both contested and obsolete as evidenced by both the increased pace of travel and the 
battles over blocks away disinsection. Dr. Brian Gushulak, a consultant at work on an early 
draft of the IHR revisions reflected that: 
The 1969 IHR, amended in 1973 and 1981 had become an ineffective tool for its 
purpose, for instance by limiting immediate reporting to three specified diseases. It 
is now clear that international infectious disease control is more effectively 
undertaken by surveillance and intervention strategies taking advantage of the 
considerable evolution in communications technology, laboratory science, and in 
diagnosis, treatment and control of infections, rather than by the application of 
quarantine practices or other inappropriate measures at sites distant from the source 
of infection. (Gushulak 1996b:1). 
 
The IHR had been found wanting in an ever-changing disease frontier (Fidler and Gostin 
2006). In shifting from a mandate to monitor three diseases to monitoring all potential 
threats, the WHO was preparing to take on a much larger role in disease control. Further, 
by aiming to make the control and surveillance the top priority of the IHR, rather than 
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sanitary measures, the power of the IHR aimed to shift from a control of practice to a 
control of knowledge- the management and consolidation of ‘surveillance capital’.  
 During an informal consultation to review the application of the IHR held on 
December 14th 1995, the members of the informal working group remarked, in light of 
calls for the abolition of the IHR, that without such a regulatory structure there would be 
no guiding authority by which countries would manage outbreaks and that member states 
would “feel themselves permitted to take absolutely any ad hoc measures without even 
having to account for them and no one would know what to expect on going to a country” 
(WHO 1995). The WHO sought to claim that authority in order to maintain a standardized 
frame by which disease threat would be confronted and managed globally. This authority 
was all the more important in the cases of the most serious global epidemic threats.  
 The mode and means by which the WHO would now assess disease threat in this 
new deductive context became a challenge for the members of the revision committee to 
define in the early stages of reform. The previous model in which only three dangerous 
diseases were seen as presenting a significant threat to the globe had proven obsolete. 
While the criticisms of the International Health Regulations reflected the same concerns 
over the unsurveilled movements of people in the southern hemisphere, the ability of the 
WHO to police these threats was actively being questioned. However, the movement away 
from this model left the WHO in the position of having to assess which diseases would 
trigger significant responses and why. The revisions of the IHR were moving the WHO 
into a position of being able to define and effectively triage global disease threats, not 
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according to a rigid list of three diseases but through some other form of knowledge control 
derived through rigorous disease surveillance conducted by member states and 
consolidated by the WHO.  
 In seeking advice on these matters the WHO reached out to their member state actors 
for comment. In a letter to the Director General of the WHO, Dr. Nakajima, the Minister 
of Health for Mongolia Dr. D.P. Nymadawa suggested that the list of diseases be directly 
revised to include a broader range of diseases such as hemorrhagic fevers and expand the 
surveillance criteria to any illnesses causing high fatalities, atypical microbial isolates and 
unusual clinical presentations (Nymadawa 1995).  
This was found too limiting in the scope of the responses. Ultimately the WHO 
reformers chose to adopt the philosophical perspectives on the utility of global disease 
surveillance more similar to those put forward by Lederberg, the Canadians and American 
surveillance advocates thus replicating in turn, the machinations of the Trans-Imperial 
Health Apparatus. The debates over one of the more respected early models for the IHR 
relied on a method of disease surveillance and reporting known as syndromic surveillance, 
a method by which, in lieu of accurate diagnostic information, the WHO could asses the 
relative threat of outbreaks by the syndromes presented by the disease prior to full lab 
analysis. This would allow the WHO to triage risk of global spread prior to the diagnosis 
of disease and thereby act quickly. Such a method relies on timely reporting to the WHO 
of all outbreaks by member states. While not what was ultimately accepted as the strategy 
for assessing risk to the WHO, syndromic surveillance provided an early model for the 
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diagnostic criteria that the WHO would ultimately adopt in the 2005 revision. In the draft 
of the initial strategy for syndromic reporting, Dr. Gushulak, representing the Canadian 
Quarantine Health Services suggested that the threat of disease spread and the disease itself 
be assessed and prioritized not only based on medical and etiological criteria, but also the 
socio-political and economic climate of the site of outbreak, the possible threats the disease 
may pose to trade and traffic, technological capacities to treat the outbreak, and the risks 
associated with each given a potential global epidemic (Gushulak 1996a). 
“By providing expert consensus opinion and analysis, the IHR’s can become an 
internationally accepted standardized framework that guides national health providers 
in the management of epidemic outbreaks. Diversity in control activities, which may 
occur as different national health authorities attempt to deal with the same situation can 
adversely affect multinational efforts to deliver a balanced and scientifically 
appropriate response to an acutely developing situation. Due to the fact that many of 
these episodes will involve emerging or re-emerging infectious diseases illnesses where 
knowledge and clinical experience may be limited, guidelines and collectively 
approved recommendations can be a useful tool. They prevent or moderate the 
introduction of unnecessary or inappropriate measures that can interfere with 
international commerce. They can also provide global standards for disease control that 
can be used as national models. The availability of internationally consistent disease 
control measures will assist national authorities in the maintenance of public 
confidence in time of international emergency. Additionally they will greatly facilitate 
the decision making process faced by national health authorities by providing a widely 
accepted framework of response measures. In this manner, they will support the 
efficient and effective allocation of resources directed at international control efforts in 
areas where action is required. At the same time they can clearly delineate the lack of 
necessity for inappropriate or unnecessary control measures.” (Gushulak 1996b). 
 
 This model transformed the disease threat, previously represented as the mere presence 
of the disease for which there would be clear responses, into a dynamic heuristic whereby 
the WHO would directly assess the risk of spread and develop practical responses based 
upon that risk. The creation of this classificatory schema relied significantly upon meeting 
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the challenges that all organizations traditionally have to face. The concerns of the 
members of the Informal working group over the rapid reporting of outbreaks reflected the 
particular anxieties of the WHO at the time. Namely, the concerns over the rapid 
dissemination of information about outbreaks leading to a secondary epidemic of panic 
spread by the emergent 24 hour media was a pressing concern. The recent outbreak of 
pneumonic plague in India produced a great deal of media speculation on the outbreak 
without a cohesive assessment from WHO experts. This weakened the WHO’s capacity to 
control the modes of information dissemination on the outbreak. This urgent issue of media 
optics, melded with the concerns over the overall mission of the IHR to limit the threat of 
disease to trade and traffic. As such, both the early and final versions of the IHR considered 
media coverage in its risk assessment of outbreaks.  
“Media role in Syndromic reporting:  
Public concern: 
F) is there grave concern about the syndrome among the public or the media leading to 
discriminatory actions in business or social transactions? 
G) Is there international media coverage and concern 
H) Is international aid being sought? 
When at least one criteria in any two groups are satisfied a health problem would be 
reportable…  
What is the justification of these criteria? 
Concern leading to discriminatory actions: Rumors and misunderstandings leading to 
inappropriate actions at home and at frontiers/ports would require classification and 
monitoring and WHO should be able to give the true story to other countries who are 
instituting or contemplating such inappropriate measures.” (Bleed 1996:2). 
 
While this particular formulation of syndromic surveillance would prove to be 
unpopular, the model itself of retaining control over the risk assessment of different 
diseases would come to be the accepted form of disease control within the 2005 IHR. 
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Ultimately Syndromic reporting was scrapped due to the infeasibility of implementing such 
a rapid reporting system under the present institutional constraints of the WHO.  
“Syndromic reporting will likely result in more reports of disease outbreaks. 
Management of political and economic concerns and reassurance of worried 
citizens will be critical…WHO and member nations will almost certainly receive 
more requests for assistance. This will impact on already limited resources.” (Fax 
to Dr. Alary; Dr. David Heymann from Dr. Margaret Tipple). 
 
 The political and economic risks of declaring a multiplicity of threats was considered 
too significant an undertaking on the part of the WHO and could present a major challenge 
to their credibility if too many emergencies were triggered. Secondly, the WHO concluded 
that an excess of emergencies could trigger collateral effects to trade and traffic.  
 A pilot study in 22 countries in all WHO regions (completed in 1999) field tested the 
approach. As the result of an interim review, it was concluded however that syndromic 
reporting, although valuable within a national system, was not appropriate for use in the 
context of a regulatory framework, mainly because of difficulties in reporting syndromes 
in the field test, and because syndromes could not be linked to preset rules for control of 
spread. (World Health Assembly 2001:3) 
 Ultimately the reformers of the IHR settled upon a very specific and top down mode 
of disease control and management. The clear issues associated with earlier drafts of the 
IHR reflect the need to be able to assess and declare threat according to a particular criteria, 
embracing of epidemic concerns as well as the social, political and economic factors 
associated with that risk including the costs that the WHO would have to bear. Early drafts 
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for disease management and threat assessment that included syndromic reporting 
recognized the need for the WHO to claim its role as the authority over the control of 
international disease spread, however, how that authority would be exercised proved to be 
a central challenge.  
 The WHO decided to assess the threat of outbreaks based on a reproducible 
algorithm to determine the level of global risk. In place of the previous model in the IHR 
by which any outbreaks of plague, cholera or yellow fever would receive the highest levels 
of control and scrutiny, the WHO settled on the designation of Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern (PHEIC), a designation in the sole control and authority of the 
Director General of the WHO.  
 In addition to this classificatory structure for assessing disease threat, the WHO 
further consolidated its command over surveillance capital through the formulation of 
GOARN- the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network to act as a clearing house for 
all incoming disease and surveillance information. A novel component of the notification 
system that emerged in the 2005 IHR is the ability of the WHO to accept surveillance data 
from non-state actors. This significantly increased the capacity of the WHO to assess threat 
but also challenged the authority of their member states to hide, conceal or control 
surveillance data from the WHO. Thus, reporters, health actors or NGO's can send reports 
and information to the WHO without notifying or confirming with the national government 
in question. Such a model of reporting had never been in place previously and further 
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solidified the WHO’s control over the employment and management of surveillance 
knowledge in the absence of other forms of sanction or direct power.  
SURVEILLANCE- THE DOXA AND ITS CAPITAL 
 The fundamental discourse that oriented the International Sanitary Conventions 
was the inherent and constant threat posed by infectious diseases emanating from the heart 
of European colonies, interrupting patterns of trade and ultimately reaching European 
shores. To protect European enterprise, the International Sanitary Conventions formulated 
a Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus that ensured that all colonial governments would, 
through strict surveillance and aggressive sanitary regimes, contain any outbreak deemed 
threatening to Europe. Thus far we have seen how this same orientalism, reproduced by 
actors like the American CDC, the Canadian Advisory Committee on epidemiology as well 
as the emergent disease surveillance community and global news agencies, reflect this 
dominant belief that the major disease threats to the global body require the aggressive 
policing of those threats that emanate from beyond their territories. Like the orientalist 
frame that separated colony from metropole and colonizer from colonized in order to 
protect Europe from disease, the same epidemic orientalism reifies similar boundaries in a 
world where they are less visible in the absence of explicit empire. These logics maintain 
themselves as the doxa underlying the modern field of infectious disease control.  
“Systems of classification which reproduce, in their own specific logic, the 
objective classes, i.e. the divisions by sex, age, or position in the relations of 
production, make their specific contribution to the reproduction of the power 
relations of which they are the product, by securing the misrecognition, and hence 
the recognition, of the arbitrariness on which they are based : in the extreme case, 
that is to say, when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective 
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order and the subjective principles of organization (as in ancient societies) the 
natural and social world appears as self-evident. This experience we shall call doxa, 
so as to distinguish it from an orthodox or heterodox belief implying awareness and 
recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs.”  
 
 
 The International Sanitary Regulations and first International Health Regulations 
(1969) under the WHO condensed the force of these earlier controls to border spaces and 
restricted the sanitary gaze almost exclusively to those traversing national borders. The 
concern for the emergence of diseases such as Ebola and Nipah virus among others, 
emanating from post-colonial tropical areas once again triggered racist anxieties over the 
unobserved movement of non-white peoples around the world. The same epidemic 
orientalism that prompted segregation in Cape Town in 1901 and the aggressive sanitary 
policing of Muslims on Hajj remains in 21st century. As the field of infectious disease 
management emerged, the WHO was challenged for its inability to effectively surveil the 
masses that would bring disease to the rest of the world and establish regulations 
accordingly. This prompted the reformers of the IHR to attempt, through the reconstitution 
of the regulations, to reclaim the dominant symbolic capital of the field-surveillance 
capital. This capital empowered the WHO, through the regulations to define and classify 
disease threat through the same epidemic orientalist realm as previously, rendering a 
constellation of economic, political and epidemiological considerations as common-sense. 
The need for global surveillance-both the knowledge of disease outbreaks and the power 
to define risk-became the common shared capital of this emergent field. The WHO has in 
turn captured the nomos of this field and discovered an avenue by which to reclaim their 
role and responsibility as the authority on international disease control.  
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CONCLUSION  
 In many ways the reforms of the 1990’s and early 21st century reflect a return to 
previous methods of disease control. As the reform of the International Sanitary 
Conventions under the authority of the WHO had reproduced the orientalizing gaze of 
previous sanitary eras, the lingering concerns over the un-surveilled movement of people 
beyond these zones in the absence of colonial rule remained. The solution to this power 
vacuum was the establishment through the IHR of the WHO as the collector and sole arbiter 
of disease threats around the world, responsible for maintaining the orientalism and the 
Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus which enabled the success of the International Sanitary 
Conventions. Rather than acquiesce to the demands of their member states and detractors, 
the reformers of the IHR attempted to entirely reshape the field by placing itself at the 
center of how infectious outbreaks are assessed for risk, classified and ultimately managed 
thus taking control of the symbolic capital of the field. Recognizing the WHO’s loss of its 
primary symbolic capital- surveillance capital- and the threat to its authority, the reformers 
of the IHR re-established the WHO as the central body to arbitrate over the use and power 
of that capital. The recognition of the WHO and its experts of its role in a growing, 
contested battle over the authority to police disease in competition with non-governmental 
and state actors produced these particular reforms. The relative difficulty and unilateral 
power of the Director General to assign PHEIC’s also demonstrates the symbolic power 
and latitude that the WHO maintains in deciding which outbreaks become a threat requiring 
international cooperation to stop. The enhanced requirements to mandate reporting on any 
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suspicious outbreaks by their member states permanently place the WHO at the center of 
international disease control where the previous instantiation of the IHR risked placing it 
very much at the periphery.  
 The International Health Regulations of 2005, like its predecessors represent the 
only binding international agreement on public health between nations (Giesecke 
2000:588). Several scholars have pointed to the inherent disjointedness and weakness of 
the WHO as an organization in recent times (Halabi, Gostin, and Crowley 2016). Critics 
have concluded that the lack of sanctioning power, small budget (Gostin, Sridhar, and 
Hougendobler 2015) and decentralized operating structure, with regional blocs operating 
semi-autonomously from the central headquarters limits its role as a central actor in global 
health (Kickbusch 1995). However, the recent responses to epidemic outbreaks have 
challenged this understanding that the WHO and the IHR, which it maintains, is marginal 
in the space of global health. The WHO maintains a very powerful role in proliferating and 
maintaining health norms and practices throughout the globe (Gostin et al. 2015). This is 
especially the case in establishing best practice procedures for the treatment and 
surveillance of diseases by making direct recommendations to member states.  
The authority of the WHO is even more explicit in the domain of the IHR. This 
examination into the symbolic power of the IHR demonstrates that while the WHO may 
not wield sanctioning power over its member states, it retains significant might as a 
normative regulatory actor in the larger field of global health. “The International Health 
Regulations are the only legally binding instrument to prevent the trans-boundary spread 
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of infectious diseases” (World Health Organization 2004). The authority of the IHR makes 
the WHO a powerful force for both signaling threat and as a coordinating body.  
 Since 2005, four outbreaks have received the designation PHEIC- the 2009 
outbreak of Swine Flu; the resurgence of Polio in 2014; the West African Ebola outbreak 
of 2014-2016; and the Zika Virus outbreak of 2016. Each of these diseases was determined 
to be a PHEIC by the Director General of the WHO after deliberation with an Emergency 
committee of experts. This dynamic designation has cemented the role of the WHO at the 
center of all major outbreak responses and consolidated its power through the IHR. The 
following chapter will explore how and under what circumstances a PHEIC is ultimately 
designated.  
  
  
179 
 
Chapter VI: Policing the Modern Plagues: Epidemics, Symbolic Power and the 
Global Management of Disease Risk 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapters have explained which forces govern the practices and 
responses to particular epidemic threats. It is an epidemic orientalism which structures the 
responses to diseases and organizes the perception of disease threat. Historically these 
diseases have been plague, cholera and yellow fever. In the current era, where disease 
threats are assessed based on the threat designation, the Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC), what sort of epidemics compel the international 
community to act? How do these priorities affect which outbreaks become a focus for 
actors like the World Health Organization (WHO) and which outbreaks receive 
comparatively less global attention? Who becomes the focus of the power of the IHR? 
While Epidemic Orientalism, the guiding discourse of the International Sanitary 
Conventions and the WHO’s International Health Regulations has thus far explained why 
certain disease threats are prioritized over others, this theory alone cannot explain why 
certain diseases interpolated as international concerns garner more attention than others. 
 To answer these questions, this chapter examines the deliberation process behind 
the highest infectious disease threat designation- the Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern as the management of symbolic power by the WHO. The previous 
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chapter explored how the WHO managed to retain, through the reform of the IHR, the 
dominance over the field of infectious disease control through the capture and control of 
symbolic power. Through the revisions of the IHR in the 1990’s and 2000’s the WHO was 
able to recapture a level of global disease surveillance that had been missing since the first 
International Sanitary Conventions. Given the expanded authority of the WHO, in this 
chapter I show how the organization mobilizes its symbolic power to effect desired 
responses from its member states and fellow international organizations.  
Since 200724, the World Health Organization has employed the term Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) to classify the highest level of public health 
emergencies. The designation of this term under the International Health Regulations of 
2005 (IHR 2005) mandates that the WHO and in some instances its member nations 
commit to extraordinary measures to combat the health threat. The WHO upon this 
declaration is empowered to coordinate the disease response, offer regular guidance and 
technical support to the affected regions, suggest or challenge the emplacement of travel 
and trade barriers and facilitate the gathering of resources from its member nations to 
combat the threat. While this designation technically covers all manner of health threats 
including biohazard and biological warfare, it has only been declared in response to 
moments of epidemic outbreak.  
  Since 2005, four outbreaks have received the designation PHEIC- the 2009 
outbreak of Swine Flu; the resurgence of Polio in 2014; the West African Ebola outbreak 
                                               
24 This was the year the IHR 2005 went into effect.  
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of 2014-2016; and the Zika Virus outbreak of 2016. Each of these diseases was determined 
to be a PHEIC by the Director General of the WHO after deliberation with an Emergency 
committee of experts. However, two diseases have come before the Director General and 
Emergency Committee that did not receive the designation PHEIC; Yellow Fever in 2016 
and the MERS Coronavirus (MERS-CoV). While MERS-CoV has caused fewer fatalities, 
ultimately it exhibits mortality rate than Zika virus and is more contagious than Ebola. 
Yellow fever, carried by the same mosquito as Zika Virus has caused far more fatalities in 
the last several years than Zika virus and has spread in urban areas in Angola and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo to Beijing and other parts of China. While each disease 
spread across borders and generated serious public health impacts (Lucey D and Gostin 
LO 2016; Woodall and Yuill 2016), the Emergency Committees and Director General 
denied the designation of PHEIC for these two diseases.  
  All of these diseases would seem to fit the criteria of a global disease threat through 
the lens of epidemic orientalism, as all derive from former colonial areas and reflect a threat 
from those spaces that can travel to the ‘developed’ world. This is not to say that epidemic 
orientalism is not still at work in the practice of disease control. Quite the opposite in fact. 
Each PHEIC has been determined and responses have been structured under the 
understanding that the countries affected can no longer help themselves. However, neither 
yellow fever or MERS-CoV triggered a PHEIC designation so another causal mechanism 
must be at work.  
This chapter argues that in deciding to recommend a PHEIC, members of the 
Emergency Committees must contend with the symbolic power of the designation and the 
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effects that it may have on the outbreak response as well as subsequently the patterning of 
epidemic spread itself. The symbolic power of employing the designation itself produces 
effects that not only challenge its future legitimacy but also affect the efficacy of anti-
outbreak responses. By considering the symbolic power of the PHEIC designation which 
produces consequences that must be attended to and are difficult to anticipate, the PHEIC 
itself is, amidst a constellation of human, state and organizational actors involved in 
epidemic response. Novel scholarship has developed Bourdieu’s concepts of field beyond 
the nation-state container (Buchholz 2016; Go 2008, 2013; Go and Krause 2016). This 
work seeks to extend this thinking to other aspects of Bourdieu’s theorizing, exploring the 
manner through which symbolic power is applied and seen as legitimate. 
  Explaining the discrepancy between critical diseases that each triggered alerts but 
may or may not have received the designation of PHEIC is critical to the understanding of 
how disease risk is assessed on a global scale and demonstrate how the symbolic power of 
the WHO is employed. What I demonstrate is that the PHEIC designation is more than 
solely a signal that compels the international community to act in response to an epidemic 
crisis. It is also a powerful mechanism for maintaining or curbing challenges to world trade 
and travel as well as organizing the activities of the WHO. Similar to the original 
International Sanitary Conventions which aimed to halt the production of un-coordinated 
quarantine practices in Europe, the PHEIC is often employed, or not, to limit the actions 
of member states that are incongruous with the desired aims of the WHO. Much like the 
International Sanitary Convention compelled aggressive disease control measures from 
colonies exhibiting outbreaks of particular diseases, so too does the PHEIC designation 
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decide not only which diseases warrant concern from the international community but also 
which diseases demand an aggressive response.  
Table 4. Outbreaks Prompting Emergency Committee Meetings and their Outcomes 
 
Disease Date of 
First 
Meeting 
Number of 
Emergency 
Committee 
Meetings 
No. of 
Members 
Countries 
Affected 
Decision 
H1N1 25-Apr-
09 
9 15; 1 
Advisor 
Pandemic-
global 
Declared 
a PHEIC 
upon first 
meeting 
Poliomyelitis 5-May-
14 
13; ongoing 15; 5 
Advisors 
Pakistan; 
Afghanistan; 
Nigeria/Lake 
Chad Region 
Declared 
a PHEIC 
upon first 
meeting 
MERS-CoV 9-Jul-13 10 17; 7 
Advisors 
Algeria; Iran; 
Jordan; 
Netherlands; 
Saudi Arabia; 
(UAE); USA; 
Qatar; South 
Korea 
No 
PHEIC 
declared 
Ebola Virus 
Disease 
8-Aug-
14 
9 13; 9 
Advisors 
Guinea; 
Liberia; Sierra 
Leone; Mali; 
Senegal; Italy; 
Spain; UK; 
USA; Nigeria 
Declared 
a PHEIC 
upon first 
meeting 
Zika Micro-
cephaly 
1-Feb-
16 
5 13; 10 
Advisors 
Most of North 
and South 
America; East 
Africa; Parts of 
Asia 
Declared 
a PHEIC 
upon first 
meeting 
Yellow Fever 16-May-
16 
2 8; 3 
Advisors 
Angola; 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo; China 
No 
PHEIC 
declared 
 
Caption (Chan 2009; Heymann et al. 2016; World Health Organization 2009a:1, 2015b, 
2016g, 2016f, 2016a) 
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It was the objective of the WHO, in the production of the PHEIC and the decision-
making algorithm of the instrument, to create a reproducible method by which to assess 
the risk of international spread of infectious disease. The PHEIC designation process brings 
together key experts in the field of medicine and epidemiology to respond to the data 
produced from disease surveillance sources around the world in order to determine at that 
time if an outbreak constitutes a public health emergency of international concern. As noted 
in Figure 1, the sizes of these Emergency Committees are small and the discussion quite 
intimate. The provision of a standardized classificatory schema to routinize the designation 
of disease risk is the objective of the PHEIC.  
  Scholarship suggests that key to the WHO’s legitimacy on the world stage is its 
power to leverage its normative authority. As the most significant international agency 
devoted to health and commissioned by the United Nations, the WHO has the power to 
establish global standards, provide technical guidance and expert knowledge, negotiate 
treaties, define and classify health situations and diagnostic criteria and coordinate 
responses to health emergencies (Gostin 2017; Gostin, Sridhar, and Hougendobler 2015).  
 Over the last five years in particular, the WHO has come under significant scrutiny 
over its management of epidemic emergencies like the West African Ebola Virus Disease 
(EVD) outbreak of 2013-2016 and the more recent Zika and Yellow Fever outbreaks of the 
last two years (Chardell 2016; Roberts 2015; World Health Organization 2015b) resulting 
in significant calls for reform and weakening the organizations position as the normative 
authority over infectious disease response, namely the utility and effectiveness of the 
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classificatory system it uses in declaring health emergencies.  
By conducting interviews with senior members of the WHO Emergency 
Committees that deliberate over the threat of international disease spread, I examine the 
factors that determine how epidemic risk is assessed finding that the symbolic, 
classificatory power of the PHEIC designation is an important force to be mediated by 
Emergency Committee members in order to derive sound health responses. Through 
interview as well as archival analysis of formal WHO documents and speeches, this chapter 
appraises the decision-making practices involved in the major outbreaks since 2005 when 
the IHR was implemented. In doing so this work provides an explanation of the formal 
system by which the Director General and Emergency Committees assess disease risk to 
demonstrate the complex informal considerations that Emergency Committee members 
must also balance in their deliberations over whether to advise the declaration of a PHEIC. 
Employing Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power (Bourdieu 1989; Bourdieu et al. 
2003) I suggest that members of the WHO Emergency Committees engage in a complex 
negotiation that incorporates concerns for the potential effects of the designation itself upon 
the outbreak and the responses to it from nations. In applying Bourdieu’s theory in this 
way, beyond the original scope of the nation I show how international organizations such 
as the WHO are able to wield significant power over even their most powerful member 
nations to effect responses in the interests of the organization.  
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF A PHEIC 
The declaration of a PHEIC drastically alters the conditions of outbreak response. 
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Under the designation, the WHO takes responsibility for coordinating the international 
response to the outbreak. The effect of this was particularly evident in the Ebola response 
in West Africa. While the WHO was slow to respond to the outbreak, the designation of 
the PHEIC galvanized international support and coordinated a range of national and non-
governmental actors under a single authority, which streamlined communication and 
activities. The other major function of the PHEIC designation is to manage the economic 
fallout of outbreaks. Outbreaks have historically been economically devastating for the 
nations affected. An outbreak of pneumonic plague in Surat India in 1994, though small 
and relatively isolated resulted in 2 billion dollars of economic losses to India over the 
course of the outbreak including trade embargos and tourism losses to the region 
(Brahmbhatt and Dutta 2008). The SARS epidemic of 2003 resulted in losses of up to 1% 
of GDP in Singapore, Hong Kong, China and Taiwan respectively. The scope and scale of 
outbreak responses, managed on an international level is modulated by the PHEIC 
designation and effective responses can hinge upon the guidance of actors within the WHO. 
As climate change and the movement of human populations into previously unpopulated 
areas increase, novel and reemergent diseases such as Zika Virus and Yellow fever will 
spread to areas where they had not previously been endemic. The threat of infectious 
disease is considered to be a major geopolitical and medical threat to global populations 
for their capacity to destabilize developing economies and yield mass death (Centers for 
Disease Control 1992; Century, Health, and Medicine 2003; Health 1992; Tambo, Ugwu, 
and Ngogang 2014). A clearer understanding of the geopolitical factors that contribute to 
disease responses can also yield the production of more effective and transparent policies 
  
187 
for disease control that can aid medical teams and infectious disease actors in their 
treatment and control of the most dangerous contagions facing the world population. 
Conversations around the reform of the International Health Regulations have focused 
upon the weakness of the WHO to recognize and coordinate responses to international 
emergencies in an effective and timely manner. However, little focus has been given to the 
ways that the PHEIC designation structure itself challenges and affects the WHO’s 
operational capacity and how that concern becomes embedded in decision making 
practices.  
Figure 3. Professional Affiliation of Emergency Committee Membership 
 
Caption (World Health Organization 2009b, 2013, 2014, 2016c, 2016b, 2016c, 2016e) 
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Security: Operational Procedures” (2008b), the WHO lays out a “reproducible process for 
managing acute public health events” (2008b:7) that may affect the international 
community. The document provides a framework for how events should be monitored and 
how the WHO should assess risk regarding international epidemic events. In efforts to be 
reproducible and transparent, the document lays out standardized questions and actions by 
which threats are assessed for potential risk. Events are managed by a diverse group of 
actors coordinated around the world through WHO headquarters. Threats are assessed and 
managed by an Event Management Group (EMG), an ad-hoc network composed of experts 
in outbreak control from the WHO country office of the affected Member state, regional 
offices, and ultimately WHO headquarters (World Health Organization 2008b:3). The 
EMG is coordinated by an event manager designated by the Director General, Department 
of Epidemic and pandemic Alert and Response or the Coordinator of the Alert and 
Response network.  
 Upon verification of an outbreak event through specific protocols further 
established by the WHO (World Health Organization 2008b: 9–10), the event is assessed 
for its potential risk. The risk of an outbreak of international concern is primarily evaluated 
under the rubric laid out under Annex 2 of the IHR (2005). According to this algorithm, 
potential PHEIC’s are to be judged based on four major conditions:  
● Is the public health impact of the event is serious; 
● Is the event unusual or unexpected; 
● Is there a significant risk of international spread;  
● Is there a significant risk of international restriction(s) to travel and trade? (World 
Health Organization 2008a) 
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While these questions make up the focus of the algorithm and are predicated on a further 
list of sub-questions there are a set of additional considerations necessitated in the risk 
assessment that take into account not only the medical risks associated with the outbreak 
but also the geopolitical situation in the country(s) of outbreak as well as the public 
perception of risk and the potential risks associated with the WHO not taking action.  
 At the outcome of the risk assessment, having considered the alert delivered by the 
member nation struck by outbreak or by a confirmed source, the WHO event management 
group, may choose one of five responses;  
1. “Discard the event if there is no risk of international spread; 
2. Continue to monitor the event; 
3. Assist by providing technical assistance 
4. Disseminate information to the international community to prevent similar events 
5. Escalate the level of intervention;  
6. Advise the WHO senior management to initiate a PHEIC determination procedure” 
(World Health Organization 2008b: 11) 
 
If a PHEIC determination procedure is requested then an emergency committee will be 
formed, the Director General will appoint a chair under the conditions of Article 48 of the 
IHR 2005 and the Director General will decide whether the event constitutes a PHEIC 
considering the following:  
“(a) Information provided by the State Party;  
(b) The decision instrument contained in Annex 2;  
(c) The advice of the Emergency Committee;  
(d) Scientific principles as well as the available scientific evidence and other relevant 
information; and  
(e) An assessment of the risk to human health, of the risk of international spread of 
disease and of the risk of interference with international traffic.” (World Health 
Organization 2008a: 14) 
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If the event is determined to be PHEIC after this protocol is enacted, then International 
cooperation will likely be required and mandated by the WHO to take a response decided 
to be appropriate for the outbreak. 
Edelstein et al. conducted the first significant appraisal of the validity of the PHEIC 
designation system (2012). The authors compiled 175 unique infectious disease events and 
provided details of these events to three key experts in the field of infectious disease 
management. Based on the decision making instrument in Annex 2 of the International 
Health Regulations they were asked to answer yes or no answers to questions on whether 
these outbreaks constituted a PHEIC. In addition to providing affirmative or negative 
answers to these questions the experts were required to state their confidence in their 
assertion based on a 5-point likert scale (1. strongly disagree-5. Strongly agree) (Edelstein 
et al. 2012:1116). While the experts were unaware of the outcomes and effects of the 
hypothetical emergency scenarios they were ultimately based on real world situations. The 
result was that of the 46 unique disease events determined to be of international concern 
by the experts involved, 44 of them would have been reported using Annex 2 of the IHR 
2005. This is a 95.6% sensitivity under the conditions put forward by the test (Edelstein et 
al. 2012). 
While this research tested the reproducibility of the diagnostic criteria of Annex 2 
of the IHR, it did not establish the validity of the underlying assumptions over what makes 
an international health event, namely the 4 conditions central to the algorithm. Several 
doctors and medical experts have challenged the way in which the PHEIC designation and 
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the strategic employment of Emergency Committees as powerful consensus building 
engines as well as a vehicle to shed light on outbreaks and draw attention to their 
importance.  
THEORIZING WHO RISK ASSESMENT 
 Which factors affect the WHO’s deliberation practices over the PHEIC 
designation? As stated earlier, while epidemic orientalism, as well as concerns for trade 
can be seen to structure the construction of threat, these causal factors alone are not enough 
to generate a PHEIC. Though a PHEIC can only be designated in the case of an outbreak 
capable of crossing borders and disturbing trade a disease meeting these criteria alone does 
not always provoke the designation. A standard biomedical response would suggest that 
any response that triggers an alert already meets the criteria to a significant extent of a 
PHEIC. If the considerations for determining a PHEIC are ostensibly the same as those 
outlined in Annex 2 of the IHR (2005), detailing the procedures for triggering an alert, then 
the cases of MERS-CoV and Yellow Fever in Angola and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo should have also been designated as PHEICs.  
Organizational sociology theories that posit that international organizations are 
constantly in pursuit of authority over, and autonomy from their member nations (Barnett 
and Coleman 2005; Chorev 2012b, 2012a; Chorev and Babb 2009) would also support a 
conclusion that the WHO would seek a PHEIC designation in most cases. Declaring a 
PHEIC would place the WHO in the central coordinating position for managing epidemic 
responses and give them significant power over their member nations and many more 
resources. However, the WHO is quite reticent to declare PHEICs. In both the case of the 
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Ebola outbreak in West Africa and with regards to Yellow Fever in South Western Africa, 
the WHO was slow even to convene Emergency Committees leading to widespread 
condemnation by medical experts and other international health organizations (Lucey D 
and Gostin LO 2016; Médecins Sans Frontières International 2015; World Health 
Organization 2015b). Doctors Without Borders suggested bluntly that the WHO operated 
only in the service of its more powerful member states in declaring the recent ebola 
outbreak a PHEIC. 
The argument that the WHO operates in the service of its most powerful member 
states finds some theoretical support from scholarship in global sociology. A World-
Systems approach (Frank 1990; Wallerstein 1974) would support the conclusion that an 
epidemic outbreak would become a matter of global concern only once the disease became 
capable of travelling from global peripheries to metropoles thus affecting the economic 
and political flows of the world system. However, each of these diseases crossed borders 
into major global economic hubs at various times producing infection. MERS-CoV for 
instance, though requiring direct contact for transmission like Ebola produced cases in 26 
different countries including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea and 
Germany, as well as in its primary reservoirs of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, yet was not 
declared a PHEIC (World Health Organization 2015a). Yellow Fever also spread to Beijing 
from Angola, signaling a particularly severe threat of urban spread in a population 
unvaccinated against the disease. World Society Theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Krücken and Drori 2010; Meyer et al. 1997) would likewise suggest that the WHO would 
operate as a diffusionary actor, establishing globalized norms of practice in spaces less 
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incorporated into world society. However, each of these epidemics threatened the global 
flow of trade25. While this may be a WHO priority, the global vaccine coverage for Polio 
reflects a far lesser threat to global economic and political orders than the other diseases 
that have produced emergency committees. Scholarship on biosecurity, which generally 
demonstrates that concerns for international health threats are governed by the perspectives 
of the most powerful economic nations (Bashford 2006; Brown and Bell 2008; Collier and 
Lakoff 2013; Figuié 2013) likewise cannot explain the discrepancies in the WHO’s risk 
assessment strategies. While international organizations often operate as large 
bureaucracies managing particular social and geopolitical orders, their behavior can also 
produce unusual outcomes that appear to limit their own aims (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004:ix).  
Though significant research has considered the role of international organizations 
operating as diffusionary actors on behalf of nation states (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Meyer et al. 1997), in the service of powerful economic interests (Babb 2009), or as entities 
struggling for authority and autonomy (Barnett and Coleman 2005; Barnett and Finnemore 
1999; Chorev 2012a, 2012b), few theories examine the power of international 
organizations to effect responses and impose authority upon both weak and powerful 
nations. This chapter argues that through the power of classification and the symbolic 
power that classifications convey, the WHO manages the responses of its member nations.  
                                               
25 The one exception to this being Polio, which was clustered in rural Pakistan yet 
received a PHEIC designation because it is scheduled for eradication and therefore 
triggers automatic notification.  
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 I explore the PHEIC Designation process through the lens once more of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power as a case of symbolic power maintenance by the 
WHO Emergency Committees. In deliberating over a PHEIC declaration, the members of 
the committee weigh how the symbolic power of designation will affect the response to the 
outbreak itself, which in certain cases may overshadow the effectiveness of responses. This 
power is equally as important in the initial discussion over designation as well as in the 
downsizing of a threat after the initial outbreak has subsided, as will be shown in the cases 
of Zika Microcephaly and EVD in West Africa. The scope and risk dictated by a PHEIC is 
therefore heavily modulated by the symbolic power and effects produced by the PHEIC 
designation as a risk classification, independent of the epidemiological situation at the site 
of outbreak. In applying Bourdieu’s theory to this case I intend to show how symbolic 
power operates beyond the realm of the nation state, granting significant power to non-
governmental institutions while also exploring the techniques of the application of this 
power beyond the traditional formulations of the state. In doing so, I demonstrate how the 
mechanisms by which symbolic power is mobilized outside of the context of the state relies 
on a deeply conscious negotiated process by those in control of the symbolic capital to 
manage the effective responses to that power.  
 Bourdieu introduced the concept of symbolic power as a form of power that allows 
for the imposition of “classifications and meanings as significant” (Swartz 2013:38). 
Symbolic power, therefore endows the wielder the authority to impose particular 
knowledges or understandings as common sense, universally acceptable and uncontested 
fact (Bourdieu, Thompson, and Raymond 2003:170). Science and technology scholarship 
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as well as organizational theorists have shown that the power to classify and the established 
standards that result impose a particular form of order upon those beholden to those 
classifications (Barman 2013; Bowker and Star 1999; Timmermans and Berg 1997; 
Timmermans and Epstein 2010). This symbolic power to classify thereby flattens the world 
according to the particular perspectives of those in power and obscures the contestations 
between actors over that power (Barman 2013; Go and Krause 2016). While the battle for 
symbolic power has been well examined within the context of fields, comparatively less 
work has explored how forms of classification themselves leverage that symbolic power 
once dominance is accepted. Most scholarship exploring the contestations over symbolic 
capitals explore the battles within particular fields over resources and power (Bourdieu 
1975; Go and Krause 2016; Krause 2014; Steinmetz 2008). Symbolic power is also under-
theorized beyond a national context.  
Bourdieu theorizes the state as the ultimate actor capable of imposing categories 
and classification to be accepted as common sense (Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 
1994). While competition over symbolic capital and symbolic power ultimately occurs 
between the holders of state authority and those seeking it, it is the state, with its monopoly 
over symbolic and physical violence which also has in some capacity the power to compel 
the acceptance of their classifications. In Bourdieu’s conception, the state is the ultimate 
source of symbolic power (Swartz 2004).  
The state is able to elicit submission to its symbolic order and its presentation of 
reality- the achievement of doxic submission, precisely because it controls “the cognitive 
structures through which it is perceived” (Bourdieu et al. 1994:14). Bourdieu’s 
  
196 
understanding is that by controlling the structuring structures through which reality is 
perceived, namely schools and the education system, the state is able to impose its form of 
domination as their classifications go unchallenged. Consent to domination in Bourdieu’s 
conception of state authority is always already granted by the dominated because their 
habitus and understandings are produced by those structures that also constitute the state. 
To further achieve legitimation, the state also has recourse to violence to impose a 
particular vision of social reality.  
 In decentering symbolic power from its state centric vision, the armatures of the 
state to manage symbolic power fail to exist and therefore a divergent understanding of its 
operation need be developed. It should not be surprising that the concept of symbolic 
power, operating beyond the state-context from which it was developed should behave 
differently. Symbolic power in a state context, since it is wielded from within the structures 
that themselves structure the vision of common-sense reality, it is both invisible to those 
who are subject to it and those who exercise it (Bourdieu et al. 2003:164). However, in the 
case of the employment of PHEIC designations, I show that symbolic power, in operation 
beyond the nation state, is wielded consciously and also unconsciously. Certain scholarship 
regarding symbolic power manipulation in moments of crisis may also point to the 
conscious management of symbolic capitals (Reed 2015). The exercise of symbolic power, 
while potentially invisible to those beholden to the classifications that the WHO produces, 
only occurs through a rigorous analysis of the potential effects that the classification may 
have. 
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THE INTERVIEWS26 
 To understand the complexities of the deliberation process over the PHEIC 
designation, interviews were requested from members of the Emergency Committees of 
each outbreak that provoked a meeting, including those that did not produce PHEIC 
declarations. The members of each Emergency Committee are listed on the WHO website 
along with their biographies. Contact was attempted with every member of each committee 
for whom contact information was available27 via email and in more formal settings at 
Scientific Conferences. Interviews with those who responded to the request were carried 
out between January and August 2017. Particular priority was assigned to those members 
who have served on multiple committees as their experience with emergency committees 
spans several health emergencies. Through this period roughly 10% of all active committee 
members were interviewed. While this percentage may seem low, the focus of this research 
was not to survey the whole population on certain matters but rather to understand the 
process of designation and the considerations brought to bear on each issue. Sampling 
therefore prioritized representation of a distribution across emergency committees rather 
than a significant, clustered interview population. These data collected from interviews 
were supplemented by archival research conducted upon official WHO correspondence 
and documents collected at the WHO archives in Geneva as well as through their online 
                                               
26 See Appendix B for schedule of Interview Questions. 
27 This research was facilitated under an ethics review from the Boston University 
Internal Review Board. As part of its ethical criteria I am not permitted to interview 
elected officials for whom their comments may have proved potentially detrimental to 
their careers.  
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archive IRIS. All names and affiliations of interview subjects have been anonymized to 
protect the identities of interview subjects as per the conditions of the Boston University 
Internal Review Board.  
 In conducting interviews, particular attention was paid to the considerations that 
were brought to bear on the deliberations including any disputes that may have arisen 
within the emergency committees. A focus of these interviews was also the materiality of 
the meetings itself– how epidemiological data was conveyed to the committee members 
and how meetings were organized, coordinated and run. The reason for these foci is 
theoretically driven. In attempting to claim a level of scientific validity for this designation, 
Emergency Committee members are tasked with sifting the available disease surveillance 
information, exploring the possibilities for international disease spread in the context of 
global trade and travel. Scholarship in science and technology studies has often found that 
the localized practice of building scientific consensus is often obscured in the final 
presentation of findings (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Timmermans and Berg 1997). An 
attention to these details aimed to uncover these processes that may go under-examined in 
the final documents justifying the declaration or non-declaration of a PHEIC.  
DISEASE THREAT AND SYMBOLIC POWER 
It is the mandate of the International Health Regulations to “ensure the maximum 
security against the international spread of diseases with minimum interference with world 
traffic.” (World Health Organization 2008a). While each outbreak of a major agent could 
potentially trigger a PHEIC, every case is different, producing very different contexts from 
which to deliberate the scope of the threat. The IHR and Annex 2 of the regulations were 
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designed to acknowledge this. In addition to the designation, the Emergency Committee 
members have to acknowledge a variety of exogenous factors that produce secondary 
effects to the designation itself and end up modulating the decision making of the 
Committee. Central among these is the complex negotiation of the potential effects of the 
catalyzing power of the PHEIC designation itself which, as interview subjects will 
demonstrate, can have either beneficial or highly negative effects upon the ability to 
coordinate outbreak responses. Though the epidemiological, economic and political threats 
posed by an outbreak may represent their own health emergency in and of themselves, the 
application of the PHEIC designation produces second order externalities that transform 
the nature of the outbreak itself. In recognizing this, Emergency Committee members 
absorb these considerations and modulate their responses. The three key areas in which 
Emergency Committee members must anticipate these concerns are in relation to managing 
the potential responses of the global community to the threat of a potentially global 
outbreak, managing the economic fallout from the designation of a PHEIC and the 
management of media and information dissemination during times of outbreak. These are 
the modes through which Emergency Committee Members manage and manipulate the 
effects of symbolic power in order to effect different outcomes from actors at the sites of 
epidemic as well as their broader community of member states.  
Figure 4. Formal and Informal Considerations involved in Declaring PHEIC 
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Caption: (World Health Organization 2008a, 2010) 
Managing the Responses of the Global Community 
 While the mandate of the IHR is to control the spread of disease and minimize the 
effects on trade and travel, the WHO and Emergency Committee members must respond 
not only to the potential economic impact of an outbreak which may or may not increase 
the likelihood of a PHEIC designation but also recognize that the designation alters the 
global perspective on the outbreak. This may in some cases positively increase the levels 
of international response and cooperation or in some cases, may exacerbate the already 
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devastating epidemiological effects of outbreak. These concerns were central to the 
deliberations concerning the Yellow Fever outbreak concentrated in Angola and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.  
A member of the Yellow Fever Emergency Committee suggested that the effect of 
a PHEIC designation in response to the yellow fever outbreak would have limited the 
response capacity of the WHO to the outbreak. Though Yellow Fever is a preventable 
disease with a very effective vaccine, the scale of this urban outbreak, the largest of its kind 
in several decades, posed very serious concerns for the global vaccine supply. While mass 
vaccination was possible, it required supplies of stockpiled vaccines to be shifted to the 
site of outbreak in order to prevent high death rates as well as the possibility of further 
spread to Yellow Fever susceptible areas such as China, North America, South Asia and 
Europe. In Emergency Committee deliberations, the possibility of a PHEIC designation 
negatively affecting the ability to mobilize the vaccine supplies needed to carry out an 
effective response was a focus of discussion. 
“…Therefore if we introduce those things (mass vaccination campaigns) as West 
Africa did in those parts of Africa then we can actually reduce to a large extent the 
possibility of the spread of Yellow Fever. And if we know that anybody who has 
come into the endemic area gets themselves vaccinated before coming then the 
chances are somewhat more reduced. The alternative would have been to have 
declared a (PHEIC) and said “yes it is a public health emergency”. What would 
have happened would have been a cascade of activities in which many countries 
would now be asking for vaccines. Supposedly countries that don’t really need it 
would now be asking for vaccines and we are now in a state of vaccine shortage 
that would have compounded the issue. We would have not had enough vaccines 
to take care of DR Congo, Angola, and those other places and that would have left 
opportunities for the disease to spread. And those are the things that we looked at. 
In taking a position on that. Yes. It is an emergency, but it is not a PHEIC, and if 
we do what is right we can actually nip that in the bud.” (Yellow Fever Member 1) 
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This decision not to upgrade the Yellow Fever threat to a PHEIC in order to maximize 
access to the much-needed vaccines to combat the outbreak in the affected nations displays 
the symbolic power of the PHEIC designation to mobilize the international community into 
action. While that is exactly what it is actually designed for, the response of national actors 
to the invocation of a PHEIC can produce negative externalities that may harm efforts to 
control outbreaks as evidenced above. Instead, the WHO coordinated what amounted to 
one of the largest vaccination campaigns in modern history (Donald G. Jr 2016; World 
Health Organization 2016d) 
Conversely, the symbolic power of the PHEIC partially justified the maintenance 
of the designation in the context of the West African Ebola outbreak. Some have argued 
that the PHEIC designation in the West African Ebola case heightened the economic 
penalties incurred upon the main three countries affected due to border closures (Worsnop 
2017). However, the maintenance of the designation was also used as a signal to maintain 
vigilance in the waning months of the outbreak.  
 “Particularly at the end (of the epidemic). Should we lift the PHEIC? At what stage 
should we lift the PHEIC? Particularly to reopen the doors for travel and trade… 
But with respect to Travel and trade it’s always a big decision to declare a PHEIC. 
And in our case and you may recall we had a meeting just before the holidays, just 
before Christmas/new year and the epidemiological situation was pretty well 
improved then. And if we would have had to declare a new PHEIC at that stage, we 
probably would have decided no that’s not a PHEIC but if you already have a 
PHEIC it’s a question of if you terminate a PHEIC would then the people feel 
suddenly feel ok then it’s no longer an important health problem? No longer a 
public health concern of any value? And particularly with respect to the holidays 
we decided just to keep it on because we had some concerns that otherwise many 
people in the three countries affected as well and elsewhere as well possibly would 
just go on a vacation and say "ok now it’s over, we don't need to deal with it." And 
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so if you may recall we continued with the PHEIC until early March.” (Ebola 
Committee Member 1). 
In the case of the diminution of the Ebola threat, the risk of complacency, brought on in 
part from seasonal holidays prompted a longer PHEIC period than was necessarily 
medically required. While the medical threat had diminished, it was the power of the 
designation itself that prolonged a heightened state of vigilance towards the outbreak itself.  
 PHEIC designations carry with them a powerful geopolitical weight that in and of 
themselves structure how the international community may respond to threat affecting the 
epidemiological course of outbreak. The classification of Yellow Fever as a PHEIC would 
have, in the eyes of the Emergency Committee, produced negative outcomes that would 
have hindered the public health mission. Conversely the removal of the PHEIC designation 
for Ebola at the natural decline of the epidemic could have produced a secondary epidemic 
due to a lapse in health practices as a result of the lowering of the PHEIC.  
PHEIC and its Economic Effects 
 A particularly challenging role for the Emergency Committee to navigate is that of 
managing the economic effects of outbreak. A central consideration of a PHEIC 
designation is the potential risk to trade and traffic of a particular threat. This can in and of 
itself produce the designation. Historically, international epidemics have been 
economically disastrous for the nations affected as other countries embargo products and 
institute travel bans prohibiting the movement of people (Harrison 2013; Worsnop 2017). 
These effects compound the human devastation wrought by such events. While the PHEIC 
provides a powerful signal to the global community to divert resources to the outbreak, 
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often this designation may also elicit trade and border responses on the part of the WHO 
member nations. One of the actions that the WHO may take upon designating a PHEIC is 
to instruct nations to open or close borders. However, with no enforcement or sanctioning 
power, the WHO must leverage the power of the PHEIC effectively so as to produce the 
most effective responses from their member nations. This places the Emergency 
Committee members in a difficult position of having to manage the concerns for the nations 
affected and the wider economic community while also anticipating the actions of other 
nations that may act to secure their borders.  
“Yeah well you see, different countries react differently to PHEIC. I think... let me 
tell you where I am coming from... I look at it as each country has a right to protect 
its own people if there is an epidemic going on somewhere else. And there is an 
initial reaction that I don’t want to bring people in from somewhere else because 
that could become a problem in my country…The country that cares about its 
people will want to do whatever it needs to do to ensure that nothing comes into the 
country. While the signs of it may not be right, the first reaction is exception- what 
is the easiest way of not getting diseases in my country? It’s not to go where the 
disease is. So don’t bring in people from there. And they have the facilities to 
quarantine or do whatever but suppose those people escape my quarantine? So we 
must give into the countries themselves, they have a right to first of all consider 
their people. That was the point and that was the point I had to tell my colleagues 
there that if we fail to do what is right and countries decide to do what they think is 
right for themselves, you can't blame them. If we discover we are not able to curb 
our epidemics and become international then we must pay for whatever decision. 
This is a personal opinion. I know what the international organization (WHO) says 
but at the same time I think we need to balance that. Countries have a right to protect 
themselves by whatever means they can. There are many international regulations 
that have been broken today. What is anybody doing about it? When you look at 
international regulations there are also national concerns and that’s why I feel very 
strongly that before an issue becomes an international concern countries themselves 
must look at it as if it is a national concern and do something about that.” (MERS-
CoV Member 1) 
This particular issue, in attempting to anticipate the responses of nations to PHEIC’s is 
made more complex by the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the IHR. Unlike the 
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regulations overseen by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Organization for 
Animal Health (OIE) which have significant sanction and enforcement mechanisms, the 
WHO relies upon international pressure from its member nations and good faith to assert 
its recommendations. For this reason, the practice of navigating the effect of a PHEIC 
designation requires a complex calculus that mediates whether or not to declare a PHEIC.  
“Well, they (WHO) say the rules are that determines... for example they talk about 
that if a foreign epidemic is going on in place, you should not ban travel, you should 
not ban commerce and industry but then you remember, with animal diseases for 
example, if my country has the foot and mouth disease, and I'm exporting meat to 
your country, the rule also says I cannot because, you want to protect your own 
animal population and therefore, that’s why I think the OIE, is a little more 
aggressive, more realistic than what the human side is talking about. If you have 
foot and mouth disease, you have rhinderpest, you’re automatically banned from 
exporting disease from another country. It’s there in their regulations. Although 
you can’t compare animals to humans but we are talking about similar economic 
things and things of that nature. And your cost by not doing your duty is exposing 
me to danger and it’s also an economic issue.” (MERS-CoV Member 1) 
This matter became central to the justifications to declare a PHEIC in response to Ebola in 
West Africa. However, the capacity of the WHO and the Emergency Committee to put 
pressure upon nations implementing travel bans was limited.  
“And we have seen that particularly in the United States and also in Caribbean 
countries and also some others by the way where there was an overreaction, which 
had a negative impact on travel and trade… That was certainly not helpful. Neither 
to the global community, nor to the persons involved and particularly not to the 
three countries involved. As until now they do have some handicaps and they got 
stigmatized…We had actually before and after the meeting [1st Ebola Emergency 
Committee Meeting] a prolonged discussion on how we should try to convince 
those nations to abandon the unnecessary and illogical measures. The problem was 
that very often these for instance small Caribbean nations would not even reply to 
requests of the WHO. And when the WHO sent more and more urging notes that 
they should immediately reply and they should immediately act well there was just 
no action. And that was truly frustrating. So some of us tried through personal 
connections to contact people in these nations to try and convince them but very 
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often we found out that there was just a basic fundamental non-scientific fear that 
Ebola could be introduced.” (Ebola Committee Member 1).  
This challenge of limiting the economic effects of epidemic are particularly acute for the 
WHO, an organization without the level of direct enforcement power as other global 
entities. Where the PHEIC designation for Ebola emerged in part to reduce the scale of the 
economic effects to the three affected West African nations the outbreak continued to 
provoke trade and travel controls at ports of entry around the world (Worsnop 2017). As 
recent conversations on IHR reform have been reticent to consider giving the WHO more 
enforcement capacity it is unlikely that this particular phenomenon, affecting the 
deliberations of the Emergency Committee will be resolved soon (Kamradt-Scott 2016; 
World Health Organization 2015b). 
PHEIC as Global Signal 
A final critical mode through which the symbolic power of a PHEIC operates, in 
addition to driving international resources, providing technical support and coordination 
and trade and travel advisories is in the more ersatz realm as information disseminator and 
signaling. A PHEIC represents a marker to the global community that a major outbreak is 
occurring and that the world should take notice (Lucey D and Gostin LO 2016). In many 
cases the convening of an Emergency Committee in and of itself attracts greater global 
interest to the outbreak and thereby conveys the seriousness of a threat. The importance of 
knowledge dissemination and the ability of the WHO to craft the narrative around the 
disease are critical to the future success and implementation of an effective response to a 
PHEIC. Both the declaration of a PHEIC and the convening of Emergency Committee 
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meetings are critical tools which the WHO use strategically to elicit support and coordinate 
responses to these outbreaks. Emergency Committee members are acutely aware of the 
historical role that media and information plays in these outbreak scenarios.  
“Well I think any time you can one of these events and make it known to the general 
public then they feel interested. And I think that then facilitates, or makes it easier 
for governments to contribute funds and resources. Not just money but technical 
support as well. Now that said, that was already in place before the press really got 
involved but I think as it became more and more apparent that these where global 
issues of international importance and they were being talked about in the national 
press literally around the world, I think political leaders saw this and I think part of 
this is why the Europeans actually got that much more involved because they saw 
that they had resources they'd invested in their own scientific, technical capabilities 
they wanted to be sure that they were participating in these outbreaks as well. And 
there is a long history of some scientific and medical centers collaborating on the 
research. The original discovery of Ebola for example was an international 
partnership as well. As these became more common knowledge to the general 
public and the politicians it was easier for governments to play a larger role in 
supporting their institutions.” (Ebola Committee Member 2). 
In the case of the Zika Microcephaly outbreak concentrated in South America, a disease 
for which there was at the time of the PHEIC designation very little knowledge, the 
effective dissemination of information by highlighting the threat proved a critical 
component of the response itself.  
“The WHO took immediate action compared to other epidemics we have had 
before. And I mean one thing is very little was known about Zika before and the 
other thing is at least with public, with those kinds of meetings we are creating 
public awareness and that I hope helped a lot to keep the world alert of an 
impending epidemic, or rather pandemic.” (Zika Microcephaly Committee Member 
1) 
In the deliberations over Ebola, the role of the PHEIC in effectively driving awareness of 
the disease was both critical and unique to the disease itself. As it was both deadly and 
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incurable at the time, a wide, accurate public understanding of how the virus spreads was 
central to effective health responses. 
“Imagine if Ebola had spread into Nigeria. It would have been more disastrous. And 
I think the situation in Nigeria– let’s look at it. While Nigeria did what was right 
there was also the element of luck. The guy who brought Ebola into Nigeria actually 
fell sick at the airport and he collapsed at the airport and therefore was seen almost 
immediately on arrival. At that time when he came the hospitals were closed 
because they were on strike. And so he didn’t go into a public hospital he went to 
a private hospital. But when you look at what happened in the private hospital we 
still had a risk of the hospital staff getting infected. When they saw that he was 
coming from an Ebola country that proper steps be taken, not waiting three or four 
days before we began to suspect it was Ebola. So it is through that fear which we 
learned that a lot of African diseases follow the same pattern (as Ebola. The first 
thing you think of is malaria fever and other diseases. So given that maybe the 
awareness or quick response to certain exotic or dangerous diseases have not been 
brought online it was necessary to have a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern so people’s awareness would have gone up. And remember for Ebola we 
didn’t have the vaccine we didn’t have a drug so it would have been more difficult, 
if you’re going to have epidemic spread I suppose it’s possible around the world. 
So I feel the emergency was justified.” (Ebola Committee Member 3). 
The power of the PHEIC as a signal to the global community to take notice, which focuses 
attention upon the actions and expertise of the WHO is a critical component of disease 
responses. The employment of the rhetorical power of both the PHEIC and Emergency 
Committee meetings allow the WHO to construct and control the narrative and technical 
information about an outbreak, dismissing rumors or conjecture in exchange for a clarified 
message. As a result, the PHEIC designation and the process that forms it itself drastically 
affects the nature of the outbreak going forward.  
CONCLUSION 
 While scholarship illustrates the symbolic power of classifications to maintain 
institutional power (Bowker and Star 1999; Timmermans and Berg 1997), this work 
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demonstrates the ways in which those in charge of designating such classifications 
consciously manage this power in order to affect desired global health outcomes. In doing 
so, this work expands upon Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power beyond the bounds of 
the nation-state and shows how it operates in contexts outside of such. The PHEIC 
designation is a classification of the highest international disease threat. Declared by the 
Director General of the WHO under the advisement of Emergency Committees established 
on a case-by-case basis, the PHEIC designation grants the WHO authority to manage and 
centrally coordinate outbreak responses between the nations affected, international 
organizations and their member nations. It also provides greater authority for the WHO to 
make temporary recommendations on travel guidance and trade restrictions. These formal 
aspects of the PHEIC fit broadly within the mandate of the IHR to maximize the prevention 
of infectious disease across borders while minimizing the risks to trade and traffic.  
 However, beyond the explicit parameters of the PHEIC classification structure lies 
a far more complex matrix of decision-making and concerns that operate in conjunction to 
any epidemiological knowledge of an outbreak. These structure the deliberations of WHO 
Emergency Committees and affect how PHEIC’s are themselves designated. This chapter 
explored the ways in which the PHEIC designation itself, as a signal and through its effect 
on outbreak responses conditions the possibility of declaring a PHEIC. The designation of 
a PHEIC, while acting as a powerful signal to the global community to respond to a 
universal risk, also has the power to limit and weaken responses, thereby affecting the 
epidemiological course of outbreak. In the case of the Yellow Fever outbreak located 
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primarily in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the potential fallout of vaccine 
stockpiling, driven by the increased threat level of a PHEIC would have made it more 
difficult to carry out effective health campaigns. Alternately, the de-escalation of the Ebola 
PHEIC designation provoked concern that a too rapid decline in epidemiological vigilance 
could provoke a secondary outbreak. The economic effects of outbreaks may also be 
compounded or alleviated by the PHEIC designation. As the WHO has no major 
enforcement authority with respect to the IHR or the implementation of PHEIC 
recommendations, the manner which the Emergency Committee and Director General 
respond to the PHEIC designation produces significant effects upon this aspect of epidemic 
control. Finally, the PHEIC can also be wielded deftly as a powerful signaling tool to the 
larger world, allowing for ease of resource acquisition to fight outbreak while also 
coordinating the global message and technological knowledge about a disease. The PHEIC 
designation, given the authority it conveys to the WHO and the weight it holds on the 
global stage often makes the negotiation of its effects on outbreak response unwieldy.  
 This constellation of secondary considerations surrounding the WHO’s highest 
international threat designation shows the ways in which the spheres of the social, 
economic and medical world are less distinct but rather co-constitutive of one another. The 
PHEIC designation is the most powerful tool in the WHO’s arsenal for compelling the 
nations of the world to act in a manner they most desire. These modulate the classification 
of what is on its surface an epidemiological decision presided over by public health experts. 
The fusing of health concerns with diplomatic and economic concerns is not novel in the 
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history of infectious disease responses (Collier and Lakoff 2013; Harrison 2013; Packard 
2011). However, understanding the contours by which a disease meets the conditions of a 
Public Health Emergency of International Concern demonstrates the lingering 
interconnections that these factors play in the production of scientific consensus around 
outbreaks and how they govern global health action against potentially devastating 
outbreaks. 
  
  
212 
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS 
 
“It [cholera] extends into the Far East, in the Gulf Bengal, Burma, Indo-China, the 
treaties of China, Korea, Japan, and all the coast of the seas of China, as far as 
Wladivostock. In recent years, it has been raging in Iraq-Arabia, Mesopotamia, 
Persia, Syria, Arabia (Mecca) and Africa (Massawa). The economic 
transformations that are on the entire surface of the African continent, will further 
aggravate the danger. So the question of the defense of Europe against the cholera 
always stands with a pressing interest and a fearful actuality. The aim of our efforts 
is to intercept all direct communication between the contaminated provenances of 
the Far East on one side; Egypt, the Mediterranean and Europe, on the other.” 
(Proust 1892) 
 
“Therefore when the Additional regulations come into force, it is possible that the 
countries or areas which fall into the yellow-fever endemic zone may not be 
declared as infected local areas, or may subsequently be declared as free from 
infection after a period of three months has elapsed… The periods now prescribed 
for determining freedom from yellow-fever infection are too short… The 
information provided in this publication indicates that, year after year, yellow fever 
is a constant and continuous problem in various parts of Latin America. Secondly 
the possibility of a person getting out of a jungle area, leaving by plane and arriving 
at an airport in a receptive area within the incubation period, has always to be borne 
in mind.” (Reservations of the Government of Ceylon, Committee on International 
Quarantine 1956:2) 
 
“Well… I believe all the pillars (of the IHR) are important. However, I think that 
the most important is the detection (of infectious outbreaks) of which a number of 
the middle and low-income countries have no capacity. Because if they could… 
most of the countries have infectious disease surveillance and in sub-Saharan 
Africa particularly of which I know better, they have adopted the WHO, what 
they call the integrated disease surveillance and response strategy. And this 
requires reporting of notifiable diseases, Diseases of International Public Health 
Concern within 24 hours of when they occur. But with that kind of 
epidemiological surveillance system they should be able to use that information to 
predict outbreaks before they occur. But we find that most of these developing 
countries do not even utilize the data they collect. And therefore, most of the 
epidemics are their own fault. By the time they realize this is an important public 
health event a number of casualties have been reported. So I think that detection 
to me is the most important pillar of regulations.” (Member of the Zika 
Microcephaly Emergency Committee) 
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 These three quotes, taken from three different eras of disease control highlight the 
enduring belief of the field: international sanitary security is premised upon the control and 
surveillance of people who once felt the grip of empire, the colonial subjects, now the 
decolonized peoples of the world. This, epidemic orientalism is the binding logic of this 
particular domain of global health, its legacies evident in the language and strategies of the 
modern day International Health Regulations.  
 This dissertation has endeavored to pursue the power dynamics, the ideologies and 
effects of disease control in order to better understand how diseases are responded to, why, 
and how these factors affect the social constructions of illness. Why do some diseases 
engender vastly different responses from others? Why do certain diseases become global 
threats and not others? The historical responses to international epidemic diseases 
demonstrates the manifold ways by which global economic and political power, and 
epidemiological knowledge and data combine to effect divergent understandings of 
diseases based on their relationships with each of these domains. Epidemics have been a 
priority of international cooperation for over 150 years. First dependent on methods of 
colonial governance and totalizing surveillance upon populations for their successful 
implementation, the International Sanitary Conventions sought to free the engines of trade 
and travel from the threat of diseases most devastating to their expansion. Producing unique 
and powerful forms of control in sites of outbreak, from the first urban township, to mass 
fingerprinting and quarantine, the vision for disease control laid out in these first 
conventions largely protected Europe from plague, cholera and yellow fever for over half 
a century. As the authority for the International Sanitary Conventions shifted to the WHO, 
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the focus on disciplining the spaces and people at sites of outbreak emerged in an attempt 
to replicate those same systems of control. As these practices failed to confront new 
challenges, the WHO sought to reclaim its authority over international disease control by 
establishing a global network of disease surveillance that positioned itself as the arbiter of 
disease risk. It mobilizes that authority today, predicated on the surveillance of postcolonial 
subjects in order to assess the risk of Public Health Emergencies of International Concern. 
Through the mobilization of its power, it conditions the nations of the world and other 
international actors to operate according to its intentions as best it can within a field that 
sees disease control as predicated upon the management of the same populations that once 
bore the brunt of the controls under the Trans-Imperial Health Apparatus.  
 As with every research and theoretical undertaking there are limitations to this 
work. More work should still be done to explore how this field of infectious disease control 
operates in the constellation of other global health responses and actors. Further, a lack of 
data on the activities of disease control during a contemporary outbreak limits the ability 
to explore how these practices of threat designation produce lived effects upon those at the 
site of epidemic. This limitation precipitates what I see to be the greatest weakness of this 
work. While I hope to have successfully examined the gears and mechanisms that turn 
behind the eyes of power, there is little examination of the experience of those under this 
gaze. There are stories of those affected by these diseases, who are at the whim of these 
responses that are unacknowledged in this dissertation and deserve exposure. These stories 
would suggest how, those at the center of outbreak redefine diseases for themselves or 
reconstitute these dominant social constructions to shift their perspective (Decoteau 2013). 
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The contrasting impositions of these dynamics would be a fruitful area of further study in 
one of these cases.  
 From a theoretical perspective this work expands upon the studies of international 
fields. Demonstrating how symbolic power may act beyond the role of states and amongst 
a heterogeneous field of actors, this case demonstrates how international organizations 
coerce nations and their member states to act. In exploring how fields develop, the 
historical character of this research also provides an avenue to understanding how colonial 
practices, existent prior to the emergence of a field, shape its organization.  
 This work is significant as it highlights the power dynamics and processes at work 
behind the seemingly bloodless and rational actions of medicine to make determinations 
outside of the bounds of the natural. This research contests the bifurcation of the natural 
and the social that is so often taken for granted, as common-sense in academic settings as 
well as by health practitioners. Race science, imperial greed, military might and 
xenophobia have all guided at different times, the construction of disease risk and 
produced, through these constructions, drastically different and punitive responses to 
outbreaks. In other settings, the threats of disease have been downplayed in order not to 
trigger these same modes of control and to produce effective disease responses, as is the 
case with the Yellow Fever outbreak in West Africa several years ago. What connects all 
of the cases, in this work, as highlighted in the quotes beginning this chapter, is the 
dominant belief that in order to protect the sanitized world from the ‘unsanitary’, a constant 
eye must be focused upon the activities and practices of the people for whom these 
regulations were never designed to protect in the first place. This work along with a much 
  
216 
more distinguished and long list of others demonstrates the enduring power of imperial 
practice and logics to cleave the world for the benefit of some overall. The practice of 
surveillance has exposed the dynamics whereby those seeking protection from infectious 
disease are separated from those from whom they are to be protected. Disease surveillance 
is critically important. Knowing which diseases occur and where, is critical to their 
prevention but how surveillance data is used, and in whose service, is where the harm is 
done.  
 This is not to say that some good has not come from the modern systems of disease 
control. While contested and perhaps too late, the declaration of a PHEIC during the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa coordinated a vast array of resources and saved many lives. The 
declaration of the Zika virus PHEIC exposed the horror of a disease, long thought harmless 
and generated knowledge and funding to halt the disease. I have seen doctors choke back 
tears while presenting scientific papers at major conferences, the human cost of their data 
visible on their faces. This dissertation is not proscriptive but I can confidently suggest that 
without a recognition of epidemic orientalism, I cannot imagine we will become more 
effective in preventing the devastation, or mistakes caused by epidemic outbreaks if the 
current structures remain unchanged.  
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APPENDIX A. 
 
Appendix A. Signatories to the Venice International Sanitary Convention of 1897 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands 
Empire of Germany 
Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary 
The Kingdom of Belgium 
The Kingdom of Spain 
The French Republic 
The United Kingdom and British Empire 
The Kingdom of Greece 
The Kingdom of Italy 
The Duchy of Luxembourg 
The Principality of Montenegro 
The Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarve 
The Empire of Russia 
The Kingdom of Romania 
The Kingdom of Serbia 
The Swiss Federation 
The Ottoman Empire 
The Persian Empire 
All data from text of original Venice International Sanitary Convention of 1897 (Mayor 
et al. 1897) 
APPENDIX B 
 
SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DETERMINATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE RISK 
 
Broad, Biographic And Overview Questions 
1. What was the process for applying or obtaining membership to the Emergency 
Committee? 
2. What activities made you an effective candidate for these positions? 
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3. Which Emergency Committees have you served on? 
4. How many Emergency Committees have you served on (in case of multiple)? 
5. Why did you serve on the particular committee for which you were chosen? 
6. Over the last few years, questions have been raised as to whether the Director 
General should have the authority to decide a PHEIC. Where do you stand on this 
issue? 
7. What do you see as the value of the PHEIC designation? 
8. What does the PHEIC allow the WHO to do?  
9. What are the benefits and limitations of the PHEIC? 
Disease Specific Questions 
1. What sort of arguments was raised for and against the determination of a Public 
health emergency of international Concern (PHEIC)? 
2. (If served on particular EC) Why do you feel that Yellow Fever should not have 
received the PHEIC designation? 
3. (If served on particular EC) Why do you feel that MERS-COV should not have 
received the PHEIC designation? 
4. Do you think that Yellow Fever in other situations would qualify as a PHEIC? 
Under what sort of conditions? 
5. How do you find countries respond to the designation?  
a. Is this a factor you take into account in the deliberation process? 
Emergency Committee Practices 
1. How do emergency committee meetings proceed?  
2. How is disease surveillance information transferred to you?  
3. What aspects of the Annex 2 algorithm do you focus upon? 
4. What is the value of the Emergency committee as a tool? 
5. What are your thoughts on the post-Ebola recommendations for the International 
Health Regulations? 
6. Why do certain outbreaks require more Emergency Committee meetings than 
others? 
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